Friends and neighbours

It was puzzlement and outrage that marked one’s initial reaction, in this column, to the border clash between Indian and Bangladeshi forces. Puzzlement over the strength of the attack by Bangladesh forces against the Indian forces and outrage at the manner in which 16 BSF jawans were tortured and killed. The low-key Indian response was also intriguing. The origins of the clashes are more complicated than initial reports seem to indicate.

Initial reports put out from India were that Bangladesh forces launched an unprovoked attack against BSF cadres in the Pyrduwah area, capturing the enclave. This was followed by the statement that 16 BSF cadres were ‘‘lured into Bangladesh territory and then murdered in cold blood, after being tortured’’. The statements of the Bangladesh government contradicted this version of the events. It averred that Bangladesh forces fired in self-defence against intrusions by the BSF. The statements between the April 22 and 30 compounded the confusion. One version was that BSF was in the process of building a road to the enclave of Pyrduwah which was objected to by Bangladesh forces, leading to clashes. Similarly, early statements from our side explained the border clash in Boraibari as a counter-measure by the BSF to balance off the capture of Pyrduwah by Bangladesh forces. This was later modified. The clash was seen as the result of BSF undertaking border exercises at a higher level of alertness after Pyrduwah.

What caused this violence is also subject to contradictory and confusing explanations. Official pronouncements from India described the clashes as localised adventurism by Bangladesh forces on the border. There was speculation that the attempt was to create tension between the two countries, by the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party and sections of the army, with a view to embarrassing Sheikh Hasina in the forthcoming elections.

While Indian public opinion is grappling with the confusing and uncertain perceptions created by these statements, the director general of the BSF, Gurbachan Jagat, in a recent interview, categorically accused the chiefs of the Bangladesh army and the Bangladesh Rifles of having launched a pre-planned attack against BSF forces on the Assam-Meghalaya border.

Although Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has ordered an inquiry into the events, the statement issued by her government categorically asserts that Bangladesh forces acted in self-defence. Contrary to Indian claims, Bangladesh’s statement does not refer to any apology or regret from either Hasina or her government.

Sifting through these contradictions and claims, these are the basic facts that emerge: first, that the Bangladesh security forces mounted an offensive against the BSF in the Pyrduwah area in brigade strength. Second, the BSF did undertake some kind of a large-scale patrolling exercise in the Boraibari region which came apart and ended in a fiasco leading to the brutal murder of the BSF personnel. It also seems that the Boraibari violence occurred in Bangladesh territory. Third, it is difficult to accept that a three to five battalion strength operation by the Bangladesh Armed Forces could be organised autonomously by any local Bangladeshi commander. The operation was clearly planned at the highest military levels. It is also reasonable to presume that Hasina and her government was generally aware of this operation as it was taking place. It follows from this that the field intelligence and monitoring mechanism of the BSF did not anticipate the events between April 15 and 19.

There is a tenuous simmering down of the situation but undercurrents of tension continue to mark Indo-Bangladesh relations in the short-term and there have been public demonstrations on both sides of the border. India’s reaction has been low key, practical and based on the larger consideration of sustaining good relations with Bangladesh. It was also influenced by the fact that it does not wish to embarrass the Hasina government — which is supposed to be more friendly towards it — during an election year. The third reason for our non-assertive reaction is because of a perception that the border clash should perhaps not be blamed on Bangladesh alone.

One has fairly authoritative information on Hasina’s telephone conversation with Prime Minister Vajpayee. She expressed sorrow and pain at the events and felt they could have been avoided. There was no apology or regret from her. Simultaneously, Foreign Secretary Chokila Iyer’s demarche with her Bangladeshi counterpart, Syed Muazzem Ali, led to the vacation of Pyrduwah by Bangladeshi forces.

Going beyond the rights and wrongs and responsibilities of either side, two actions by the Bangladesh government cannot be explained away: first, the large-scale offensive in the Pyrduwah sector. Second, the brutalisation and murder of BSF jawans. India must raise these issues with Bangladesh and sort them out at an appropriate level. Jaswant Singh could have been sent to Dhaka within 48 hours of the border clash. This decision was not taken because of a lack of clear cut evidence about the origin of the conflict. Now it is too late for such a move. Foreign secretaries of SAARC countries would be meeting in Colombo in June and our foreign secretary could utilise the occasion to have a detailed exchange with her Bangladesh counterpart.

There are reports that Hasina would be visiting India later this month on her way back from Europe. Such a visit is not advisable because she may face angry demonstrations. It would also put her in a difficult position back home, apart from the fact that such demonstrations would embarrass our prime minister. Some more time should be allowed to pass before such a visit.

In the long run, we must be conscious that India has unresolved border disputes with Pakistan, China, Nepal and Bangladesh. Our endevour should be to resolve those among them which can be managed more easily. Regardless of short term political considerations, India should ratify the 1974 Agreement on exchange of enclaves with Bangladesh and resolve its border disputes with that country. Simultaneously, we must strengthen and intensify our border security management arrangements to counter not only the phenomenon of illegal migration, smuggling, and so on, but the impulses of anti-Indian political attitudes entertained by some political segments, encouraged and abetted by extremist religious forces and Pakistani intelligence agencies.

One cannot wish away the fact that our initial reaction has resulted in a public perception of India being a soft state, though our governmental reactions are based on long-term considerations affecting Indian interests. Such a perception can only be removed by structured and purposive action to stabilise Indo-Bangladesh relations. We must do this without Bangladesh taking India’s tolerance threshhold for granted.

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