To be sure, J&K is not a homogeneous entity and has three distinct divisions: in the south and below the Pir Panjal range is Jammu, which is predominantly Hindu; the Kashmir valley is over 90 per cent Muslim; Ladakh to the east that is Buddhist. The Kargil area lies between Kashmir and Ladakh and has mixed population. Most Muslims here are Shia and have a hearty dislike for a fundamentalist Sunni Pakistan. All through 1980s unrest, Kargil area has been a haven of peace.

Just beyond the Zojila pass is Dras. This lies at the foot of several glaciersand is the second coldest inhabited place after Verkoyansk in Siberia. Temperatures in winter go down to minus 40 degrees C. Dras at 10,000 ft is located in a bowl that is surrounded by peaks that climb up to 17,000 feet. Kargil, which is located due east of Dras on the Zaskar range, is in the rain shadow area. Here the snow is minimal. Batalik, another place where the fighting is on at the moment, is on the Ladakh range and is also in the `cold desert' area.

Besides the high altitude, the absence of trees makes for lack of oxygen. Climbing is exhausting and the mountain face in most of these areas is sheer rock. The defender has tremendous advantage. Artillery or air power is of very limited use.

In the Dras-Kargil area as well as elsewhere in J&K, the army has built several lines of defences in the rear. These posts are not manned in normal times and are earmarked either for reserve forces or reinforcements in times of hot war. The danger that infiltrators can surreptitiously occupy these posts has beena cause of worry for all commanders. Normally, regular surveillance is kept on these unoccupied peaks and it is expected that once any enemy presence is detected swift action is taken to evict them. Time is of essence as any delay would give time to infiltrators to consolidate.

In the Kargil areas, the local army units obviously failed in this task. In addition, at the level of intelligence organisations, there was no prior warning. The Pakistanis were obviously successful in hiding their preparations for this action.

The actions in Kargil by India have been mainly reactive. At the army headquarters level, there appears to be some flaw in contingency planning. For if this Pakistani action was visualised earlier, the Indian response should have been swift and sure, which was not the case.

But partly, the Indian failure to anticipate Pakistani actions stems from the basic lack of understanding of the Pak psyche. That the occupation of these posts would draw Indian reaction would have been anticipated bythe Pakistanis. It is also clear that in face of a determined Indian army and air force, the infiltrators cannot hold on for long. Then what have they achieved?

It appears that Pakistan expects to up the nuclear ante and draw in the UN and US in as mediators. Another objective could have been to sabotage peace process begun by `Lahore Declaration'. It is this that has given rise to the suspicion that the Pak army may well have masterminded the whole operation, keeping the political leadership in the dark. It needs mentioning that even in 1965, when `Operation Gibraltar' was launched by Pakistan to push infiltrators into Kashmir, was conducted by a `Kashmir Cell' and even the army knew very little about it-we have this from the horse's mouth, Lt Gen (Retd) Gul Hasan.

In India, many in the media and in opposition have taken exception to defence minister George Fernandes's statement expressing doubts about whether the Pakistani Prime Minister knew about the Kargil plans of the army. But this is because theydo not know Pakistan well. In Pakistan, more often than not it is the army that decides to sack a prime minister and not the other way around -- as in India.

Mindful of the dangers of escalation, Pakistan has agreed to send its foreign minister for talks. This is the reason why it has also released the captured IAF pilot and proposed a local cease fire. In the best case scenario, Pakistan may, without acknowledging its role in pushing in the infiltrators, may offer to withdraw the remaining infiltrators. The Lahore peace process then can resume its course and include discussions on the Kashmir issue. If this happens, it would strengthen Nawaz Sharif vis-a-vis the Pak army and also give a political dividend to Vajpayee in the forthcoming elections.

But if the Pakistani army has made up its mind to create a `nuclear war' scare and thereby draw the international community into the Kashmir quagmire, then the situation does indeed look bleak. Pakistan can continue to support the entrenched infiltrators withfresh supplies of men and material and give them close artillery support from across the border.

This will make the Indian task so difficult and expensive in lives that India may well have to think of a counter-penetration strategy and capture some Pak-held areas of Kashmir. The town of Skardu is an ideal target. It should be remembered that in 1965 that is exactly what India did. It not only chased the infiltrators from the valley but also captured the strategic Haji Pir pass on August 28, 1965.

If Pakistan also decides to react to this, then the 1965 scenario may well be repeated with an all out war. India also has the option of escalating the artillery war to other sectors, notably in the Muzaffarabad area where Indian field guns can pulverise the crucial highway that is the lifeline of Skardu and other areas. The eastern edge of Mangla dam (that produces half of Pakistan's electricity) is also within Indian gun range from the Jhangar area north-west of Jammu. Both these actions can quickly bringPakistan to its senses.

The next few days will be crucial as they will tell whether Pakistan wants to follow the path of peace or wants to start its journey on the slippery slope of escalation.

The author is a Pune-based defence analyst