War clouds and Pakistan’s shadow

Husain Haqqani

India and Pakistan appear once again to be on the brink of war. The arrest of the chief of Jamaat Al-Dawa, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, who until recently headed Lashkar-e-Taiba has been welcomed by New Delhi as ‘‘a step in the right direction’’. But India seeks a complete end to all Pakistan-based activities in Kashmir. India’s list of demands may not be one that General Pervez Musharraf can easily fulfil.

The people of Pakistan have been told until now that the jihad in Kashmir is a freedom struggle, and even General Musharraf has called the jihadis ‘‘freedom fighters’’ in the past. The sudden turn-around, involving the arrest of Islamic leaders who were projected as being respectable in Pakistani society, can only cause further erosion of support for General Musharraf’s regime. By bringing issues to a head, under the threat of war, India is seeking to influence the course of events inside Pakistan in a manner it has not done since 1971.

Prime Minister Vajpayee’s government mobilised troops before trying diplomacy on grounds of Pakistan’s perceived failure in living up to its commitments in the past. New Delhi appears to have calculated that brinkmanship and the threat of war will yield better results for India by diminishing or undercutting Pakistan’s military might. According to the Indian calculus, General Musharraf’s government would almost certainly fall if Pakistan lost a limited war. In case the military build-up continues and General Musharraf is forced to back down, his position as Pakistan’s strongman will be seriously compromised. India seems to realise that a civilian government in Pakistan is better from its perspective than a military regime.

The possibility of either side (most likely Pakistan) using tactical nuclear weapons to compensate for failures in a conventional military campaign cannot be completely ruled out. In addition to the spectre of nuclear conflict, an India-Pakistan war at this juncture could seriously affect the US-led campaign against terrorism. But Washington has found in the past that Pakistan is more amenable to its prodding while India plans its moves in the region with less deference to US concerns.

President George Bush has called upon India to exercise restraint while demanding stronger action by President General Pervez Musharraf, against the Jihadi groups. Ironically, Pakistan is now arresting Islamic militants accused by India of involvement in the December 13 attack after initially having rejected the demand for their arrest on grounds of insufficient evidence. Even now, the arrests have been made not on charges of terrorism (as India demands) but for objectionable speeches or undesirable political activity.

Both Pakistan and India say they do not want a war but are prepared for one. Pakistan’s leadership has privately expressed the view that war is unlikely, though that could be wishful thinking rather than accurate analysis.

In a showdown involving conventional warfare, Pakistan would probably be at a disadvantage. Its military has received no new weapons from the United States in a decade. Indigenously manufactured weapons and arms supplied by China might not be sufficient to effectively ward off an attack by India, which has been buying modern weapons on the international market from a variety of sources. Pakistani generals say they can effectively fight off an Indian attack and inflict considerable damage on the larger neighbour. But the Pakistani nation has not been fully mobilised and political differences tear it apart, as was visible during General Musharraf’s recent meeting with the country’s politicians. With the religious political groups under pressure, and recrimination with mainstream politicians continuing, the domestic situation is not as conducive as those in the ruling circles assume. The military imbalance between India and Pakistan raises the prospect of reliance on nuclear deterrence by Pakistan.

WAR, even if limited to skirmishes in Kashmir, would severely damage the economies of both nations. The last time the two countries fought each other during the Kargil conflict of 1999, their stock markets dipped and foreign investors were frightened away. South Asia is already one of the world’s poorest regions. Military conflict, and even a prolonged cold war, can only add to its economic problems.

Pakistan’s decision to ban the two jihadi groups accused by India of attacking its Parliament, and the arrest of their leaders, was initially described by New Delhi as ‘‘too little, too late’’ though subsequent pronouncements from the Vajpayee government say ‘‘it is a step in the right direction’’. The world’s leaders, including President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, have spoken to General Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee to try and defuse the situation. But on ground there is no sign that India will stand down or Pakistan will meet all of India’s demands.

The mood in India after the Parliament attack is unsympathetic to dialogue with Pakistan. But the Indian leadership must understand that it is simply not possible to ‘‘eliminate’’ or ‘‘liquidate’’ a neighbour with nuclear weapons without massive cost. At a time when extremists are on the run globally, and Pakistan is an important ally of the United States, India’s insistence on rubbing Pakistan’s nose in the ground would be counter-productive. Not only would it impair Pakistan’s ability to cooperate in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan, it could even give a boost to the Pakistani militants.

Conflict with India tends to unite Pakistanis. If General Musharraf’s regime is seen as acting under Indian duress, support for the militants opposing him could increase. General Musharraf’s refusal to expand his support base beyond the military makes his domestic position somewhat precarious. While supporting General Musharraf in his efforts against Islamic extremists, the US needs to ensure that it can count on help from the entire Pakistani nation and not just its military leader. For that reason, the US must not give up on pushing Pakistan towards democracy and constitutional rule. It is important to note that India and Pakistan have managed to avoid war whenever Islamabad has had a civilian government.

Pakistan needs to root out extremism and evolve as a functioning democracy for its own sake, not only to fulfill Indian and US demands. But India must also wake up to the fact that it will continue to have a Kashmir problem even after the current militancy there is brought under control. Sooner or later, India will have to discuss the future of Jammu and Kashmir, both with the people of the state and with Pakistan. Why not do it now, so that a comprehensive solution to South Asia’s security problems can be implemented?

(The writer served as adviser to Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto and as Pakistan’s Ambassador to Sri Lanka)