Excerpts:

You have said that India should sign the CTBT. And yet it was you who took such a strong position against it?

It is not like a dharma that does not change. Our objection was that the treaty was neither comprehensive nor non-discriminatory. Nor did it ban all tests. When I say that now you should negotiate from a different position, I say so because it has been India's policy since Jawaharlal Nehru's time that all tests should be banned. The CTBT, as it is drafted, is a charade.

Now that we have established ourselves, we don't need these types of tests anymore. Other types of technology will come into play. We should now be willing to sit with the Permanent Five and discuss how to make the treaty comprehensive and non-discriminatory.

But we have to beaccepted as a weapon state by the others?

This has to be sorted out in discussion and we have to negotiate with the P-5. Now we are a nuclear weapon state. You can't unscramble an omelette.

You have said there was readiness in your time to take such an action. Why did you not do it?

I would not say we were ready. But since Narasimha Rao's time, it has been under consideration -- whether we should keep our facilities untested or we test their efficacy. Every prime minister applied his mind to it. It was considered in Deve Gowda's time and in mine also. In Narasimha Rao's time they came very close to it. The pits that have been used now were dug then. But every PM has to have a balance-sheet before him. It is a cost-benefit exercise. Everyone does not come to the same conclusion.

What was your balance-sheet?

In my balance-sheet, economic development was more important. Arms and ammunition alone do not make a country strong. Otherwise North Korea would have been a power today and theSoviet Union would not have collapsed. However, I saw the argument that the technocrats gave that tests were important for scientific growth.

You have talked about not making the nuclear issue a partisan one...

My way of looking at foreign policy is not in party terms. I made it a multi-party approach on issues like the CTBT or what has been described as my doctrine in relation to neighbours.

I wrote to the Prime Minister last night to make sure that the impression is not created that consensus on foreign policy has collapsed. The euphoria on the issue should not be partisan. If it is projected as a party achievement, the consensus would get fractured. I can understand you can't take people into confidence before the tests, but definite efforts have to be made to repair the consensus. It is extremely important to unify the nation. What has been tested was not made after the last election.

How do you explain the timing of the tests?

It is difficult for me to interpret it. They (the BJP)had put it in their manifesto.

But why now and not four months down the line? Do you see the BJP going in for an early general election?

Could be. May be that is part of their agenda.

Do you see it happening in the next two to three months time, say after the Budget session?

Possibly.

Had you anticipated the kind of international reaction that is now coming?

Whenever such a decision is taken, any policymaker must make it on the basis of the worst-case scenario. They must have done that exercise. No policymaker in his wisdom can ever proceed on the basis of the best case scenario, particularly on an issue of war and peace.

The Prime Minister has in his letter to heads of various countries explaining India's action come out very strongly against China?

If I was writing the letter, I would not have made it so pointed. I had discussed the issue with President Clinton when I met him last September. I told him to look at the country's geography with more than 1,000 milesof border with Tibet, where, I told him, going by your sources there are nuclear devices. Then there is Diego Garcia, which is nuclearised. We are very close to the Gulf which is littered with ships, some of them with nuclear weapons. There is Pakistan and American sources are telling us that they have a nuclear programme. You put yourself in my position, I said. Would you be oblivious to all this when desigining your security?

What did Clinton say?

He said, ``I understand your difficulty.'' After that he decided to come to India, and Madeleine Albright came and we built a new type of scenario in our relationship.

I deliberately avoided any mention of China or playing the China card. It is wrong diplomacy. We want to improve our relations with China sooner rather than later and sort out contentious issues.

In diplomatic initiatives, we should not look at any country as an enemy. No one can use nuclear weapons, no one should. Therefore, we have to act with a great deal of sobriety.

In my ownway I also gave messages, when I gave the Bharat Ratna to Kalam. He is the only living scientist and only Muslim to have got the high honour. He mothered and fathered several programmes.

Modern diplomacy has to be extremely subtle and Indian tradition is never to challenge or to talk loud or give up your basic commitment to peace and democracy and consensus on foreign policy.

You also wanted to move the focus of foreign policy away from Pakistan?

That does not mean shifting the focus from one country to another. Our area of interest is very wide, and includes improvement of relations with the US. Making it China-centric is playing into other people's hands and that is dangerous. We have no grievance against China. The centre-point of India's foreign policy is economic development.

Do you feel the United Front is still relevant?

The relevance of the third factor is there. But in the last few months, there has been considerable disarray. Every coalition arrangement undergoes a changewith new elections.

Would you favour a pre-election arrangement with the Congress this time?

I see nothing wrong in it. We had two governments with the co-operation of the Congress even though their longevity was limited. We have to make mutually acceptable arrangements though it is difficult to say what kind just now.