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September
20, 2000
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Bangaru
Laxmans pipedream
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The
masses will decide
If
Laxman has a special fondness for the Muslims and desires their
expedient relationship with his party, he will have
to redress their grievances
A french
journalist reminds us of our cultural and civilisational norms.
One is amused but not offended. As if this was not enough, he exhorts
us how to read and interpret our own history. The eminent historian,
D.D. Kosambi, must be turning in his grave. He was one of those
who believed that historians should be given power by attaching
more credibility to scientifically-founded knowledge of the past
rather than the claim of amateurs.
Now,
a leading Indian columnist admonishes Indias 110 million Muslims
not to retreat into fundamental ghettos sustained by foreign
funding. Assuming that the criterion for nationhood is determined
by ones loyalty to the BJP, he expects them to forge
an expedient working relationship with that party.
Without
referring to the historical roots of their estrangement, he warns
them of the grim consequences of a contrived alienation.
Besides the Muslims, this stern warning must alert millions of others
who may have decided not to vote for the BJP in the forthcoming
Assembly elections. I fear the next step would be putting the Christians
on the firing line.
In
his customary acerbic tone, the columnist proceeds to target the
mullahs as well as the modernists people like
you and me who pursue our vocation in life unobtrusively, raise
our voice against intolerance and religio-political bigotry and
nurture the vision of a strong and united India. Why? The answer
is that you and I share a deep-rooted... aversion to the BJP,
and that we do not recognise its leaders as the new avatars guiding
our nation. The vehemence of his vituperation reaches its crescendo
when the Bakhts and Naqvis are compared with Maulana Azad, Khan
Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Rafi Ahmad Kidwai. This is, to say the least,
adding insult to injury.
That
is not all. The columnist is indignant because the certified engineers
of secularism and secular fundamentalists have
dismissed as a sham Bangaru Laxmans overtures. Although cynicism
and bitterness is so palpably reflected in the usage of such expressions,
the noteworthy point that is conveniently overlooked is that Bangaru
Laxman has, after all, struck a favourable chord among some Muslim
spokesmen. If others have not joined the bandwagon, it is because
their local and regional interests, coupled with their ideology,
are not served by tying up with the BJP. Neither the first nor the
second sets of people act as Muslims per se. Sure enough, the self-appointed
Muslim leaders (not the Bakhts or the Naqvis) will decide whether
Laxmans gesture merits a degree of reciprocity or not, though
the decision will ultimately rest with the Muslim peasant in Barabanki,
the coal mine worker in Dhanbad, and the fishermen in coastal Andhra.
For
the moment, though, the BJP president will have to come to terms
with the widespread aversion to his party an aversion, I
hasten to add, shared by many castes, communities and political
groupings. If he has a special fondness for the Muslims and desires
their expedient relationship with his party, he will
have to devise ways and means of redressing their grievances. If
he wants them to soften their opposition, he will have to airlift
the Hindutva ideologues to the Staten Island for rest and recuperation.
In short, he will have to accept the primacy of the Constitution
as the reference point for nurturing a national perspective.
This
brings me to the Congress-led Muslim mass contact campaign
of 1937. Flaunting my knowledge of history is not my style, and
yet one has to refute ill-informed views and interpretations. First
of all, Jawaharlal Nehru, the architect of the idea, was impressed
by the favourable Muslim responses to the 1937 election campaign.
The ensuing drive reflected a change from the corporate conception
and strategy of direct appeals to Muslims to a policy of more self-conscious,
secular appeals, and direct strategy of developing support.
Contrary
to what this columnist thinks, the strategy paid off for the time
being. By mid-1938, a hundred thousand Muslims were enrolled as
primary members of the Congress outside Uttar Pradesh, Bengal, and
the NWFP. Of these, 25,000 were from Bihar, 15,000 from Madras,
and 13,995 from Punjab.
The
campaign petered out not because of countrywide Muslim opposition,
but because it was devoid of any social and economic content, and
that it offered too little, too late. The secularist, radical rhetoric
alarmed vested interests. The Muslim Leaguers perceived a threat
to their very existence and felt that, unless they woo the poor
Muslims in urban and rural areas, they might find the Congress walking
away with their flock. Although the Congress and the League had
existed as separate organisations, never before was there such a
rivalry between them for association with the Muslim masses. Second,
the Congress effort was in large part confined to urban areas with
little activity expended in the villages or among the underprivileged
groups, thus averting Nehrus interest in disassociating Muslim
peasants from Muslim landlords. Nisar Ahmad, an advocate from Bahawalpur,
complained that the Congress had not reached the Muslim masses
the backbone of the community. The pattern of mobilisation
was thus similar to that of 1930 to 1932, when Congress leaders
minimised civil disobedience propaganda in areas with high proportion
of Muslims in order to avoid igniting communal passions.
Finally,
the strategy fell prey as well to a divided Congress and to opposition
from Hindu nationalists that feared the influx of Muslim activists
having a critical and unacceptable influence on party policy. People
like G.B. Pant, J.B. Kripalani and Morarji Desai girded themselves
to resist the campaign that threatened their political dominance
and raised the chances of Nehrus Muslim and communist allies
dominating the Congress. Part of their strategy was to starve mass
contact committees of funds, to fill them with rank communalists
and to ensure that Muslims were eased out of Congress committees.
Thus senior Congress office-bearers in Gorakhpur led a Holi procession
with spears, swords, and sticks on display. Khushi Lal, chairman
of the Dehradun municipal board, lamented that Congressmen tried
imposing a social boycott of the Muslims for the sins, imaginary
or real, of one or two.
Important
lessons must be learnt from the failure of the mass
contact. One of them is that national unity, grounded on the
principles of democracy, secularism, social justice and equity,
must be the cardinal political assumption in the nation-building
enterprise. The other is not to stigmatise or essentialise a community,
Hindu, Muslim, Sikh or Christian, but to help build bridges of fraternity
and understanding. It will be comforting if religious and political
fundamentalists can be converted to this idea sooner than later.
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