The import of the Chinese Army Chief's visit stems from the fact that China remains in possession of 14,000 sq km of Indian terrority. The India-China border dispute persiststhough China has solved similar territorial problems with her other two neighbours Russia and Myanmar. Also the Sino-Pakistan relationship involving technology transfer in missiles and nuclear weapons is critical to Indian security interests.

Chief of Army Staff General VP Malik mentioned at a recently concluded Army Commanders conference -- shortly before General Fu's visit -- that the progress on the longstanding border dispute has been slow. On the other hand, the Chinese Army Chief stated that the border dispute cannot be settled quickly. While talking to Indian reporters in New Delhi about the 1996 peace agreement and the delay on the border demarcation on the Line of Actual Control, General Fu said, ``We should not say this has been delayed. It is important for both sides to carry out a gradual realisation of the boundary demarcation.''

The Chinese have repeatedly stated that the ``time is not ripe for a settlement of the border dispute'' for their own reasons. Indian strategic analysts feel thatthis policy of dragging on the dispute since the early 1980s is only to keep the border a `live' issue. Even during former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Beijing in December 1988, the late Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping said that future generations could solve the border problem. Clearly this shows that the Chinese have no intention to solve the border dispute in a hurry with India.

Former Foreign Secretary A P Venkateswaran says: ``The Chinese statement about the time not being ripe only reflects their assessment that India can be taken for granted. And we have no leverage to hurt them. The Sino-Pakistan nexus is a manifestation of this attitude.'' The Defence Ministry annual report for 1996-97 referring to China states: ``India's concerns regarding China's defence cooperation with Pakistan's clandestine nuclear programme and the sale of missiles and sophisticated weapon systems by it to Pakistan, were conveyed to the Chinese side.''

Over the years, Chinese policy towards India has not beenexactly friendly judging by their actions and words. In 1979, Chinese hostilities against Vietnam coincided with then External Affairs Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's official visit to China. Vajpayee cut short his visit and returned to India.

Again in May 1992, Chinese nuclear tests coincided with President R Venkataraman's visit to Beijing. A Chinese professor speaking at a seminar on international relations in Colombo around this time expressed strong criticism against what he called India's hegemonistic tendencies in South Asia. These harsh realities cannot be ignored in understanding Chinese policy towards India. The question is while New Delhi desires friendly relations with Beijing does the neighbour want it too?

The Defence Ministry Annual Reports further adds: ``The progress that China has made in the recent years in augmenting her nuclear arsenal and missile capabilities will continue to have relevance for India's security concerns. Upgradation of China's logistic capabilities all along theIndia-China border for strengthened air operations has to be noted. China's posture in the South China Sea has implications for the region.''

Indian security and foreign policy towards China in the 1980s revolves around confidence building measures (CBMs) to manage military tensions along the Himalayan borders which are not clearly demarcated. In a sense such CBMs involve de-militarisation along the border and could be considered a short term approach to military security without taking into view long term implications.

Strategic analyst Bharat Karnad says that CBMs which curb strategic reconnaissance, large scale war exercises, electronic interference with each other's radio traffic and offensive patrolling are unexceptionable. He further adds the imprudence in withdrawing from strongly held strategic positions along the undemarcated border is highlighted by the terrain anomalies, which are stacked against this country. The 40 km withdrawal by India and China conceived presumably on ``as the crow fliesbasis,'' means that even as the PLA forward forces are carried back over an established network of motorable roads to more secure encampments on the Tibetan plateau, Indian forces have to negotiate a hard climb all the way from the heights down to around 6000 feet before vehicles can ferry them to the foothills, according to Karnad.

Chinese military modernisation, begun in the '70s, is slowly but surely taking shape and has a definitive bearing on Indian security interests. The recently concluded 15th Party Congress has officially announced its decision for a half million force reduction by 2000.

In airpower, the PLA Air Force is likely to outstrip India by 2000. While India would have only 30 Sukhoi-30 multirole fighters, China is expected to have 150-200 such aircraft at the turn of the century. The PLAAF has already obtained two airborne early-warning aircraft and plans to acquire two more such aircraft from Israel.

The Defence Ministry report states: ``China's strengthening defence relations withMyanmar need to be carefully watched in view of the geo-strategic location of Myanmar.'' The Chinese have set up naval bases with radar facilities in Myanmar capable of monitoring Indian military movements in the Bay of Bengal region.

Until the 1970s, the Chinese threat -- at a strategic level -- to India only manifested across the Himalayas but in the 1990s it has assumed maritime and aerial dimensions. Apparently a bureaucratic inertia characterises New Delhi's response to the Chinese air force and naval expansion. The Indian Embassy in Beijing has only a military attache or defence advisor (an Army Brigadier) with no air attache or naval attache to report on military related developments in China competently. This despite the fact that China is a major factor in the Indian security calculus.