What’s in it for us?

INDIA’S surprisingly prompt endorsement of the US government’s plans to create a National Missile Defence (NMD) Arrangement has generated both curiosity and criticism. Curiosity about the rationale of its endorsement of USA’s plans within eight hours of their announcement. Criticism that India has given full support to US strategic plans to manage the global security environment about which even its allies have been cautious. There was also the criticism that India had contradicted its own statements criticising USA’s intentions of doing away with the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

India’s statement supporting Bush’s NMD policy also raises the question of whether India now fully shares US perceptions on global security. On all counts the government’s pro-NMD statement is a major policy announcement. Any value judgements on it should be based on answers to the following questions: Has India clearly understood the motivations of the US to deploy the NMD? Was India’s supportive announcement an impromptu policy decision or was it preceded by consultations with the US and assessments of likely reactions to it from other powers? Did we assess the implications this has for India’s nuclear weaponisation and missile capacities?

One doubts whether India has understood the motivations of USA’s NMD plans clearly. The rationale given is that India has not commented on the NMD itself but has endorsed US policies because it aims at a reduction of nuclear missile arsenals — an objective which is in line with the Indian aim of eliminating weapons of mass destruction. Secondly, the NMD could provide security against potential nuclear threats from powers which may be inclined to use such weapons against India. This perception is valid, but the point is that the fundamental US objective is to emerge as the supreme power, transcending the current arms control and disarmament arrangements.

John Lodal, former principal deputy under secretary of defence at the US National Security Council, has stated this clearly in his, The Price of Dominance:‘As Russia’s nuclear arsenal continues to shrink with age, a significant NMD could give the United States for the first time in the nuclear age, a ‘true first strike capability’, the ability to launch a pre-emptive attack destroying enough of Russia’s weapons systems permits the NMD to intercept any residual retaliation. A nuclear first strike capability would provide the ultimate military advantage, giving the US enough force to threaten the survival of any rival.’’ This thesis has been backed up by the US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice’s own stances.

It is in this context that the NMD is envisaged. The point to be made is that the elements of Bush’s statement which we have supported cannot be de-linked from the basic politico-strategic motivations as expressed in US articulations given above. Have we come to the conclusion that these motivations are inevitable and we should adjust to them rather than work towards counter-balancing them with other like-minded powers? I do not think India’s supportive announcement was an impromptu one. External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh must have discussed issues related to National Missile Defence (NMD) with Strobe Talbott during the Clinton period, which he must have followed up during his discussions in Washington early in April with US defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, and Condoleezza Rice. It is to be noted that our announcement on May 2 followed a telephone call from Rice to Singh. So our policy statement is based on consultations with US leaders. What could the deal be? It is reasonable to presume that India did not have any detailed discussions on its proposed reaction to the NMD with other powers. One learns that our pronouncement is based on the assumption that, except for China, all the power centres will fall in line with US plans.

But one still needs to know whether our government had carefully assessed the implications of NMD on our evolving nuclear weapons and missile systems. Since we support the logic of the NMD, have we taken the decision to keep our nuclear and missile carrying capacities at the present levels? Or have we taken the first step towards accepting a strategic security umbrella from the US in return for limiting our nuclear and missile capacities? There have been no indications that our reaction had taken into account the responses of China, Japan and the Russian Federation to the NMD and the deployment of theatre missile defence in the Western Pacific. Are we sure, in terms of our specific security concerns, that the NMD will be deployed in our favour in case of aggressive moves by China or Pakistan? One is not certain.

From all indications the Indian statement was not preceded by any Cabinet discussion or institutional discussions with the national security advisor or the Strategic Policy Group. The decision to support Bush’s pronouncement was based on recommendations from Jaswant Singh as the foreign and defence minister and his advisers. The foreign office and service chiefs had only a marginal role in the exercise. Nor was the statement preceded by Opposition leaders being given a briefing. Wasn’t this minimal consultation necessary before making a major policy statement on national security matters?

As for the question about whether there would be political returns, the recent visit of US deputy secretary of state, Richard Armitage, which is to be followed in June by that of USA’s joint chiefs of staff India for consultations, signals a qualitative upgrading of Indo-US defence discussions. Inherent in this exercise is USA’s acknowledgement of India’s importance in the Asian region. There are also indications that sanctions may be lifted. The question is, which of them will be lifted and would this be in line with our substantive requirements?

As far as the impact of our support to the US on our relations with the Russia, West Europe, Japan, the Gulf and ASEAN countries go, indications are that there would be no critical impact except for the perception that we are going to be progressively more supportive of US security policies. China would certainly interpret our stand as moving towards the US to pre-empt potential Chinese threats. The security dialogue with China, begun after Singh’s visit to Beijing last year, would now be inhibited by this.

Our pulling back from our previous stance on the ABM Treaty, will be seen as a qualitative change in our policies. Importantly, how would we reconcile our support of USA’s NMD with our desire to fashion substantive relations with Iran, which has been named as an adversary in US statements on NMD? The question is, was there any imperative necessitating so quick a response? Was there any political or strategic urgency to be the first to come out in support of this US move? Our Parliament and people have a right to know.

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