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Why
Congress is appeasing BJP
The
Congress enables the Vajpayee government to have all the appearances
of stability
At
a homely dinner, one friend asked: “How do you see the political
scenario evolve over the next few months and years?” First,
said the host, you must not take your eyes off the presidential
election due in 2002. He seemed to imply that Atal Bihari Vajpayee
might be a candidate for the republic’s highest office. For
this to be achieved, co-ordination with the Congress might be an
essential pre-condition. What, then, will be the quid pro quo?
For
those observing Congress behaviour over the past decade or so, there
is nothing new in the line of speculation. In the recent past, the
Congress has contained within itself two distinct attitudes to the
Sangh Parivar.
In
Kerala, K. Karunakaran always found the BJP a useful ally in containing
the Left Front. In MP, the party had no alternative but to fight
the BJP. These parallel tendencies could be contained so long as
the Congress was in power at the Centre. But once Congress lost
at the Centre, having vacated vast spaces to the BJP in the Hindi
heartland and to the regional parties elsewhere, it was under pressure
to choose between the two tendencies.
It
could take the philosophical view that its current decline was consequence
of recent mismanagement particularly in its social policies by P.V.
Narasimha Rao and gang, hold its ground, however diminished its
numbers, refurbish its image in the opposition, untainted by any
coalition, and allow a leadership to emerge which had the potential
of catching the nation’s imagination.
The
other alternative was to make a swift shift. Recognise its rapid
decline and make alliances with leaders of the social groups who
had defected from the Congress, the party of which they were once
the backbone.
There
was, of course, the third temptation. This entailed a contemplation
of the social groups which had defected from the Congress as class
and caste enemy, a force out to disrupt the national equilibrium
which the Congress represented. The caste structure and the Congress,
in this framework, were coterminous.
The BJP was the beneficiary of the Congress Party’s total inability
to read the tectonic changes that were talking place at the social
base.
Let
us not forget that the BJP, a tight cadre based party, exploded
into a national movement against the backdrop of the Mandal-Mandir
conflict. The upper castes, feeling the heat of Mandal, found the
tattered tent of the Congress insufficient to accord them protection.
They crossed over to the BJP.
The Congress, accustomed to power, arrogant, aloof, found itself
unable to respond to the new political and social demands.
The
BJP, on the other hand, had been in the field since 1953, had a
whiff of power in 1967, and tasted it temporarily in 1977. When
a series of opportunities came its way since 1996, it immediately
got down to some quick social engineering. Mayawati’s stint
as chief minister of UP was the signal that the BJP as party of
governance would have to swiftly widen its social base. Bangaru
Laxman’s elevation as party president is a sharp move in recognition
of that reality.
Sonia
Gandhi shunned coalitions at the Panchmarhi session of the Congress
in September 1998. It made sense but only in the short run, because
elections were due in November in MP, Rajasthan and Delhi where
the contest was a direct one between the BJP and the Congress. No
coalitions were required. The Congress won.
Various
interests, including caste interests, interpreted the results in
the three states as an endorsement of "no" to coalitions
for all times and in all circumstances. It was an absurd line particularly
in a state like UP.
The
aversion of the Congress to coalitions had the effect of completely
marginalising the Left in the affairs at the Centre. A stable third
front was not possible without the Left participating in it, and
the Congress supporting it.
A Congress-led coalition was not possible because, first, the Congress
itself was averse to coalitions and secondly, the potential coalition
partners would face all manner of contradiction since they were
in direct conflict with the Congress in at least eight states.
Sheer
pressure at the grassroots levels was pushing the Congress into
arrangements in Bihar and Maharashtra. If the party had taken the
realistic line that it would consider coalitions on a case-by-case
basis, these adjustments would have come across as astute, realistic
politics. But against a general posture of arrogant aloofness, these
efforts at coalition have had the effect of confusing the picture.
The party neither stands out on its own in bold relief, nor does
it look like an energetic coalition builder.
The
Congress today has a wishy-washy image, its most redeeming feature
being that it enables the Vajpayee government to have all the appearances
of stability, the hiccups within the NDA notwithstanding.
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