Sept 11, Dec 13: Pak dates with policy change

Musharraf’s U-turn on Afghanistan should have been accompanied by a change in other aspects of Pakistani policy. The key to becoming part of a new order would have been a new approach towards relations with India in general and resolving Kashmir in particular.

Husain Haqqani

IF September 11 was a defining moment in America’s commitment towards rooting out terror, December 13 could define India’s response to militancy in the days to come.

The brazen attack on the Parliament building in New Delhi will most likely lead to stronger counter-insurgency measures than have so far been adopted. The Government might heed calls for ‘‘hot pursuit’’ of alleged terrorists, possibly across the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, notwithstanding the dangers accompanying such a move.

In any case, General Pervez Musharraf has repeatedly made a distinction between the Line of Control and Pakistan’s international border with India in efforts to reject Indian charges of cross border terrorism. India will now argue that if Pakistan cannot control mujahideen crossing over the line of control, it should not stop India from attacking them even if that entails action across that line.

Having supported the US right to bomb Afghanistan in pursuit of terrorists, Pakistan will now be in a difficult position to deal with India’s reaction. Just as the US rejected demands for evidence against Osama bin Laden, saying its intelligence reports were enough, India will identify its target of retaliation on the basis of its own intelligence. Both India and Pakistan could avoid a confrontation by cooperating in the anti-terrorist effort. But that requires a paradigm shift that neither country appears prepared for at the moment.

Pakistan has not benefited much from joining the US-led coalition against terrorism. This poses no problem for those of us who saw the war against terrorism as a moral issue. From our point of view, terrorism is wrong and Pakistan should have supported the global effort against terrorism without calculating gains and losses. But General Pervez Musharraf sought support for his decision to cooperate with the United States on grounds of future political and economic benefits. With this prospect looking thin on the ground, the general and his team need a new justification for their decisions.

Paul Knox of the Toronto Globe and Mail summed up the situation in a recent column. ‘‘The United States hailed Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf as a man of courage when he signed on to the fight against Osama bin Laden and Afghanistan’s Taliban regime in September,’’ he wrote. ‘‘But with the battle in its final stages, General Musharraf has ended up at a disadvantage on the political chessboard. He has few allies in the interim Afghan government that was fashioned out of anti-Taliban opposition groups last week. He has not won political support for pro-Pakistani independence groups fighting against Indian rule in Kashmir. And he has not been able to counter the strengthening of US relations with India, Pakistan’s traditional rival for influence in the region and its adversary in a nuclear standoff.’’

‘‘Well, he got $1-billion,’’ Knox quotes Ashok Kapur, political scientist and specialist on South Asian politics at the University of Waterloo in Ontario as saying. Of course, Pakistan will get the $1-billion in aid promised by President Bush last month. Last week, the International Monetary Fund announced a $1.32-billion poverty-alleviation loan — part of $9.5-billion that has been promised to cushion the effects of the Afghan war. But in return, General Musharraf abandoned Pakistan’s traditional Islamic allies and has failed to reorient Pakistan’s foreign policy to benefit fully from joining the US-led coalition.

According to Professor Kapur, ‘‘We are looking at a picture of fundamental realignment at the international level, where the US, India, Israel and Russia seem to be coming together on a variety of issues and poor Pakistan is left out in the cold.’’ Musharraf’s only substantive benefit may have been that he gained legitimacy for himself and his government, as J N Dixit, former Ambassador to Kabul and Islamabad pointed out in an article in this newspaper.

Pakistan has little to celebrate about the new interim government in Afghanistan. Two of the triumvirate of Northern Alliance leaders now playing key roles Younus Qanooni, Abdullah Abdullah and Mohammed Qasim Fahim — have visited India. The alliance clearly remains concerned about Pakistan’s stance towards them. When Islamabad maintained diplomatic relations with the Taliban, New Delhi supported the alliance. The Indians have also managed to cultivate the 30,000 Afghan refugees living in their country and Qanooni, Abdullah and other Afghan leaders have families there.

General Musharraf’s spinmeisters seek solace in the selection of Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun living in Pakistan for two decades, as head of the interim government. But even he was educated in India and can best be described as favourably disposed towards both India and Pakistan.

General Musharraf’s U-turn on Afghanistan should have been accompanied by a swift change in other aspects of policy as well. Support for the Taliban, tolerance of jihadis, and rejection of consensus politics at home were all results of a worldview that was shattered after the WTC attacks. So far, he has embraced change only in part. He allied himself to the US in the destruction of the Taliban but is unwilling to change other elements of that shattered worldview. The key to becoming part of a new order would have been a new approach towards relations with India, in general, and resolving the Kashmir dispute, in particular. Pakistan and the Kashmiri people have a legitimate case that can be pursued in the political arena, without the stigma of militancy and militarism.

If General Musharraf wants to make the most of the new, difficult situation facing Pakistan, he will have to accept a diminished role for Pakistan’s military establishment in making policy. Since 1958, the military establishment has insisted on its right to define national interest, instead of limiting itself to its duty of defending it. ‘National interest’ has included confrontation with India and the exclusion from effective political power of civilians with a mind of their own. Perhaps it is time for a more extensive U-turn than the one taken so far.

(The writer served as adviser to Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto and as Pakistan’s Ambassador to Sri Lanka)