Similar views were expressed by vice-premier Qian Qichen and Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan in their meetings with the Sakigaki Party delegation from Japan and during talks with the visiting Sri LankanForeign Minister.The mouthpiece of the military, the Liberation Army Daily (LAD) carried on May 19 a page full of articles expanding on these themes. One accused India of adopting an ``offensive'' strategic posture and said that its goal was to ``dominate South Asia, contain China, control the Indian Ocean'' and become a major military power. Yet another, while attacking the views of George Fernandes, said that they are at odds with those of former prime ministers and ``even different'' from that of Vajpayee, and that they ``run counter'' to ``the wishes of the Indian people to develop relations with China''. Another commentary attributed nuclear tests to the domestic compulsions of the BJP.

It is very clear from these statements and the subsequent ``deep regret'' about Pakistan's tests a mild observation to paper over the Sino-Pak military nexus that Beijing still views India in the South Asian context, while exaggerating the implications of the tests for political dividend.It appears that Beijing was asmuch taken aback by the tests as other major powers. It was perhaps of the view that the Indian coalition government, despite its commitment to review the nuclear agenda, would not be able to test so soon after coming to power. Moreover, the scientific sophistication displayed by the different categories of tests to produce strategic, tactical and miniature theater-oriented weapons systems, may also have come as a surprise. Currently, there is indeed a debate in China on the implications of these tests for its security framework.

The debate in Beijing -- the contours of which are visible -- suggests that there is a differentiated perception of the tests and their implications. There is a view which suggests that the China threat is a mere pretext and actually India seeks global status. Another is that the weapons are directed more against Pakistan than China. On the other hand, one commentator has opined that China should increase its vigilance as such weapons mated with the Agni missile could reach areas``south of central China''. This implies that India's nuclear weapons will be an input in China's strategic framework.

Second, there is quite a bit of articulation now on China's no-first-use doctrine. This originated from perceived threats from the USA and the then USSR launching a pre-emptive strike on its nuclear facilities after it became a nuclear weapons power in 1964. It has undergone subtle modifications down the years to suit political requirements. In the current avatar there are two basic propositions that have remained constant for quite some time now. The Foreign Ministry statement on the Indian tests reiterated the position that China has unilaterally committed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries. Since India has declared itself a nuclear weapons state, is it an implicit message that it will be taken into account in China's targeting doctrine? Or will China abide by the other proposition that nuclear weapons will only find retaliatory use, a theme thatwas articulated by President Jiang Zemin recently in an interview to AFP? But he also accused India of targeting China and Pakistan. More significantly, one of the current commentaries (May 17) also observed that ``China will not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances''. To sum it up, the fact that India has declared itself a nuclear weapons state will indeed be included as a variable in China's overall nuclear doctrine, but China's position on no first use has perhaps not changed although some ambivalence is evident in the Foreign Ministry statement. Moreover, it needs to be noted that China indicated it had accepted the concept of the usability of tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons when it held a war game involving such a weapon in the Ningxia region in 1982. Taking this fact into account and the current doctrine of local, high-tech wars, one may also say that India's sub-kiloton tests will be perceived as tactical weapons capability and will became a part ofChina's tactical calculus. These trends suggest that there is a need for a nuclear dialogue with China to clear misunderstanding, if any, and to build mutual confidence.

One cannot accept with equanimity China's call to India to accept the NPT and CTBT regimes which are blatantly discriminatory. China became a party to the CTBT after 45 tests and for a quid pro quo from the US without jeopardising its strategic assets. It may be recalled that in the Sixties and early Seventies, China justified its nuclear weapons programme as a drive to smash the nuclear monopoly of ``imperialism and revisionism'', that is, the US and the then USSR. Having become a member of the nuclear club, it seeks to blackball other aspirants. It is like Casanova extolling the virtues of abstinence.

The current irritants should be seen as a brief interlude in the process of mutual confidence-building to find solutions to issues in other areas. India's nuclear weapons are defence-oriented, as indeed China's weapons are. On the basis ofthis reality the two countries should proceed to abide by, and carry forward, the agreements reached in the last ten years, beginning with the China visit of Rajiv Gandhi in 1988. The two most populous nations of Asia who share a common border a geostrategic reality have shared goals to pursue in meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century.

The writer is with the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses