Ironical though it was, what we called non-alignment since the seventies amounted to a strategic partnership, if not alliance with the Soviet Union now. The 21st Century's new and official strategic partnership between India and Russia has little that is strategic about it. If strategy deals with the realm of raw power, this partnership seeks to avoid commitments at that level. But it reaffirms the best of a political relationship that embraces vast defence contracts, nuclear energy, and science and technology, and it makes despairing noises about trade and culture.

This Declaration has claimed filiation to the treaty of 1993, which itself is described as a continuation of the treaty of 1971. Naturally, it did not say the obvious, that the 1993 treaty had dropped the "strategic" Article 9 of the 1971 treaty, by which the two sides were to take "effective measures" when threatened.

In general, the Soviet relationship was globally strategic for protecting India's territorial integrity (Kashmir), supplying her armed forces and assisting her industrialisation, all in the face of US ire at our non-alignment. The treaty of 1971 was merely the high point for contributing to the Indian strategy of dismembering Pakistan. By the Declaration of this year, the two sides have merely promised not to enter into alliances that are directed against either.

It likewise claims descent from the Moscow Declaration of 1994 on the Protection of the Interests of Pluralistic States. That did not prescribe action as such; it merely restated the eternal principle of territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs. But it was useful then, because India and Russia are the two largest polyglot states in the world.

Russia had apparently delegitimised such states when it broke up the Soviet Union. But by 1994 Russia feared for her own integrity, now threatened by Chechen succession. India's composition and problems were comparable and we joined hands. To India, it was always useful to get another endorsement over Kashmir; to Russia, it was more urgent. Today, in 2000, this is a reiteration of an old principle.

The next statement on strategy concerns multi-polarity. Russia is anxious to see other centres of power in the world. But which are they to be? The European Union can not be, since its security and unification depend upon the US and NATO. China aspires to such a role; but Russia would not welcome such a prospect.

There remains India; but we are too feeble to be a pole in world politics. Moreover, we seem to be happy with the "hyper power" of the US if only we could enlist it against Pakistan. Many see that process as having begun after the exchange of visits by President Clinton and our Prime Minister this year. Bluntly put, multi-polarity to Russia means the restoration of Cold War bi-polarity in some measure; and it means little to India which hopes to exploit unipolarity as long as it makes some concessions to our nuclear programme.

Multi-polarity is a slogan that conceals unstated differences. The final point of strategy in that Declaration concerns "the democratisation of international relations". This presumably refers to Indian membership of the Security Council, to which Russia committed herself long ago. But in today's world it means less and less. The ultimate weapon in the Security Council is the veto. In the post-Cold War world, it is a weapon that both Russia and China dread to use for fear of the USA.

Our veto right in the Security Council cannot protect Kashmir, our nuclear programme, or anything else dear to us. Russia could not save Iraq from the Security Council; and the Council was bypassed to destroy Yugoslavia. Were the US to lead a hostile coalition against us, our veto power would be of little help. Further, we would gain a seat only in an expanded, ergo diluted Council, which further reduces its significance. The Council seat is of limited strategic worth in the post-Cold War world, although it must be pursued for political maneuvering in international bodies.

However, the Declaration could possibly be genuinely strategic in one respect. This refers to the common struggle against international terrorism, narcotics, organised crime and separatism, read with a commitment to coordinate action in international bodies. We have a common threat emanating from Pakistan-Taliban; in this area alone we may act together with the strategic purpose of containing the worst of Pakistan.But it would presumably mean, not military action but enhanced intelligence cooperation and joint lobbying in international bodies and Washington.

However, we do not need each other the way we did during the Cold War. We both want the containment of Pakistan and Taliban; neither of us is capable of doing so singly or jointly; and we both need the US, which can do so unilaterally, but is yet to act.

Therefore, the strategic cooperation over the Pakistan-Taliban problem becomes effectively strategic only with US collaboration; only then does the raw game of power begin to be played. Thus the strategic declaration has little that is strategic about it. Yet India and Russia are today establishing the best of political relations almost ten years after the Cold War ended.

Russia dropped India like a hot potato in 1991; but most aspects of our relationship continued uninterrupted, except for trade, which collapsed along with the Russian economy. The impetus that comes with summit meetings, which solve so many problems down the line, was, however, missing all these years. That has been corrected with the promise of annual summit meetings.

So much depends on just that essentially half a working day of talks between top leaders.

India is now in a position she had never enjoyed over the past half century. Russia and the US are both friends and both are fed up with Pakistan, albeit in different ways. We have to exploit this advantage, worrisome as US friendship can be to the less developed economies like ours. The Putin visit has defined a possible constellation of India-Russia-US; but it has not said where China belongs. We have to find a place for China in the strategic jigsaw we are piecing together.

(The author is professor of history at theJawaharlal Nehru University and specialises in Russian history.)