Kashmir's history for the last 50 years has been one long chain of errors of judgment on the part of decision makers. At every turning point, they chose the wrong direction. Most of their lapses are fairly well known. But what has gone largely unnoticed is the grave failure to judge men and moments. They failed to judge Sheikh Abdullah. They failed to size up Zulfikar Ali Bhutto at Shimla in 1972 and Zia-ul-Huq at a later stage, when he was quietly preparing to wage a proxy war in Kashmir.

Duane R. Clarridge has recorded the following in his book, A Spy For All Seasons: My Life In the CIA:

``In 1974, Nehru released Sheikh Abdullah from prison. Abdullah immediately left for Paris. I flew to Paris to see him. He seemed a bit tentative, and nothing much came of the meeting.

``Later, I flew to Jidda and contacted him. This time, Abdullah really did have something to say, and it was explosive. During his pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, for the Haj, and before my arrival in Jidda, Abdullah claimed he had been briefed on Pakistan's next moves on Kashmir, which would result in the first Indo-Pakistani war in the fall of 1965.

``The Lion of Kashmir basically gave me the whole plan of the Pakistanis for Kashmir. The Pakistanis were going to begin infiltrating small guerrilla units out of Azad Kashmir into Kashmir proper. Those units would then begin to stir things up. Once the insurrection got under way in Kashmir, regular Pakistani military forces would come to Kashmir's aid.''

The disclosure speaks for itself. It is yet another piece of evidence to show how the Indian leadership failed to understand the mind and motivation of those with whom it had to deal on the Kashmir problem.

It should have been clear to a discerning mind that for Sheikh Abdullah it was his power game that took precedence over all else. What suited him at a particular moment was all that mattered. From 1947 to 1952, he kept proclaiming that Kashmir's accession was based on fundamental principles and was irrevocable. At the same time, he was sounding out various quarters for support to the idea of an independent `Sheikhdom'. As early as January 28, 1948, he discussed the subject of independence with American officials. This is evident from the note sent by Warren Austin to the State Department after an interview with Sheikh Abdullah on January 28, 1948. The report (September 1950) of Loy Henderson, the US Ambassador to India, noted: ``In discussing future-Kashmir, Abdullah was vigorous that it should be independent''. On May 3, 1953, Adlai Stevenson came to Srinagar and had a long meeting with Sheikh Abdullah.

All these events, taken together, should leave nobody in doubt that Sheikh Abdullah was dreaming of becoming an independent ruler of Kashmir and the Anglo-US bloc was encouraging him.

Having ignored the streaks of duplicity and deception in Sheikh Abdullah, Nehru was caught on the wrong foot in August 1953 when he found that there was no alternative to dismissing Sheikh Abdullah. This extreme step could have been avoided if Sheikh Abdullah had been understood correctly.

The same lack of understanding was shown in respect of Bhutto at the Shimla Conference (1972). At that time, India held all the cards. Indira Gandhi's advisers failed to read the mind of Pakistan's Prime Minister. The way Bhutto's mind was actually working comes out clearly in his letter of June 23, 1972, to General Tikka Khan: ``So, neither a few years of arranged peace, nor the present situation can possibly permit us to ignore the reality that there must inevitably, sooner or later, come another war...every invasion from this side has defeated India...And we ourselves have ruled them for eight centuries. All this is not ancient history. It is current history...''

P.N. Dhar, in an article published in a national daily on April 4, 1995, said that Bhutto had agreed to change the ceasefire-line into a de facto international border. He asserted, ``It was thought that with the gradual use of the LoC as a de facto frontier, public opinion on both sides would get reconciled to its permanence...''

This account has been refuted by a senior diplomat and member of Pakistan's delegation to Shimla, Abdul Sattar. But even if Dhar's account is taken as true, it only confirms how naive India had been in accepting Bhutto's words.

Pakistan was in disarray and its potential for mischief crippled. It was a time when links between Kashmir and the rest of India could be firmly founded and institutionalised. All the laws which encouraged a separatist attitude could have been scrapped and the common Kashmiri persuaded to realise that he stood to gain in every way by becoming an effective and vibrant part of the national mainstream. This was a mainstream that emerged not only from the great tradition of catholicity and compassion but also from a liberal, humane and enlightened Constitution which provided full scope for advancement of every culture, language and literature.

But, unfortunately, the habit of relying solely on personalities persisted. Sheikh Abdullah was brought back to the helm of affairs through the Kashmir accord of February 1975. It was not even ensured that he would not revert to his game of whipping up insular and parochial forces to build his own nest.

By the time Sheikh Abdullah passed away, the adverse fallout of unsound decisions of the post-1972 period had spread far and wide both in the Valley and abroad. If proof were needed, it was forthcoming in the form of virulent anti-India demonstration at the time of the India-West Indies cricket match in Srinagar in October 1983; the vicious attack on the central income-tax team; and the kidnapping and killing of Indian diplomat Ravinder Mahatre, by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, at Birmingham in February 1984.

The mind and motivation of Zia-ul-Haq was not properly assessed either. While the Indian leadership continued its usual wishful thinking to hold that the Shimla Agreement provided a framework for durable peace Zia went on preparing for his proxy war, making deft use of lethal and light weapons placed at Pakistan's disposal by the US for Afghan Mujahideens. The result is there for all to see: over eight years of a bloody `proxy' war.

Copyright © 1997 Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Ltd.