Inida's relations with Afghanistan have been on the back burner for the last 18 months or so, thanks to political uncertainty at home. Afghanistan emerged as the focus of attention in regional politics following the Taliban's capture of Mazar-e-Sharif and Samangan. The situation now stands reversed again with the Taliban being pushed out of Mazar-e-Sharif by its own allies. This, however, is not likely to change overall prospects. Dostum has fled to Turkey and Rabbani has gone into exile in Iran. Ahmed Shah Masood continues his sporadic resistance, and may be overrun. The Taliban are now in de facto control of most of Afghan territory. After nearly 17 years of civil war and foreign invasion, Afghanistan may come under the unified control of a single politico-military organisation. It is worthwhile examining whether this assessment is valid and also to assess the implications of an Afghanistan controlled by an orthodox Islamic power structure. The Taliban did not succeed purely due to their ideological image and military discipline. Though these are major factors, more significant factors are the enormous financial and material support which they receive from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, with the endorsement of the US. Political powers opposed to the Taliban like Iran and Russia did not show the political will or provide logistical and material support to Dostum and Masood and the pro-Iranian factions. Neither did the Central Asian republics. Most importantly, Dostum was defeated not due to a direct military confrontation, but due to a number of his generals defecting to the Taliban for financial and material reasons. Apparently General Pehalwan, a leading defector from the Dostum camp, was paid $200 million by Pakistan. This is expected behaviour in Afghanistan -- the Najibullah Government fell because Dostum himself defected in 1992.

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have been prompt in recognising the Taliban Government. Saudi Arabia, apart from aligning with the US, is interested in establishing a Sunni Muslim regime in Afghanistan. Pakistan has similar interests. The US would desire a regime which would contain Iranian influence and also erode Russian influence in Central Asia. An Afghan regime influenced by Pakistan, USA and Saudi Arabia will facilitate the expansion of the influence of these countries in Central Asia. For the US, the overall strategic gains are worth it even though it involves the establishment of an extremist Islamic regime. The US and Saudi Arabia's economic interest in the natural resources of northern Afghanistan and Central Asia and its markets is an additional factor. The Taliban's success reduces the relevance of efforts of the UN and Iran to forge a negotiated political settlement. In any case, Iranian political initiatives were in a drift for the last eight weeks because of a preoccupation with its Presidential elections. Russia, perhaps, did not wish to take a confrontationist posture against the US because of strategic concerns in Europe. Perhaps Russia also expected Dostum and Masood to protract the resistance to the Taliban, buying time for the UN and Iran.

It is interesting that Iran, while still appealing for negotiations, has not made any firm policy pronouncements against the Taliban. President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan has expressed general concern about the impact of the Taliban's advance on Uzbek and Tajik areas of Afghanistan. Russia decided to take on a tentatively assertive stance by warning the Taliban that if they interfere in any of the Central Asian Republics, the 30,000 Russian border guards and military personnel in Central Asia would resist.

Much depends on how the Taliban conduct themselves after assuming full control. If the Pushtoon-dominated Taliban persecute the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, there can be a massive flow of refugees into Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and to some extent into Iran and Turkmenistan, generating political tensions. A matter of greater concern would be the Taliban initiating orthodox Islamic movements in the Central Asian republics and giving them political and material support. While the Presidents of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have expressed their concern, they by themselves may be hesitant in taking on a Taliban supported by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the US. Their capacity for resistance would depend on the extent of Russian backing. Iran seems diplomatically and politically hamstrung in dealing with developments adverse to its interests in Afghanistan.

The basic question, however, is whether Taliban rule can stabilise Afghanistan. Both Dostum and Masood have asserted during the last week that they will continue the fight. The Taliban themselves may suffer from factionalism and rivalries between regional leaders once they are in power, if the historical behaviour patterns in Afghanistan politics are repeated. For the present, however, the situation in Afghanistan is that of negative ferment, from the Indian point of view. The success of Pakistani military and intelligence establishments in fulfilling their objectives in Afghanistan would encourage them to divert Taliban cadres to make trouble in Kashmir. The Taliban Government in Afghanistan would be antagonistic to India, specially in the context of India's having supported Dostum and Rabbani even after clear indications that the Taliban would emerge dominant in Afghanistan. It was natural for India to support the more moderate nationalistic forces, but we should perhaps have opened some lines of communication with the Taliban leadership also last summer.

India's Afghanistan policies over the last two years have not kept in touch with the evolving ground realities. India should deal with the Taliban Government if it consolidates itself as the effective authority. We should also function in consultation with Russia, Iran and Uzbekistan in structuring our policies. Apart from its new strategic importance for India in terms of our relations with Pakistan, a working relationship with Afghanistan is important for the future of relations with the Central Asian republics.

An interesting test of the new atmosphere of goodwill that is claimed in Indo-Pak relations is whether Pakistan will cooperate with India to enable it to establish links with the Taliban Government. This should be a subject of discussion and there will be an opportunity when the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries meet in Islamabad on June 19.

Copyright © 1997 Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Ltd.