Such a weapon in the hands of Libya or Iraq, dubbed as rogue states by the western media, and delivered by a missile available for ready cash suchas the Chinese 'Silk worm', the French 'Excocet', Soviet 'Scud', or even Pakistan's pride, the 'Ghauri' could stop the all powerful Seventh fleet dead in its tracks. What worries the US is that as the creator of the first Islamic bomb, Pakistan may well be on the way to develop a subkilotonne device, (unless it already has), and technology transfer to one of these Islamic states could put to an end to all policing by the US in International waters and gun-boat diplomacy as was witnessed in the recent bombing of targets in Afghanistan and Sudan.

The yield from the three tests conducted by India on May 11, 1998, were 15 kilotonnes (only 3 more than one exploded in 1974), a low-yeild 0.2 kilotonne device and the big daddy of 45 kilotonnes thermo-nuclear device. On May 13, two more subkilotonne devices with yields ranging from 0.2 to 0.6 were exploded.

As was later revealed by experts, this low-yield device is a 'tactical weapon', which could be used on thebattlefield for 'localised effect' by mounting it on a small missile and aiming at specific targets. A kilotonne bomb has an energy equivalent to a 1,000 tonnes of tri-nitro-toluene (TNT), the common ingredient of most explosives, and a subkilotonne device packs a limited though quite an effective punch.

The basic raw material for an atomic bomb is plutonium, which is available in nuclear plants as the spent uranium fuel, and the CTBT in principle aims at keeping a hawk eye on this by-product so that it does not end up inside an atom bomb. In effect, the CTBT requires the signatory country to proudly claim that it is populated by imbeciles who do not know how to prevent the spent fuel from their nuclear plants from getting into wrong hands, assuming they have no interest in making an atom bomb for themselves.

Under the CTBT, the big boys (Russia, UK, France, China ably led by US), who call the shots in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have abrogated tothemselves the right to carry out inspections and determine the end use if and when nuclear fuel is supplied to a country, which is a signatory to the CTBT.

The Multilateral Export Control Regime (MECR) was set up under the auspices of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) to prevent the access of the non-nuclear weapon states to acquire any kind of nuclear technology, and has been applied to India since 1977 after it carried out the Pokhran test in 1974. What India is now demanding is its rightful place in the nuclear club, and as a responsible member, full and free access to the leading-edge technology in the vital area of use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including lifting of the barrier against transfer of frontier technologies to all atomic research establishments in India.

Meanwhile, India continues to exercise its freedom to choose technology appropriate to it and at much lower cost, refusing to succumb to the subtle arm-twisting of the CTBT and theassociated economic sanctions.