The current Kargil operation pushes the low-intensity conflict to a new level.

This alone raises the possibility of escalation by conventional forces-an escalation that has already begun to occur with the commitment of the Indian Air Force, say military analysts.

``Reports of Pakistanis in an operating or coordinating role in this operation only blur the line between low-intensity conflict, ``legitimate'' insurgency, and conventional (or special forces) operations, again, raising the potential for escalation to a higher level of intensity and conventional conflict,'' says Timothy DHoyt, adjunct professor at George Town University, during an online debate under the aegis of think tank Stimson Centre, Washington DC.

``For political analysts, the confused role of Pakistan's civilian leadership in the crisis should be a very serious warning sign. Musings from the mid-1990s that somehow the sub-continent would be pacified through opaque nuclear deterrence, non-weaponised deterrence, operationalised nuclear forces, or through the development of legitimate democracy in Pakistan and ``democratic peace'' all appear to be deeply flawed, viewed in the light of the Kargil crisis,'' says Hoyt.

The good news is that the current crisis in Kargil suggests that the worst fears of the non-proliferation community regarding Indo-Pakistani tensions are exaggerated. Despite a very significant military threat to India's strategic position in northern Kashmir, India has reacted with relative restraint, he says.

It should be noted that a serious situation has not escalated into a nuclear confrontation,and in India at least, it appears that the authorities remain firmly in control of both the military and strategic forces.

However, the bad news is that the Kargil crisis strongly indicates that the creation of overt nuclear capabilities by both sides does not provide corresponding political or military stability.

The infiltration of insurgents from Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK) is nothing new--even during the 1990 crisis, India and most of the world were aware of Pakistan's role in training, supporting and infiltrating insurgents in Kashmir.

Conflict over the Line of Control (LoC) is not surprising either, given the unresolved final disposition of the Kashmir problem and the continuing ``little war'' over Siachen Glacier.

The fact that Pakistan initiated this operation despite India's unambiguous nuclear capability demonstrates that even in the sub-continent, deterrence will not function at some levels of conflict-particularly low-intensity conflict.

Second, Pakistan clearly planned thisoperation after India's nuclear tests, suggesting that some elements of Pakistani leadership are willing to continue to push for advantage in the current conflict in Kashmir despite India's conventional and nuclear predominance. Seizing strategic heights in Kargil presents India with a series of difficult military dilemmas-the supply line to Siachen is endangered by more accurate artillery fire from Pakistan's side of the LoC, Indian civilians in the region are endangered, and the costs in time and casualties of clearing out entrenched and widely dispersed infiltrators are substantial.

The existence of a nuclear balance does not appear to have dissuaded Pakistan from pursuing risky policies--on the contrary, it may have emboldened elements of the Pakistani military and/or political elites to try to expand the Low-Intensity Conflict in an effort to gain a strategic advantage, when India's conventional escalation options have been more constrained by the nuclear dilemma and international opinion.

Third,there is considerable uncertainty about the role of Pakistan's political leadership in the Kargil operation. According to some reports, this operation appears to have been designed and authorised by the military without civilian oversight. This does not bode well for short-term Indo-Pakistani relations.

If the civilian government of Pakistan cannot control (or stay informed regarding) opportunist elements of its military, the meaningfulness and durability of political commitments made by the government must also be a matter of some doubt, at least to the Indian side.

Fourth, the Indian security forces and armed forces were, without a doubt, surprised by the Kargil operation. If the Indian intelligence services could not anticipate or detect such a substantial operation, undertaken at great risk and with considerable build-up of resources on the LoC, their reliability in other types of crisis must be considered suspect.

Fifth, India has responded by an escalation of its own-utilising the Indian Air Force(IAF) for the first time in 28 years. This decision was prompted, in part, by the anticipated difficulties in rooting out the infiltrators. As a military decision, it is clearly justifiable, and India appears to have been scrupulous in keeping its operations confined to the Indian side of the LoC.

Nevertheless, resorting to the use of air strikes and sophisticated helicopter gunships is a considerable escalation, which has symbolic and political ramifications that only complicate the resolution of the Kashmir issue.

The proximity of the insurgent positions to the LoC has already resulted in the crashing of at least one Indian Air Force (IAF) jet on the Pakistani side of the LoC, in addition to the death of one Indian pilot and the capture (and safe return) of another.

The continued use of aircraft raises the possibility of deliberate or accidental escalation of the conflict across the LoC.

Sixth, intercepted messages and official statements indicate that the high-ranking officers of the Pakistaniarmy are engaged in monitoring and directing the operations of the insurgents on a regular basis at the tactical level.

According to Indian official statements, the insurgents include Pakistani regular army troops, and are supplied with sophisticated weapons, including the Stinger surface-to-air missile. Seventh, Indian and Pakistani artillery have duelled for years across the LoC. The installation of insurgents on heights overlooking a strategic road, however, allows Pakistani artillery (at least in theory) to substantially increase its effectiveness, and to put indirect pressure on Indian troops on the Siachen Glacier battlefield. Use of insurgent combatants to provide direct support to conventional combatants poses the possibility of changing the current rules of engagement between Indian and Pakistani conventional forces, and between Indian forces and insurgents.

If India were to begin using air strikes in the valley of Jammu and Kashmir, for instance, it could justify it based on its operations inKargil, but it would clearly be a significant escalation of Indian counter-insurgency operations in the region.

Eighth, there are now reports of deliberate torture, mutilation and the execution of captured Indian soldiers. These have raised extremely high emotions in portions of the Indian public. Again, in combination with the reported increase in Pakistani regular army involvement and the increase in Pakistani conventional threat to Indian operations elsewhere, this raises considerable opportunity for an escalation on the Indian side in retaliation.Ninth, and finally, at least three Indian aircraft (two jet fighters and one helicopter) have been shot down, and the Indian armed forces have suffered hundreds of casualties fighting the Kargil insurgents. This provides yet another opportunity and excuse for the conflict to escalate, particularly if high levels of Pakistani involvement are verified or demonstrable.