Consider first how it was born. Its principal constituent's hallmark is (or shall we say was) Hindutva. It was duly making some mealy-mouthed noises about Hindutva during its poll campaign. Mealy-mouthed it was, because it was becoming increasingly evident over the years that Hindus, much less Indian voters, do not live by Hindutva alone. So it was necessary to raise empty slogans.

The birth of Vajpayee's government was for the wrong reason, as the singular and almost exclusive mission of its principal constituent was pushed down to the bottom of the broadly accepted national agenda after its rise to power. Most other constituents have seldom before had any use for the slogan of Hindutva. Maneka Gandhi or Mamata Banerjee or George Fernandes or Ramakrishna Hegde had never been known for their religious identity. They had, in any case, not sought votes for establishing a Hindu rashtra.

Why was such an egregious outfit without a sense of direction put together at all? Which national need was it supposed to answer? It did indeed serve such great national missions as making Pramod Mahajan the Prime Minister's political advisor or Jaswant Singh an eternal emissary to Chennai or Chicago. These achievements have but little national relevance. One simple reason why Vajpayee's government came into being was that his party was itching for power at any cost. It could not wait a moment more possibly. Another reason could be that other traditional holders of power were for once not ready to employ any and every trick to seize it.

Vajpayee's tragedy is that after his rise to power, he was condemned to live in the political lap of three unlikely women: Maneka, Mamata and Jaya. It could also be said that he reached where he is by that route. Maneka says she is happy to live in the company of animals, though not for the reason Whitman had in mind. He would rather live in the company of animals because they are not demented by the mania of owning things.

In fact, Maneka is in Vajpayee's company now because it confers on her a certain ownership. It gives her power. She enjoyed whatever power she had during the emergency, and she was pilloried for it by those who keep her company now. So what? Jagmohan, who was so pilloried before the Shah commission, is now a celebrated scion of the Hindutva household.

Like Maneka, Mamata has also had no Hindu credentials. A residence for Rama has never been her priority. The only thing that she had in common with the political apostles of Hindutva was their honest belief that Jyoti Basu is the ultimate fountain of all evil. But Mamata had never visualised a Hindu cure for the bane of Basu. It occurred to her that a saffron remedy could be possible only when she found herself out of the docile party, whose one-woman armada she was in West Bengal. Vajpayee had no doubt what was to be done when she turned up. Mamata could, of course, be prone to flying into tantrums, whether out of conviction or craze for publicity, but she could be a useful ally where none else was available. She can be depended upon to nag anyone who leads her, Rao or Vajpayee, but she should be nursed as an entertaining source of support.

The third woman who has made it possible for Vajpayee to be in his gaddi is quite a different person. She is a person who honestly believes that she proposes and she disposes, too. Unlike Maneka and Mamata, Jayalalitha had made an occasional noise about Hindutva. Whenever she achieved what she wanted, she went back to her home turf--which has always been an area of morbid self-importance.

When Vajpayee sought her friendship, he should have known that neither had she been bitten by the bug of Hindutva nor was she an inevitable or compatible ally of his party. She was seemingly plunging into an inexorable spell of scandals when Vajpayee's outfit courted her as an ally in what scarcely looked like a fit of value-based politics. Vajpayee was looking for an ally and Jayalalitha was available. That was about all. That was the only reason for forging an alliance that made the emergence of a Vajpayee government possible. And that was a wrong reason. It was wrong because it made the seizure of power an objective that had to be achieved at any cost and with anybody's aid.

If Vajpayee's warriors put up a brave face when they go about pacifying Jayalalitha and others, it is because they feel it in their bones that either she may not, after all, ditch them, or even if she dares, someone else may yet let their government live.