Some clarity, please

The most accomplished foreign minister/diplomatist in contemporary history was Charles Maurice Tallyrand (1754-1838). He stipulated that in the conduct of any country’s foreign relations, there should be no overzealousness, there shouldn’t be excessive anxiety and once a policy is decided upon, there should be consistency in implementing it. If one were to evaluate Indo-US relations since September, and the results of Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to the US earlier this month, the conclusion is inescapable that Tallyrand’s stipulations have been ignored by the Government of India.

First, the issue of being overzealous. Vajpayee’s visit took place in the context of India being the first country to announce unreserved support and full cooperation to the US in the aftermath of September 11. We took this decision even before the closest allies of the US in NATO announced their support. Nor did our policy decision include assessments of how the Russian Federation and China were going to react. In contrast, while announcing general support for the campaign against international terrorism, the Russians and the Chinese stated it would be more effective and credible if it is conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. China expressed the view that terrorism and separatism in Tibet, Taiwan and Sinkiang should be included in the proposed campaign.

Our motivations were rooted in over-optimistic and unilateral expectations from the US. Our expectation was that by virtue of being the first to offer unconditional support, the US will rely more on us than on Pakistan. Two, we expected that our declaration of total support will result in the US targeting Pakistan-sponsored terrorism against India in its campaign. Three, that the US will be supportive of our basic position and negotiating stance on J&K. Four, that the US will not object to operations being undertaken by us in Pakistan against separatist terrorism in J&K, across the line of control, if it becomes necessary. Five, that given the reservations on Musharraf’s government and the symbiosis between India and the US as democracies, the campaign will isolate Pakistan, generating pressures on Musharraf to be reasonable with India. None of these expectations were fulfilled. Musharraf extended support to the US and at least in the short-term has become its closest ally. The US has not accepted every demand of Pakistan, but it did not question its policies on J&K. President Bush specifically advised India not to act against Pakistan till the campaign against Afghanistan is completed.

As far as anxieties are concerned, it seems to be the most permeating characteristic of our governmental and public interaction with the US. In an interview, Vajpayee stated there is disappointment in India about the US’ response to India’s concerns. There was worry that Pakistan has recovered its position vis-a-vis the US which it had lost since 1999. And that as a consequence, the US will move back to giving it general support on Kashmir.

These perceptions found some basis in the reticences and temporising statements made by the US Secretary of State Colin Powell, US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. There was reticence particularly when they commented on J&K over the last two and half months. There was no logic in our anxiety on these points. There are obvious geo-strategic, operational and political reasons why the US would have cooperative arrangements with Pakistan in their campaign against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

What, then, were the results of Vajpayee’s discussions with Bush in Washington and his interaction with other world leaders in New York? The visit led to Vajpayee and his senior advisors making personal acquaintances of the highest-level leadership of the US followed by wide-ranging discussions on aspects of Indo-US relations going beyond the campaign against international terrorism.

There are prospects of expanded defence cooperation between India and the US as confirmed by Rumsfeld when he declared his conviction of the need for ‘strategic cooperation with India’ to structure long-term stability and security in the region. Vajpayee and Bush agreed to take initiatives to stimulate bilateral economic relations, particularly, hi-tech commerce.

An important area of agreement between Bush and Vajpayee was reflected in the instructions they issued to find ways to work around the Wassenaar and Nuclear Suppliers Group technology regimes so that Indo-US cooperation in nuclear and space technologies could be revived. This is a qualitative moderation in US approach towards India’s nuclear and missile weaponisation.

Bush’s pronouncement at the UN that the world should unite in opposing all terrorists, not just some of them, and his warning that nations harbouring and supporting terrorists will pay a heavy price, indicates that Indo-US cooperation against international and cross-border terrorism will increase. Bush did not indulge in any didactic admonitions to Vajpayee on Kashmir, he did not suggest any mediatory role for the US.

On the down side, the military and economic concessions to Pakistan will strengthen Musharraf’s hostile stance on J&K. Musharraf managed to persuade the US to refer to the centrality of the Kashmir issue in the joint declaration issued at the end of his discussions with President Bush. While this is not a bad balance sheet of the achievements of Vajpayee’s US visit, one has to take note of Indian policies not conforming to Tallyrand’s third stipulation — of being consistent in policy. There have been reports that the US wanted expanded defence cooperation with India. This was publicised in the media with the comment that India had refused some of the suggestions. Jaswant Singh dismissed these reports as fiction. While he was saying this in Washington, Defence Minister George Fernandes said in Delhi that some of the proposals were discussed between him and Rumsfeld and that India was not averse to cooperating with the US after careful consideration.

Our policy at present seems to be to fully support the US and establish a close relationship with that country. If that is so, one finds the views expressed by Jaswant Singh a contradiction of this policy of which he has been the principal architect. Fernandes contradicting Jaswant Singh is a signal that India has not made up its mind on very vital aspects of Indo-US cooperation. This contradiction reflects the division in Indian public opinion on our evolving relations with the US. But being perceptive about our long-term interests, clear about our priorities and cohesive about our decisions is important in structuring our relations with major powers, particularly the US. Despite the positive results of Vajpayee-Bush meeting, our policies towards the US remain subject to contradictions, doubts and lack of clarity.

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