Who's afraid of Bush?

George Bush’s lack of interest in the CTBT, and therefore his inclination to accept India’s nuclear weaponisation, will give India more space to negotiate this issue

After a month of uncertainty and legal controversy, George W. Bush has at last been declared the president-elect of the US. Prime Minister Vajpayee was prompt in sending him a congratulatory message on December 14 itself, stating: ‘‘I recall our telephone conversation during my visit to the US in September this year and appreciate the sentiments you expressed about a close and strong partnership between our two countries. The new warmth and vibrancy that has been introduced into Indo-US relations has popular support across the political spectrum in both our countries.’’

There are two points of conventional wisdom bandied about in relation to Bush’s advent to power. The first is that Democrat presidencies have been good for Indo-US ties compared to Republican presidencies; the second is that Bush does not have much experience or interest in foreign affairs, and therefore he is not likely to have a foreign policy vision beyond the immediate strategic and foreign policy priorities which are brought to his notice by his advisers.

Neither of these assessments is entirely accurate. Indo-US relations were not terribly good or substantive during the Truman and Carter administrations, both Democrat. Though President Kennedy gave prompt help to India during its military debacle against the Chinese in 1962, he was not terribly impressed with Jawaharlal Nehru’s persona and his vision of a world order. Indeed, it is only towards the end of Bill Clinton’s second term that there was a qualitative improvement in Indo-US relations, which have been described in Vajpayee’s message to Bush as the new warmth and vibrancy that have been introduced. The point being made is that there is no validity in the assessment that Democrat administrations are more friendly towards India than Republican ones. The interaction between governments in the US and India has been influenced by perceived national interests, by political, economic, strategic and security considerations. There was, of course, the undercurrent of ideological complexes of the US rooted in the Cold War which affected its perceptions about India. That this undercurrent is no longer a factor is an over-arching and positive development.

As for as the assessment of Bush Jr not being knowledgeable about and
interested in foreign relations, this is an anticipatory value judgement which will not remain valid or relevant as he progresses in his presidency.

Before speculating on what Bush’s foreign policies would be, it would be relevant to mention what the major foreign policy concerns of the new US administration would be. First and foremost, the Bush administration would desire to enhance, consolidate and sustain the US’s over-arching influence in international affairs. This objective has to be met to sustain its economic prosperity and technological and productive capacities. Bush’s public pronouncements during his campaign indicate that he will be more assertive about nurturing US strategic, military and technological capacities, particularly in relation to China and to a lesser extent vis-a-vis Russia. He does not appear to be an internationalist in the conventional sense of the term. His foreign, economic and strategic policies would be centered on the primary interests of the US. One can expect a duality in US nuclear non-proliferation policies under Bush. He is already on record that he is not in favour of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

But he has reiterated his commitment to furthering the cause of non-proliferation amongst non-nuclear weapons states. His administration is likely to be more active in utilising WTO mechanisms to generate pressure on western Europe and on countries like India on issues of special economic interest to the US.

Given the ethos of the Republican Party, the new US administration would be a more active advocate of liberalisation and privatisation and of free market prescriptions to structure the world economic order. It is reasonable to expect that the Bush administration would use issues like human rights, environment and multilateralism more as instruments of US foreign policy than as causes to pursue devotedly. It is on the basis of this matrix that the US will structure its policies towards India, and South Asia as a whole.

In his election campaign Bush has given some specific indications about his policies towards India which merit recall. He stated that if he were elected he would be in favour of immediately lifting all sanctions against India. This view meshes in with his lack of interest in the CTBT and therefore his inclination to generally accept India’s nuclear and missile weaponisation, though he may not endorse it. His administration will continue to argue in favour of India pulling back from its nuclear weaponisation programme but it would be more in the nature of advice within the framework of the US’s global non-proliferation policies rather than an exercise of direct bilateral pressure. This will give India more political space to negotiate this issue with the US.

Bush has stated that the US has often overlooked the great land mass lying to the south of Eurasia in its strategic calculations. He has asserted that the US should take note of and react to democratic India’s emergence as a major influence in world affairs in the 21st century. He has specifically advocated more trade and investment relations with India, giving the assessment that a close relationship with India would be a force for stability and security in Asia.

However, one must also anticipate that the Bush administration would be less inclined to generate the type of pressure the Clinton administration did on Pakistan since 1999. General Colin Powell as secretary of state is likely to activate the traditional interaction between the Pentagon and the Pakistani military establishment in certain political dimensions. The US government will assume a more impartial position on the Kashmir dispute but it will be more assertive in pressuring Pakistan to cooperate with the West to counter international terrorism and narco-terrorism. But this would be linked to security concerns of the US and the West and not so much the impact of these phenomena in Jammu and Kashmir.

If Pervez Musharraf assumes some kind of elective identity in the next two years, there would be some revival of US-Pak relations. We should realistically accept this possibility, without getting agitated about it.

At the most fundamental level, there will be continuity in US policies towards India and in the positive orientations in Indo-US ties which began nearly a decade ago.

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