While establishing India's edge in the nuclear field in South Asia, the tests pose innumerable problems. Global isolation stares us in the face. There are fears that India, which has been a major player in this part of the world through the Non-Aligned Movement, etc, could now become a non-player. Tests could further confirm apprehensions in those parts of South Asia where India is seen as a regional bully.

As the country's security interests are at stake these issues are perhaps surmountable. But since nuclear weapons will alter the war calculus on both sides, it is militarily that India could lose out.

A nuclearised South Asia is particularly beneficial to Pakistan. In fact, since India enjoys a clear supremacy in conventional warfare, it is Pakistan which requires theweapon as a deterrent -- to offset India's superiority. For years a large segment of the population in Pakistan has demanded that the country should go nuclear to thwart Indian efforts, in their perception, to dismember it. It is for this reason that Pakistan is likely to spurn the offer of `no first use' of nuclear weapons.

India has now provided Pakistan with a reason to go nuclear and square up. Since the bomb(s) will catapult Pakistan -- so far the underdog -- to a level of near-parity, is it not a clear case of self-defeat for India?

The BJP has managed to captivate people with the line that the nuclear weapons will provide India with the much-required security cover. But will it? How will it allow India to take back its territory from China or help solve the Kashmir problem? Should China and Pakistan gang up aggressively, how will we cope, particularly with isolation from the West looming large? Moreover, pinpricks apart, was there an immediate threat to India's security from any quarter whichwarranted nuclearisation?

India's tests, followed by retaliation from Pakistan, have pushed both nations into extreme uncertainty. The mistrust that pervades both sides is a cause for worry. Given the brinkmanship known to grip the political and military leaders in Pakistan from time to time, this mistrust could prove perilous and could envelop the region in a nuclear cloud.

Since both India and Pakistan have also tested sub-kiloton devices, it can be presumed that they intend to have nuclear warheads for tactical weapons (short-range missiles and artillery guns). Union Defence Minister George Fern-andes and Pakistan Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan have indicated this.

The use of nuclear weapons in the tactical mode -- to attack field formations -- in particular presents a scary picture. In the Indo-Pak context, the number of collateral civilian casualties will be very high in the Kashmir and Punjab sectors, where the level of troop deployment is very high. Once the nuclear threshold is crossed thereis bound to be an escalation, whether steady or sudden, in nuclear weapons of all kinds.

Strikes on big cities followed by counter strikes will be the natural corollary. Unless one side can cripple the other's nuclear capability by preemptive strikes, mutual assured destruction (MAD) is imminent.

The other important point missed in the ongoing debate is the geographical proximity of the two sides. Because of this the effect of the use of nuclear weapons would be felt by the user country. Since Pakistan lacks geographical depth, the effect of the energy so released will be more on India.

The immediate impact of the blast aside, thermal radiation would do tremendous damage in the area. Of course, meteorological factors would decide the severity of this impact but, in any given situation, major parts of the border area, which are thickly populated with heavy troop concentrations, would be affected by radiation on our side.

This also takes us to the need not only to build strong command and control butalso the ability on both sides to understand each other's systems -- to avoid undue suspicion leading to misuse. This is particularly dangerous if tactical weapons carry nuclear warheads (when field commanders -- possibly at Corps levels -- would automatically gain some control). An all-out effort would be needed to ensure that weapons are not on `launch' mode.

As for cost benefits, despite going nuclear, reducing the size of the Army and conventional weapons both by India and Pakistan is unlikely till there is a tangible understanding between the two. This appears unlikely in the near future.

Having exploded the devices, as both sides prepare to nuclearise their weapons, one is reminded of a piece of advice one heard as a child. Having been brought up in a military family in the midst of small firearms, there was a tendency among the kids to carry around these weapons in an effort to show off. A family elder (of Atal Behari Vajpayee's vintage, and a veteran of the Second World War) was often heardsounding words of caution to kids against showing off with weapons. "Never carry a weapon on yourself till you are prepared to use it. Your opponent could force its misuse."

While the tests have provided the thrill and aplomb, the frill of deploying nuclear weapons is best avoided.