Be practical and reasonable

India shifted its Pakistan policies into a high pro-active gear in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on Parliament on December 13. Three broad patterns of reactions have emerged about India’s diplomatic, political and military moves to generate pressure on Pakistan and to signal India’s determination to be more decisive in responding to the proxy war conducted by Pakistan against India over the last decade. There is a collective international consensus and concern that India and Pakistan should not get enmeshed in a military conflict with potentialities of a nuclear confrontation. Secondly, there are people who advocate that India should not resile from the policy of generating military pressure based on the large-scale deployment of Indian armed forces on the India-Pakistan border and on the Line of Control. Thirdly, there is the view that the pressure generated by India has achieved India’s objectives to the extent feasible at this stage and, therefore, India should consider shifting from high gear to a stance of reasonableness without changing the substance of its policy orientations or declared objectives.

It is obvious that a stage has been reached in the current phase of our interaction with Pakistan where we have to calibrate the nuances of our Pakistan policies in the context of Pakistan’s responses to the pressure generated by us and of assessments and advocacies of the major powers who have been actively engaged both with Pakistan and India to defuse the higher levels of tension generated since mid-December last year.

The Government of India has been host to an unusually large number of high level representatives of foreign governments over the last four weeks. It must also be noted that parallel discussions were held by representatives of these countries with the Government of Pakistan also. These visits were focussed on the current state of tense relations between India and Pakistan. We have to take note of the attitudes and concerns of the international community manifested through these visits. We also have to assess the motivations of the advice and suggestions given to us by these high level representatives of foreign governments. It is clear that there is complete consensus in the international community and especially amongst the great powers that India and Pakistan should act with restraint regardless of the provocations perpetrated against us by Pakistan and its subversive agents.

Shorn of the courtesy and diplomatic tact in the suggestions made to us, the substantive assessment of the US and other important powers is that Musharraf has started a genuine and sincere move to curb and eradicate religious extremism and terrorism in his country and therefore India should not maintain high pressure on him which might result in his having to move back from the policy initiatives in this regard which he has taken over the last three weeks. The view expressed was that India’s reducing pressure on him, apart from defusing tension, would also strengthen his hands in continuing his anti-extremist/terrorist policies. India would be wise and practical in being supportive of his efforts, instead of putting him on the defensive. The more substantive motivation, particularly of the US and Western democracies are: first and foremost, an Indo-Pakistan confrontation should be avoided as it would disrupt and interfere with the ongoing anti-terrorist campaign led by the US. Secondly, India and Pakistan should be prevented from getting enmeshed in a nuclear confrontation. Thirdly, Musharraf’s authority in Pakistan should be stabilised in the context of the support he has extended to the US and Western countries. It is significant that both Russia and China generally share these motivations.

Linked with these motivations is the longer-term objective that India and Pakistan should take some substantive steps to resolve the Kashmir problem, moving away from their traditional negotiating stances because the problem of Kashmir, if not attended to, is a continuing hair-trigger for a conflict situation. This responsiveness, however, cannot be at the cost of India’s security and political interests which in substance would have to be predicated on Pakistan’s India policies in terms of ground realities. This is the point made by both Prime Minister Vajpayee and External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh to their eminent foreign interlocutors.

One, therefore, proceeds to assess the most recent ingredients of Pakistan’s policies towards India. Much has been made of Musharraf banning Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Toiba, freezing their assets and Pakistani authorities detailing nearly 1900 Islamic activists. General Musharraf’s speech of January 12 is being interpreted as the beginning of a qualitative change in Pakistan’s India policies. The question is whether these positive interpretations of his policies are an emerging reality or are they tactical moves by him which have resulted in positive anticipatory speculations. (As far as India is concerned, the latter seems to be the case).

Musharraf in his speech on January 12, as well as his speech to a group of religious leaders on January 18 has reiterated that there will be no change in Pakistan’s support to the secessionist movements in Kashmir. There is no declaration from his government that they will stop supporting separatism in Kashmir. He has specially emphasised that his actions against various extremist groups within Pakistan are a part of his policy of general support to international campaign against terrorism led by the US and more importantly his actions are aimed at stabilising the internal situation in Pakistan. In a Press conference in mid-January he reaffirmed that he is fully prepared to face a war with India and that he is capable of teaching India a lesson. There is no commitment from him about extraditing the 20 terrorists wanted by India. He has asked for more evidence.

Given this overall context, India faces a complex predicament in dealing with Pakistan. First, there is no shift in Pakistan’s India policies (Kashmir, terrorism, repatriation of terrorists). Secondly, Musharraf’s credibility as a leader committed to the international anti-terrorist campaign and as a person desirous of defusing tension in India, has increased in international perceptions. Whatever the facts, this perception is a compelling phenomenon to which we have to respond. Thirdly, our high politico-military stance having achieved the initial desired objective to some extent is now subject to the law of diminishing returns.

It’s necessary for India to appear practical and reasonable without lowering its guard or pulling back from its principled approach on the question of Pakistani involvement in subversive terrorism against us. It is equally important that we do not lose the general support of the international community which we have gained since last September. The calibration of our Pakistan policy should, therefore, aim at meeting these twin objectives.

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