Empathy is dangerous

In 1320, Ghazi Tughlaq rose in revolt against Sultan Khusrav Khan. The pretext was that Islam was in danger since the ascent of Khusrav Khan — a convert from Hinduism — represented the triumph of the conquered heathen. It was the first time the cry of ‘‘Islam in danger!’’ was raised by a rabble-rouser on Indian soil. Quite successfully too — the governors of Multan and Samana were killed by their own people for the sin of remaining loyal to the Sultan. The lesson has not been lost on Muslim politicians in the Indian subcontinent ever since.

Aurangzeb would use it as a weapon to seize the Peacock Throne. The Qaid-e-Azam would revenge himself upon Gandhi by reciting the magic words. General Zia would justify his usurpation from the (relatively) secular Bhutto with the same excuse. Will General Pervez Musharraf be the next to fall?

That is what the United States fears, offering it as the sole credible reason why India should exercise ‘‘restraint’’. It was summed up nicely in an article by Nicholas Kristof for the New York Times: ‘‘Just as New Delhi is politically unable to allow Kashmiris a plebiscite on their future, so General Musharraf cannot arrest Kashmiri militants and hand them over to India. He would be overthrown ten minutes later.’’

This is a classic example of the shabby analysis which raises hackles in Delhi. Read the United Nations resolution which Pakistan constantly harps upon, and you find any plebiscite is contingent on Pakistan withdrawing all its troops. As for Muhajir Musharraf, is he really so unpopular with Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluchis and Pathans that arresting twenty militants will topple him? Well, then, why should India pander to the fears and fancies of a man so hated by his own people?

Here lies the first truth we must face squarely: no country shall aid India in its battle against terrorism. Washington seeks to hunt down Osama bin Laden, and keeping Pakistan happy is necessary if only because its troops are required to man the mountain passes to Afghanistan. None of the other chancelleries will dare defy the United States. Indira Gandhi’s diplomatic efforts — sending envoys to various capitals — proved fruitless in 1971; I am not sure such attempts will be more useful today.

I will be sorry if anything is done to hamper the American effort to hunt down the the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. But India’s security is a far greater concern, and Musharraf’s personal security is of no import whatsoever.

Yes, anyone who shunts Musharraf aside will probably be even more closely linked to militants. But this is a shopworn excuse, one first offered by Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru when he pleaded his inability to rein in the men who invaded Jammu and Kashmir. India’s patience has been ill-paid over the years. Iskander Mirza was no improvement over the Qaid-e-Millat. Yahya Khan was worse than the Ayub with whom the world wanted Lal Bahadur Shastri to negotiate. And surely nobody argues that Pervez Musharraf be granted concessions that India would have denied to Nawaz Sharif?

The world urged restraint in 1999 when there was fighting in Kargil. What was the result? That the terrorists have now been emboldened to attack not just the Assembly in Srinagar, but Parliament in Delhi!

Here is a second truth we must face: it is not in the interest of the Pakistani elite to have peace with India. The Pakistan Army is a state within a state, and the Inter-Services Intelligence is a state within a state within a state. Both occupy prized positions because they made a bogey-man of ‘‘Hindu’’ India.

It is a dirty bargain that Pakistan’s generals have struck with the Mullahs. The generals want to play with their dogs, to have their photographs taken, and to enjoy their daily tipple (all forbidden under a strict interpretation of the Shariat). But they will allow the Mullahs free rein if only they will divert the attention of the people from their own miserable condition to anger at their neighbouring nation.

Yet the world changed on September 11, 2001, though it took some time for the truth to sink in. Late in November, Musharraf was talking about a ‘‘moderate’’ Taliban, and after the attack on Parliament House he couldn’t bring himself to utter the word ‘‘terrorists’’ (preferring ‘‘armed intruders’’). Rashid Qureshi, Musharraf’s official spokesman, raised the balloon that the attack was nothing more than a drama directed by India. And Foreign Minister Abdus Sattar, Islamabad’s ranking civilian, said Delhi accused the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad merely to blacken the ‘‘freedom fighters’’ in Kashmir.

I think these latter statements inflamed Indian opinion more than the actual assault on Parliament House. They confirmed an opinion building up since the Kargil War and the Agra Summit that Pakistan’s rulers are insincere and untrustworthy, pretending to negotiate only under pressure.

Some American friends have wondered why India isn’t giving enough credit to Musharraf for arresting a few score militants. Very simply, he is doing it in the most sullen manner possible, and only because the United States has cracked the whip. And that in turn has happened only because Washington is concerned right now about war breaking out.

What happens when American attention turns from Afghanistan to, say, Iraq? Must India mobilise all its forces after each terrorist outrage to convince the world of the depth of its anger? Appearing on a BBC show shortly after the Parliament House attack, Pramod Mahajan summed up the public mood nicely: ‘‘If we do not act now, then when will we act?’’

George Bernard Shaw was more eloquent in 1914. Britain was ‘‘sore-headed and fed-up’’, he wrote. ‘‘We were rasped beyond endurance by militarism and its contempt for us and for human happiness and common sense; and we just rose at it and went for it.’’ The result was World War I.

There are a billion Muslims in the world. Almost three hundred million of them live either in India or in Pakistan. Five men brought the subcontinent to the brink of war; five others could push both nations over the edge. Is Pervez Musharraf prepared even now to hand over twenty men to justice — or will fear of the Mullahs expose Pakistan to the horrors of war?

Let me return to 1320. Hazrat Nizamuddin Auliya, a greater exponent of Islam than any Tughlaq, refused to back the revolt. He would later prophesy of the first Tughlaq, ‘‘Dilli door ast!’’ General Musharraf, if you continue to back militants, then friendship with Dilli shall remain forever door — assuming you want such amity!

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