Recent mass killings of Shias, reportedly by cadres of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, in Lahore have caught the world's attention as symptomatic of the increasingly violent religious fissures in Pakistani civil society. This is only one facet of the internal turmoil over the last year and a half. The evolving situation negates the general expectation about democracy stabilising the political situation and gradually resolving the socio-political contradictions imposed by long military rule.Pakistan is going through crises of four categories: an entirely new crisis of identity in terms of national cohesion; a crisis afflicting the institutions of state and their equilibrium; a crisis in the economy; and a crisis of the infrastructure of national politics. There is also the question of who should be blamed for Pakistan's domestic difficulties. Should the responsibility rest with general undercurrents of political, ethno-religious and economic forces? Should it rest on Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif? Ghulam Ishaq Khanor Farooq Leghari, or successive Army chiefs beginning with General Aslam Beg and ending with General Jehangir Karamat?
It is obvious that Benazir Bhutto and, even more, Nawaz Sharif have to take the blame for Pakistan's travails. Sharif came to power in 1996 with a decisive majority. Instead of using it to consolidate a sense of national unity, he accentuated ethnic and sectarian fissiparousness and failed to control extremist and violent expressions of these tendencies. The last decade, and particularly the last two years, have witnessed a rising curve of sectarian and ethnic tension and violence, not limited to Shia-Sunni tension. There are antagonisms between excommunicated or marginalised groups such as Ahmediyas, Ismailis and Bohras. Even among Sunnis there are violent controversies between Deobandis and Barelvis. This phenomenon is fomented by the respective Madarsa systems of these schools. Then there is the rise of armed groups such as the Sipah-e-Sahiba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Harkat-ul-Ansar, who
are becoming instruments of party politics. The government has done nothing to curb these extremist groups which vitiate the internal situation and are a deliberately-encouraged destabilising factor in our Jammu and Kashmir and in Afghanistan.
A more profound dimension of the identity crisis is the higher levels of alienation of Sindhis and Mohajirs from Punjabis and the Sharif Government. The removal of Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah after his confrontation with Sharif is interpreted in ethno-political terms. Former President Farooq Leghari's and Shah's non-Punjabi ethnic identity has resulted in Sharif being accused of Punjabi hegemonism. Politicians and Sindhi media representatives are bitter. The North West Frontier Province's Provincial Assembly quietly passed a resolution renaming the Province "Pakhtoonkhwa" two months ago. The Mohajirs, despite initial equations with Sharif in the 1996 elections, are disillusioned. MQM leaders Altaf Hussain and Aftab Sheikh have accused Sharif of not fulfilling his
assurances and acting against the MQM. Punjab's major role might have been accepted because of its demographic and territorial position. But the orientation of political processes against the perceived interests of people of other provinces has the germs of political instability and a crisis of national identity.
The balance between the Presidency, the Armed Forces and the elected government, which underpinned Pakistani stability after Zia-ul-Haq's death, stands eroded. Instead of nurturing it, Sharif first took on the armed forces by trying to assume absolute power over appointments, etc. He has marginalised the National Security Council which Leghari had created, with armed forces', political and Presidential representation, as the supreme policy-making institution. Having succeeded in abrogating the 8th Amendment, he became confrontationist with both the President and the Judiciary.
Leghari's resignation and the Army chief's acquiescent role in that crisis indicate two trends. First, the President
became subject to party politics and could not sustain a detached over-arching influence. Second, the Army chief did not feel confident enough to resist Sharif's assertiveness vis-a-vis the President. Though the Army power structure claimed that it deliberately did not interfere, there are reports that Sharif has created dissensions in the Army, and that the Army chief was not confident of full support from his own senior subordinates. That such speculation is not far-fetched is proved by General Jehangir Karamat's formal statement that the higher Army ranks were not divided during the recent constitutional crisis. His having to make a public statement leads to obvious conclusions. Sharif is trying to convert the premiership into the sole power centre and the prospect has been critically debated in Pakistan these last two months.
Pakistan's economy is afflicted by low productivity and inflation. Its foreign exchange reserves were falling $206 million a week since late December. On January 8 they stood at a
mere $1.4 billion. Foreign debt on the commercial borrowing accounts is $4.85 billion. There is speculation about a further rupee devaluation. The main economic indicators are characterised by stagnation in some sectors and inflation despite the seven revival packages introduced by the Sharif Government since 1996.
The crisis of the infrastructure of Pakistan's national politics is a disappointment to those who welcomed the revival of democracy in Pakistan. The major political parties are faction-ridden and devoid of ideological integrity. Sharif is transforming the Muslim League (N) into his personal fief, according to Pakistani political observers. His concentrating power in his own and his relatives' and friends' hands is criticised, as is the role of his brothers Shahbaz Sharif and Mushahid Hussain. No party seems to have leaders with genuine grassroots support, nor are there dedicated party cadres, leaving aside sections of youth coming out of Madarsas with a theological orientation in politics and a
somewhat blinkered worldview.
A consensus is emerging that Sharif has moved away from his moderate, practical, consensus-building approach towards a more authoritarian and self-aggrandising mind-set. The consequence is a Pakistan facing a process of tense transitions. An unstable Pakistan can generate intensified adversarial attitudes towards India. One seriously hopes that Sharif will apply the brakes and revert to pragmatism and a commitment to democracy.
Copyright © 1998 Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Ltd.
