Bordering on danger

THE military confrontation between the Border Security Force of India and the Bangladesh Army and Bangladesh Rifles last week gives a critical twist to Indo-Bangladesh relations. In this context, one was reminded of a remark by Major General Rao Farman Ali, the politico-military advisor to General Niazi during the 1971 Bangladesh liberation war. Ali, while being taken with other prisoners of war to the Indian Air Force plane, turned to the Indian officer escorting him and said,‘‘These chaps whom you have liberated will turn against you.’’

The recent events in Pyrduwah lead one to ruminate over whether Ali was prophetic. In its immediate dimensions, the crisis seems to have simmered down by the morning of April 20. The question is whether this is the end of the story. This is the second time in 29 years that such a large-scale military confrontation has taken place between the security forces of both countries, resulting in large-scale Indian casualties in a single skirmish.

One has to go back to the partition of India to understand the origins of this confrontation. While demarcating the boundaries between the Indian and Pakistani dominions, the boundary of East Bengal — which was designated as East Pakistan — on the one hand and West Bengal and Assam, on the other, was done in a manner which allocated some pockets to East Pakistan and others to the Indian states. However, the populations on both sides of the border had economic and religious affinities. The whole phenomenon was described as ‘‘territories in adverse possession’’ or ‘‘enclaves’’, the future status of which was to be resolved by discussions between India and Pakistan. Both India and Bangladesh inherited this problem.

The biggest dispute was about the enclave of Boraibari, which had to go to Bangladesh but access to which had to be through Indian territory. This problem was resolved through painstaking negotiations in 1992, with India providing Bangladesh access to Boraibari through the Teen Bigha corridor. But there are still about 111 such small enclaves which are yet to be negotiated. More specifically the enclaves on the Assam-Meghalaya-Bangladesh border involves 755 acres of land, out of which 520 acres of land are with India and 235 acres with Bangladesh. Discussions regarding the settlement of these border enclaves have been prolonged despite there being a general political agreement on resolving the problem by dialogue.

Another critical factor is that these enclaves have become conduits for smuggling goods from India into Bangladesh and for illegal migration from Bangladesh into India. As the issue has remained unresolved, it has been exploited by those segments of the Bangladeshi establishment which are deeply antagonistic towards India. It has also to be acknowledged that after Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s demise, both the military and democratic regimes of Bangladesh have on occasion adopted an anti-Indian stance for domestic gains. The recent events have also to be viewed against this background.

That this military operation was pre-planned is obvious. Nearly five battalions of the 19th Division of the Bangladesh Army, with additional personnel from the Bangladesh Rifles, launched the attack against the Indian position at 1 am on April 16. Bangladeshi forces moved in with heavy infantry weapons and mortars in armoured vehicles from their base at Mymansingh. Apart from evicting the Indian Border Security Forces (BSF) personnel, the Bangladeshi forces reportedly acted against the civilian population too, resulting in most of the villagers fleeing to safer areas.

In his initial statement, the chief of the Bangladesh Rifles, Major General Fazlur Rehman, claimed that he had retrieved the territory which rightly belonged to Bangladesh. Rehman, himself, merits comment. He belongs to that category of Bangladeshi military officers who were not committed to that country’s liberation from Pakistan. He has links with extremist Islamic political parties and has acquired a somewhat assertive military reputation for having prevented the Myanmar authorities from building a dam over a river on the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. He seemed sure that neither Prime Minister Hasina, nor any other political leader, could afford to be critical of the action taken by him if he succeeded. He may have also expected a critical reaction from India, which would have provided more justification for his overall anti-Indian political orientation. This did not happen. India’s reaction was measured and sober.

There was some criticism in India that the government was not reacting strongly enough. This was not the case. BSF troops from 112th and 74th battalions had moved into the Mankachar area in Dhubri district of Assam in sufficient strength. Senior Indian officers in the operational area contacted BDR officials suggesting that they withdraw from Indian positions which they had occupied, as Indian forces would otherwise have to launch limited operations to meet this objective. Simultaneously, the Bangladesh high commissioner in New Delhi and the Indian high commissioner in Bangladesh, were involved in high level discussions to defuse the situation.

Ultimately good sense prevailed. The policy of restraint worked. India was back in possession of the areas taken over by Bangladesh by April 20 — and that too without any military action. While India deliberately did not ask for any formal apology to avoid embarrassing the Bangladesh government, there are reports that official level discussions on the question of compensation for the losses incurred by India are being considered.

One can only speculate about the reasons for this unnecessary military incident. The territory involved is very small and has neither economic nor political significance. Perhaps, it was part of Rehman’s own personal agenda, rooted in his political attitudes.

Then there is the fact that this is an election year in Bangladesh. The incident could have been engineered on the instigation of Begum Zia’s party to embarrass Prime Minister Hasina. It is significant that neither of the two women made any public statement on the incident till April 20. That Bangladesh authorities have been indirectly involved in supporting secessionist elements from the Northeast should also be kept in mind, since this has security implications for the whole region.

What, then, is to be done to manage our important relations with Bangladesh? First, our policy should be underlined by a deep awareness of Bangladesh as an important neighbour. Second, as an immediate measure, Jaswant Singh should visit Dhaka for high level talks to clear the atmosphere. He should meet not only Sheikh Hasina but Begum Khaleda Zia as well. Third, our forces should be deployed at higher levels of intensity and alertness. Most importantly, India should expeditiously take the initiative to sort out issues relating to the enclaves referred to earlier. We must be as generous as we can in relinquishing them, unless they happen to affect our territorial security.

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