To a desperate Opposition, on the eve of elections, the battlefield and diplomatic success is nightmarish. The raving and ranting of Natwarlal and other Congress worthies should be dismissed with the contempt it deserves. India obviously won the battle, thanks to the outstanding bravery, devotion to duty and raw courage displayed by our soldiers. No praise is high for them.

But the central point of this episode is neither intelligence failure, which there was, nor the initial tactical blunders of underestimating the enemy strength, it is the failure of Indian deterrence. In that sense it is a national failure and should prompt a radical rethink in our whole approach to Pakistan. Not much can be expected from the enquiry committee set up under K Subrahmanyam due to his own involvement in the failure at thestrategic level.

More than any Indian commentator, it was an American spokesman who hit the nail on the head when he said that Pakistan had broken the unwritten law of the nuclear game: that no nuclear weapons state directly invades anther nuclear weapons state! It is this "law" that protected the sentry at Checkpoint Charlie on the Berlin Wall throughout the Cold War.

There are many reasons why the US or even China opposed Pakistan, ranging from the desire of the US to build India as a counterweight to China and Chinese anxiety to stop India from moving too close to the US. But the principal reason why these countries came to side with India is that Pakistan broke this unwritten law and brought the world close to a nuclear exchange. All nations understand the consequences for mankind that will follow from breaking the taboo (of the last 52 years) on use of nukes: international anarchy.

India has obviously failed to inflict sufficient punishment on Pakistan for the transgression of the Line of Control(LoC). The talk in Pakistan of there being many more Kargils in future is pointer in that direction. The Kargil intrusion was a classic case of attack by infiltration. The presence of regular Pakistani soldiers, heavy weaponry with the intruders and close support given by the Pakistani artillery are all dead giveaways. The whole world therefore accepts that it was an attack by Pakistan on Indian territory.

The Indian response in confining our action to our side of the LoC has set a dangerous precedent. At any future date if Pakistan is to similarly try an intrusion the world will expect India to observe similar restraint. This gives Pakistan an opportunity to bleed India to death. Already it has inflicted an economic burden on us by forcing us to occupy the snowy heights throughout the year in Kargil sector.

India has failed to extract any "price" from Pakistan for its Kargil misadventure. The price could be military in terms of loss of territory/ soldiers/ equipment or destruction of terrorist traininginfrastructure. The economic costs could have been in terms of lost loans and grants and psychological costs could have been in terms of humiliation at the international level. Giving a "face saving" option to Pakistan, besides being a betrayal of the sacrifices of the jawans, is also disastrous for the future.

Does this mean that India should have escalated the conflict to a general war? The firm answer to this is NO. Yet, between the all-out war and defensive action on our side of the LoC, there are many creative options that could have been used. But such has been the stranglehold on the policy-makers of the Delhi monopolists, that strategic thinking in India has been reduced to the chanting of well-worn mantras. At times it is of "nuclear ambiguity" or the more familiar ones of the "relevance of non-alignment", "Pakistan's survival is in Indian interest" or the IDSA's claim that conventional war between India and Pakistan has become redundant.

Circumscribed by such mantras that provide the frameworkand basic premises, Indian strategic thinking has got into a rut. Clauswitz had often said that strategic matters are simple but not necessarily easy!

What Kargil has demonstrated, by the evidence from its own news-media and other comments, is that Pakistan is quite capable of starting a war that it is bound to lose. In this conflict, India has adopted a policy of letting the opponent strike the first blow and is always at a distinct disadvantage.

It cannot afford to fall behind in the technological race even for an instant. Subrahmanyam & Co and the DRDO and the bureaucratic establishment in Delhi does not appear to have thought through this issue. Else how does one explain the near parity of weapons at Kargil and the crippling shortages of essentials to the jawans. This is a deficiency that the Indian jawan overcame through sheer grit. The slogan that "there is no alternative to peace" has lulled our thinking into inaction. The belief in Islamic ideology that supposes ultimate triumph is quiteconsistent with occasional withdrawals (as at Kargil) and attempts to fill in every power vacuum though the activities of Pakistan's ISI. India has no choice but to develop a strategy of graduated employment of force that is technologically superior, causes disproportionate damage on the enemy and is still short of all-out war. Here we enter the specifics of weapons development and their employment and as an active analyst, I would rather leave it at that. Whether this fresh approach is adopted or not will largely depend on the national political leadership in Delhi being able to free itself from the grip of "Delhi ideological monopolists" over their thinking.

It would have not been a matter of any great loss if this grip of monopolists was confined to merely race to grab the loaves and fishes of office. But that is not so. What this inept and fossilised thinking has done is that it has brought nearer a "Nuclear Kargil". At some future date Pakistan may well launch or place a nuclear weapon in India andclaim that it is an action of the mujahiddin. India may well then launch a devastating strike against Pakistan and reduce it to radioactive dust, but the deterrence would have failed and with it the primary raison d'etre for the nuclear weapons stockpile becomes redundant. Assured punitive action is at the heart of nuclear strategies, India has ignored this basic principle at its own peril.

Meanwhile, Pakistani society is regressing to medievalism, has no stable state structure and is set to become the third most populous country in the world by 2050 AD. It is already a net food importer and its population is growing at five per cent per annum. Seen with the growth of fundamentalism and intolerance, it is likely to become a menace to not just India but the entire world. Much will depend on whether the world recognises this fact and takes action or the support to India is confined to mere words.

The author is a Pune-based defence analyst