How should we play it?

The USA and Pakistan have been the operational focus of India’s foreign policy since September 11, 2001, with the emphasis shifting to Pakistan even more decisively after the December 13 attack on Parliament. The major powers whose attitudes and policies are of importance in this respect are the US and China. While India believes there is greater clarity in US policies in this regard, doubts about China’s attitudes persist. The Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji’s visit to India, early in January, has to some extent clarified these ambiguities. Zhu Rongji was the second important Chinese leader to visit India since the second half of 2001. Li Peng, former prime minister and second in the Chinese Communist Party’s hierarchy, was in India with a large Chinese business delegation earlier. Both visits took place amidst changes in the strategic and security environment in sub-continental Asia, caused largely by the US-led campaign against terrorism.

Discussions between the Chinese and Indian leaders signified that the controversies which afflicted Sino-Indian relations in the aftermath of India’s 1998 nuclear weapon tests have been set aside and that both nations are trying to get bilateral relations back on track. Second, the discussions emphasised the revival of continuity in Sino-Indian relations which began with President Narayanan’s visit to China. Zhu Rongji’s arrival was particularly significant since it took place at a point of time when India’s relations with Pakistan were in a state of high tension. The Chinese premier’s visit was therefore interpreted as reflecting China’s desire to maintain an even-handed and impartial relationship with India and Pakistan.

But is this assessment entirely accurate? Recalling the immediate background of Premier Zhu’s visit would be pertinent here. General Musharraf visited Beijing twice recently. Once at the end of last year and a second time in response to Indian diplomatic and military pressure on Pakistan in reaction to the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament. Though media reports asserted that General Musharraf got a ‘‘frosty reception’’ in Beijing, the fact is that China has given both financial assistance and defence supplies to Pakistan since September 2001 to the tune of about half a billion US dollars. It is interesting to note that the US government and media have interpreted this assistance as a proof of China’s support to the US-led coalition against terrorism.

Whatever the interpretation, the net result is that Pakistan’s military capacities have been sustained and enhanced by this assistance. India must realise that China, while sustaining its substantive strategic relationship with Pakistan, is engaged in an exercise of structuring a political balance in power equations in the sub-continent by simultaneously engaging the Indian government. Zhu Rongji came at a point of time when USA’s strategic presence was increasing in South and Central Asia. The Gulf War in 1990-91 initiated this process. While the forces of the Pacific and Central Commands of the USA converge in their jurisdictional role across the Pacific and Atlantic, in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf, the US Central Command’s physical presence is now manifest in Uzbekistan, Kyrgystan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The chief of the US Central Command, Lt. General Tommy Franks, stated during his recent visit to Pakistan that the US will continue in this region for some time to come. US President Bush’s State of the Union message on January 30 underlines this — not only did he say that the campaign against terrorism is just beginning, he indicated that North Korea, Iraq and Iran could be subsequent targets.

There is US military presence now at Peshawar, Abbotabad and at the ports of Pasni, Gwadar and Karachi. The US presence at Gwadar has complicated China’s naval presence at that Pakistani port. It is logical, therefore, for China to structure its South Asian policies in the context of the challenge the US poses to Chinese influence in the area. This, in a manner, could encourage China to have a practical and stable relationship with India, while sustaining its equations with Pakistan to the maximum extent possible.

We, on our part, would do well to remember that, in relative terms, China’s relations with the US and Pakistan will remain a matter of higher priority because of economic and political reasons. Six significant bilateral agreements were signed with China during Zhu Rongji’s visit to India: the resumption of direct civil aviation contacts between Beijing and New Delhi, cooperation in the fields of tourism, space, science and technology and in countering terrorism through the creation of a Sino-Indian Joint Working Group.

Both Li Peng and Zhu Rongji emphasised China’s interest in expanding cooperation in the spheres of economy and technology, especially information technology. These are positive trends as far as they go, with one rider: the relationship is more a competing, rather than a complementary, one. An area of cooperation underpinned by some complementarity is the Track II discussions between India and China to establish and expand cooperation between Southern China and the Northeastern states of India, known at the ‘Kunming Initiative’, which is supported by the Chinese government. But even this exercise must be viewed cautiously in the light of the fact that there has been no dilution in China’s claims on the state of Arunachal Pradesh.

With regard to political issues of substance, India and China have still a long way to go. The Sino-Indian Joint Working Group on the boundary question has not yet completed the task of removing discrepancies in the delineation of the Line of Actual Control. Although an increasing number of confidence building measures have been agreed upon, they have not become fully operational. Then there is the problematic Tibet issue. India recognises Tibet as an autonomous region of the People’s Republic of China but is concerned over China continuing to disregard assurances of autonomy for Tibet. Also, since Tibet is the remaining buffer zone between India and China, the location of Chinese missiles and air bases in Tibet remains a security concern for India.

The long term stabilisation of Sino-Indian ties would then depend on these issues being addressed by both sides with foresight. Given the convergence of views between India and China on several issues, including opposition to hegemonism, there is a basis for structuring a durable and practical relationship between India and China. This, despite the undercurrents of competition and the legacy of mutual suspicion that has marked it.

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