When Putin met Vajpayee

Given the current fashion of assessing important political developments in compressed soundbytes and short stacatto articles, I should have written a composite piece on Vajpayee’s visit to Moscow, Washington and London. But such an exercise would have ignored the undercurrents of different interests and motivations affecting Indo-Russian relations on the one hand, and India’s relations with the United States and Britain on the other. So I write separately about Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to Moscow.

It is important to take note of the patterns of interests and concerns which characterise the policies of the Russian Federation. They provide the context in which the Vajpayee-Putin discussions were held and the results thereof. The Russian predicament over the last decade has been that of somehow sustaining internal economic stability and grappling with internal certifugal forces, particularly those in the Muslim provinces of Chechnya and Dagistan. Russia is now in a geo-strategic situation where its influence in the major East European countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Ukraine, has become minimal. Russia faces a similar prospect of losing its clout in the Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan — countries important to Russia not only in political terms but also for natural and energy resources, a factor that has animated the US’s long-term policies of gaining a foothold in the Central Asian region.

The economic predicament of the Russian Federation is such that it has to sustain a meaningful working relationship with the US and the Western democracies. In contrast to Boris Yeltsin who did not seem very concerned about the decline in the status of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin is clear in his mind that given Russia’s technological and military capacities and its natural resources, Russia should reassert its position in the emerging world order. His main concerns are to stabilise the domestic economy and administration, to effectively counter secessionist tendencies within the Russian Federation, particularly Islamic separatism, to retain as much political and economic influence as he can manage in Central Asia and in Eastern Europe, and to develop equations with Japan, China, and India.

He wishes to maintain a balanced and substantive relationship with the US. His discussions with Vajpayee were subject to these macro-level political objectives. Russia’s India-specific interests could be summed up as follows: a shared concern in resisting secessionist violence and terrorism. India is a large and long-term market for Russian technologies, defence equipment and energy exports. India could become an important strategic partner in structuring equations with Iran and the Central Asian Republics.

The immediate objectives of Vajpayee’s visit to Moscow were to expand the range and content of Indo-Russian cooperation against violent secessionism and cross-border terrorism. Secondly, to finalise some important decisions relating to defence cooperation. Thirdly, to make an assessment of the Russian Federation’s responsiveness to Indian concerns regarding terrorism sponsored by Pakistan. Fourth, to fashion the framework for Indo-Russian cooperation for influencing the future political dispensation in Afghanistan. Fifth, to follow up on the decisions taken in strengthening Indo-Russian relations during Putin’s visit to Delhi last year.

Public expressions of the results of the Vajpayee-Putin discussions are available in the Moscow Declaration and agreements on defence supplies and energy cooperation signed during Vajpayee’s visit. The points of political significance embodied in the Moscow Declaration are: Complete agreement between India and Russia on terrorism being acknowledged as a crime against humanity and that acts of terrorism cannot be justified selectively. Vajpayee and Putin agreed that decisive measures should be taken not only against individuals and entities involved in terrorism but also against countries. India and Russia agreed to cooperate with each other at the UN to finalise the conventions against terrorism and to make them mandatory. Russia acknowledged India’s interests in having a political dispensation in Afghanistan which is stable, moderate, representing all ethnic groups. Putin and Vajpayee ruled out any place for Taliban in the future government.

On broader political issues, Vajpayee and Putin agreed to preserve the existing arms control and disarmament agreements. Both agreed on the desirability of a multi-polar world, for UN reforms which would ensure its central role in maintaining peace and stability in the world. The Declaration also confirmed Russia’s support in principle to India’s candidature for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

In bilateral terms, India and Russia signed a memorandum on the setting up of a 2000-megawatt nuclear power plant at Kundankulam in Tamil Nadu. Other agreements signed were energy cooperation between the Astrakhan region of Russia and Gujarat in India. Discussions were held over continuing the supply of defence equipment. A point of particular interest is Russia’s agreement to transfer high quality oil exploration technology to India. Russia re-affirmed its decision to continue supplying uranium fuel for the Tarapore atomic power station.

It is noteworthy that Putin was not as responsive to India’s specific concerns in terms of separatism and terrorism in J&K. Russia’s policy as announced by him during Vajpayee’s visit was that of urging both India and Pakistan to enter into bilateral discussions to resolve the dispute. By implication Russia does not seem willing to fully acknowledge Pakistan’s terrorist role threatening the unity of India. To those who have monitored Russian policies after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, this approach is not surprising. Russia has definitely moved away from the former Soviet Union’s stance of fully supporting the Indian stand on J&K.

This is understandable given the new equations Russia has established with the US, the western democracies and China. But more importantly Pakistan has made overtures to Russia for purchasing sophisticated weapons systems including armour and aircraft. Russia calculates that a cooperative relationship with Pakistan may help Russia curb domestic Islamic extremism.

While Putin accepted India’s interest in influencing decisions regarding future political dispensation in Afghanistan, at least in public there is no commitment that Russia will strongly argue for the extension of the Six plus Two formula (the countries which would be directly involved in creating a new government in Afghanistan — Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China, Saudi Arabia, Russia and the US) to formally include India.

The general conclusion about Vajpayee’s diplomatic initiative with Putin is that Russian policies would be subject to general orientations of US policies in dealing with international terrorism. Russia may not be enthusiastic about acting against the Pakistani government and the terrorism it sponsors in J&K. There are prospects of broad political and strategic cooperation between Russia and India in dealing with the challenges of any excessive US domination of world politics. But neither India nor Russia would undertake this exercise in a confrontationist mode. It is in the spheres of bilateral relations that the most substantive and long-term results have been achieved. Relations between India and Russia are coming back on track after nearly a decade.

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