Since 1991, India has made special efforts to establish a closer political and economic relationship with ASEAN, which accepted India as a full dialogue partner in 1995. After persistent efforts, India has also become a participant in ASEAN's politico-security consultative mechanism, the ASEAN Regional Forum. There has been an increase in trade, investments and joint ventures with some ASEAN countries. I say ``some ASEAN countries'' because most activities have related to Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and, to an extent, Thailand. Expansion in a relationship with content with other members is yet to come.

There has been a slowing down of interaction between India and members of the ASEAN in the fields of trade, investment and joint ventures over the last 18 months because of two reasons. Despite the continuity in our foreign economic policies, domestic pulls and pressures in India have prevented a purposive augmentation of its relations with countries of the region.

Secondly, the major ASEAN powers themselves have been subject to economic pressures, currency crises and so on, which have focused their attention on internal and regional damage control. Even otherwise, the point to be noted is that our domestic preoccupations and our foreign policy concerns in relation to Pakistan and the United States have reflected and reduced our attention to developments in the ASEAN region, and specially about significant transformations which have taken place in that region.

Among the new developments affecting ASEAN have been the expansion of its membership, with Myanmar and Vietnam joining the group as full members. Secondly, ASEAN's collective foreign policy stance vis-a-vis the United States and China has assumed a more assertive and self-confident regional approach. Thirdly, the regimes in Vietnam and Myanmar, desiring to join the mainstream of regional and global economic trends, have readjusted their policies, economic and political, for this purpose. Another evolving trend is the interest of China and the industrially advanced countries in these new ASEAN members in economic and strategic terms. We in India have not been taking note of these significant developments, relevant to our economic and strategic interests in the regional context.

Myanmar, lying on the south-eastern flank of India, bordering our sensitive north-eastern states, along China in its northern extremities, and abutting on the major ASEAN countries on its southern extremity, is of obvious strategic importance to us. With a population of nearly 40 million and its economy still in the process of modernisation, Myanmar is a potentially positive regional economic partner for India.

The possible availability of natural gas and oil in Myanmar should be of interest for our energy requirements. The nature of Myanmar's relations with Bangladesh and China directly impinges on our foreign policy and security interests. Friendly and substantial relations with Myanmar are therefore important, an importance which increases with Myanmar's membership of ASEAN.

Myanmar, as full member, can be of assistance to us in consolidating our relations with ASEAN. In the '60s and '70s, northern Myanmar was used by secessionist Indian elements as a base for their north-eastern activities.Myanmar had gone into isolation, with an undercurrent of adversarial attitudes towards India. Since 1991, India and Myanmar have made efforts to reverse this. A positive equation is necessary to ensure territorial integration in the north-east.

We must also take note of China's interest in building up relations with Myanmar. It is a major supplier of arms to the SLORC regime of Myanmar. It is assisting in the development of Myanmar's south-eastern coast; most significantly the old Burma Road from Kunming in China's Yunnan province to Lashio in Myanmar is being extended to Mandalay. It is contributing significantly to Myanmar's infrastructure.

Our reaction should not be competitive or confrontationist, but we must be alert enough to ensure that this Sino-Myanmarese equation does not militate against India's security environment. We must also remain alert to future possibilities of China expanding its politico-military presence in Myanmar, which can affect the security environment in the north-eastern states and the Bay of Bengal, given the centrifugal forces at work in the north-eastern states.

India and Myanmar's concrete initiative between 1991 and 1994 has fallen into drift primarily because India has had an approach of drift on border trade, economic cooperation and building of roads between India and Myanmar agreed upon in the early '90s. There were pressures on India by some Western democracies to keep a distance from the Myanmar Government because of its opposition to Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy. While India and other Asian countries were being advised to be intrusively assertive about democracy, the very countries which gave us this advice were expanding their economic relations with and defence supplies to Myanmar. Consequently our policy suffered from political somnolence. ASEAN, conscious of Myanmar's importance, ignored such advice and strengthened relations. This advice is becoming progressively irrelevant anyway, with the military regime now willing to interact with the National League for Democracy and gradually allowing the `NLD' to be politically active so long as it abjures agitationist or disruptive activities. It is taking the assistance of countries like Indonesia to overcome its internal political contradictions.

There are reports that President Suharto is taking an active interest in encouraging reconciliation in consultation with former Myanmarese President General Ne Win. We must, if possible, assist in this process. Our old contacts with Suu Kyi and more recent contacts with the SLORC regime leaders endow us with this capacity if we have the political will. It must be mentioned as a footnote that foreign investors have shown some interest in organising the supply of natural gas from Myanmar to India's north-eastern states if their explorations meet with success.

Our relations with Vietnam have been traditionally strong. This country of nearly 74 million is engaged in a determined effort to modernise its economy and is going to emerge as a significant South-East Asian power. China, Japan, Russia and the US, along with the ASEAN countries, are active there. Its strategic location on the South China Sea underlines its political importance, especially with ASEAN membership and strengthening contacts with world power centres. The reservoir of goodwill in Vietnam for India provides a basis for closer and substantive relations. India has developed a static mindset about Vietnam, taking friendship for granted and making no special effort to cultivate it in its new liberal identity. There have been no high-level visits to Vietnam since 1994. With an average GDP growth of 9 per cent and the need for economic modernisation, Vietnam would be responsive to Indian overtures for economic cooperation. It is time for India to ``make things happen'' to strengthen bilateral relations. We must take cognizance of Vietnam and Myanmar's potential important partners in consolidating our relations with ASEAN and structuring regional equations to serve our national security and economic interests. We must give up the attitude of episodic and casual attention to these two important neighbours.

Copyright © 1997 Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Ltd.