In the armed forces, the situation is even worse. One can recall a simple example of induction of 81 mm mortars in the infantry in place of three inch mortars. The new weapon had nearly twice the range (nearly five km) and it was possible for the infantry to support even its neighbouring sectors. But the concept of pooling mortars and making it a part of the brigade assets took more than eight years. By that standard it is heartening that the National Security Advisory Board and National Security Council, have come up with a draft document on Indian nuclear policy for public debate. It shows that the Indian democracy is maturing and we are finally beginning to institutionalise decision-making processin the vital domain of security. One need not recount the sordid drama of 1962, when vital decisions concerning running the war were being taken from the sick bed by an ailing Prime Minister or the Sri Lankan disaster when a `learning on the job' PM sent more than 1,500 soldiers to their grave in an ill-considered and shoddily implemented `activist' policy.

There is sure to be a howl of protest from opposition parties that a caretaker government on the eve of elections has no business to take policy decisions. There is merit in this criticism as obviously the BJP intends to show this as one more instance of its concern for national security and earn votes. But the record of opposition parties on this score is dismal to say the least. In 1998 after Pokhran II, many of them including ex-PMs like Chandrashekhar roundly criticised the BJP's approach. The sad part was that none of them, including the Congress Party that ruled India for most of the last 50 years, gave any logical alternative. To the BJP, rightly,goes the credit for taking bold and necessary decisions to translate the Indian potential into capability.

But for the open demonstration of Indian capability to make thermonuclear weapons and its carrier, the railways-based, mobile AGNI II, neither would Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan had given up the Kargil heights nor would China refrained from nuclear sabre rattling (like it did in 1965). The credit for successful handling, when the army had goofed up initially, should logically go to Vajpayee and his team.

But having given due credit to the national security establishment for a move in the right direction, one must hasten to add that the draft nuclear policy paper released shows utter poverty of imagination, lack of appreciation of changed global context and fails to address the real challenges facing India in the 21st Century, only 190 days away. The strategies proposed and logic that underlies them is a rehash of the Cold War era. Many of the problems that confront India are unique; for instance we have astate with medieval mentality and weak institutions as our immediate neighbour. To talk of `retaliatory capability' and unacceptable damage as the touch stone of force planning is to unlearn the history of Indian subcontinent of last 800 years.

Accidents and inefficiencies could possibly pose a greater threat to India than the rudimentary and `kabbadi' shop nuclear arsenals of Pakistan. At Giasal, in a rail accident, we lost more lives in an instant than even in tough fighting in Kargil.

This is not a mere speculation but real worry. If the US-Russia experience is any guide, then the world came close to annihilation in November 1995, despite the end of Cold War and all the lies about `de-targeting' etc. What happened that day was that a US rocket fired to study atmosphere over Arctic was misread by the Russians as a Trident missile fired from a submarine and the Russian forces went on alert and ready to destroy the US. Luckily it was discovered that a foreign ministry bureaucrat in Russia had failed toinform the Russian air-defence about this rocket despite having received information almost a month in advance.

The chances of such accidents are even greater in the Indian context with our `chalta hai' attitude. It seems that while recommending a state of alert and second strike posture, the draft paper has neither thought through this issue nor analysed the likely reaction in Pakistan, which may well get even more jittery. Neither has the issue of escalation of proxy war, escalation ladder or defence shield seems to have engaged the attention of our experts. In any case the detailed response will have to await a receipt of full authentic draft. Yet all in all it is very welcome step in the right direction.

Even the Election Commission cannot object, and neither should opposition parties as the implementation is left to the new government. To object to even projection of draft and debate, is churlish to say the least and betrays the nervousness of a demoralised opposition led by the Congress.

Theauthor is coordinator of Pune-based Indian Initiative for Peace, Arms-control & Disarmament