Think national, not global

THE terms of reference for assessing the Indian response to the terrorist attack on America should be based on the following criteria: first, the ground realities; second, the motivations and objectives of the counter-measures planned by the US; third, the rationale and implications of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s decision to cooperate with the US in this campaign; and finally and most important, the extent to which the Indian response will safeguard India’s national interests.

First, the ground realities: the US has defined the attack as an act of war. It has also decided to launch a long-term military campaign against terrorism and against countries that harbour it. The major powers of the world as well as important regional powers have expressed their support for the US campaign. However, a number of governments like those of Russia, China and some Asian and African countries have advocated that the actions against international terrorism should preferably be organised under the umbrella of the UN, especially its Security Council.

Second, the US has a number of long-term objectives: one, to root out the organisational networks of terrorism for which it is prepared to undertake a long-term campaign. Two, to ensure that the oil producing countries of the Gulf, Central Asia and West Asia, do not succumb to terrorist pressure and its underlying ideology of Islamic extremism. In the process, the US aims at structuring a system of strategic equations stretching from South Central Asia to the Maghreb (North African Muslim countries), inorder to safeguard its security interests.

Third, Pakistan has agreed to become the hub for the launching of these operations. Musharraf’s has decided to cooperate with the US reluctantly, because Pakistan’s economic and political predicament is such that it has no other option.

It is in this context that we evaluate the Indian responses over the last month. Both Prime Minister Vajpayee and Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh initially extended unreserved support to the US. The significant points of the response were that India acknowledged the dangers posed by international and cross-border terrorism. That India agreed to join the US-led coalition since the phenomenon of international terrorism is not country specific. That this phenomenon poses a profound threat to the stability and territorial integrity of all plural societies. The Indian government offered, without any preconditions, whatever operational, logistic or intelligence cooperation that the US required in its anti-terrorist campaign. Further, India did not link terrorism with any religious or ethnic community. Finally, it hopes that the campaign will cover all categories of terrorism, including cross-border terrorism, against India.

These points form the message conveyed by National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra and the Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh during their meetings with President Bush and his cabinet colleagues in Washington in the last one month. Interestingly, Jaswant Singh’s visit to Washington took place when the Pakistan based terrorist outfit, the Jaish-e-Mohammed, attacked the Assembly building in Jammu and Kashmir. Singh, therefore, drew the attention of the US Government to terrorist violence in India. This resulted in Secretary of State Colin Powell condemning the acts of violence. Yet, the moot point is that no senior US government official publicly acknowledged Pakistan being the base for such terrorist acts against India.

The US response to the Indian policy stance so far has disappointed public perceptions in India. No US pronouncement acknowledged that a major democracy and an important Asian power like India had pledged full and unconditional support to the US. There were no indications that the US could include cross border terrorism, against India, originating in Pakistan, in the ambit of its campaign. There were also signals that the US, at this stage, is not seeking any substantial logistical and operational support from India, in terms of use of airspace, launching facilities, or Indian territory.

Pakistan has stipulated that Israel and India should be kept out of the international coalition against terrorism if US desires Pakistani support. President Musharraf in a radio and TV broadcast publicly asked India ‘‘to lay off’’. Prime Minister Vajpayee, therefore, had to introduce a balanced equilibrium in the Indian policy stance. In an interview, he openly stated that the US has not shown sensitivity regarding Indian concerns about terrorism. Second, given Musharraf’s insistence that violence in J&K is a ‘‘freedom struggle’’, instead of a terrorist campaign, India does not foresee any prospects of the resumption of the dialogue with Pakistan in the near future.

One hopes that India’s specific security concerns would have been conveyed to the US during further discussions with other heads of state, including British Prime Minister Tony Blair during his recent visit to India. The logic of the Indian response depends on the following:

• Indian policy stances are consistent with India’s opposition to international terrorism and its specific security interests.
• India’s policy response to Black Tuesday would strengthen our relations with the US especially in terms of security and political cooperation.
• India’s support to the US might result in the latter influencing Pakistan to negotiate a solution to the Kashmir problem.
• Given US support, Pakistan, however, might demand the reverse.
• India’s position to take unilateral action against cross-border terrorism gains strategic validity which the US and other powers cannot oppose by any logic. (That these powers may advise restraint to us is quite another matter which we should expect but need not succumb to).
• We should not have rushed into giving complete details of our support. Instead, we should have articulated our concerns about terrorism in clearer terms. It would have been enough to state that our assistance would depend on the US requirements.
• We need not have commented about our intentions regarding future dialogue between India and Pakistan.
• While deciding to participate in the anti-terrorist campaign we must keep in mind two factors: the feelings of our large Muslim citizenry as well as our friendly relations with important Islamic countries. There is need to fine-tune this aspect of our policy.

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