The BJP's most significant foreign-policy and national-security decision was to conduct nuclear tests. It fulfills the manifesto promise of reversing the tendency of Indian foreign and security policies to bend under pressure. The tests fulfill the BJP's declared intention of bringing an end to nuclear apartheid and aim at ``claiming a premier position for the country in international relations''. They are a rejection of hegemonistic disarmament and arms control andtechnology regimes. The question is whether they will automatically ``ensure for India a role in world affairs commensurate with its size and capability,'' objectives mentioned in the BJP manifesto.

Though I support the tests, these objectives will be hard to achieve in the short term precisely because of our nuclear weaponisation. Instead of acquiring a role, we will suffer from comparative isolation for a time. This government's declared aim was to ``vigorously pursue endeavours for India to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council''. This has become a remote possibility, though on long-term considerations we have acquired a status which may influence the international community to invite us to become a member of the Security Council after the passage of time.

The objective of reorienting diplomacy to achieve our economic goals has not been implemented effectively. In fact a coherent foreign economic policy, which is of the utmost importance, has not been structured. Our foreign economicpolicies have been stilted by contradictions in the BJP's economic views: Kushabhau Thakre's advocacy of withdrawal from the WTO and the simmering debate between the advocates of swadeshi and of selective liberalisation. This has been compounded by international economic reticence post-Pokhran-II. We have yet to come to grips with the impact of sanctions.

Another important stated policy objective was a greater regional and civilisational relationship aimed at strengthening Asian solidarity and South Asian cooperation under the SAARC umbrella. Prospects for the former have been severely affected by the handling of relations with China since May. It may take five years, perhaps even a decade, to bring Sino-Indian relations back on track because of the way we linked the tests with ``Chinese threats''. This was a clearly avoidable goof. In international relations, managing ``what is'' is more important than ``telling it like it is''. Calling a spade a spade, without taking relevant factors into account, is notgood foreign policy. In South Asia, India will have to make special endeavours as Pakistan will generate suspicions about its weapons capacity.

As for African countries, India participated in the Organisation for African Unity Conference in May; Vasundhara Raje has visited African countries and some beginnings made to strengthen relations.

Instead of ``placing Indo-US relations on an even keel,'' which the BJP manifesto wanted, relations have gone into a spin. Subconsciously, the US may have greater respect for India's grit and spirit of independence. But it is not fully responsive to India's security concerns. Yet there is a partial recognition of our security concerns, as in the statement of US Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth in Congressional testimonies in June.

Economic, defence and technological cooperation with Russia has increased in the last three months despite Russian reservations about India's nuclearisation. The clearest manifestation of its long-term interests in India is thefinalisation of the agreement to supply a nuclear power reactor. India's relations with Europe, ASEAN, Japan, South Africa, Iran, the Arab countries and Israel and the Central Asian Republics show mixed results. Relations with Germany and France have been sustained despite differences on nuclear matters. With ASEAN, Japan and South Korea they have been in drift. Relations with the Arab countries, Iran and the Central Asian Republics seem to be on hold because of other immediate preoccupations. Relations with Israel are being maintained on the basis of complementary interests, but they are under pressure because of the ill-founded suspicions about Israeli-Indian nuclear collaboration which Pakistan is spreading.

Relations with Pakistan and China have begun to slide. Our inept conduct towards China has revived a more active strategic collaboration between it and Pakistan, and Myanmar has also got involved recently with its decision to buy trained aircraft from Pakistan for its Air Force. India has to copewith the declared strategic equation between China and the USA, affirmed during Clinton's visit to Beijing which focused on India. Our foreign policy has suffered from systemic and political contradictions in the last 100 days. The first is reflected in the diminution of the Foreign Office's role, with the Prime Minister's office becoming the dominant influence. And former Prime Minister Gujral seems to be assuming a parallel institutional role in foreign policy. His interacting with world leaders on operational matters, proceeding to Dhaka with a high-powered delegation at the same time that the Indian Foreign Secretary was visiting erodes the government's role. Vajpayee and Gujral should consider whether a parallel foreign policy mechanism is in the national interest.

The political contradictions are obvious. There have been contradictory statements on relations with Sri Lanka from the BJP ranks. The most recent controversy is about the government's official line that its claim is on the whole PrincelyState of Jammu and Kashmir, which contrasts with Jaswant Singh talking about the Line of Control as a possible line on which a solution could be forged. This muddies the potential negotiating stance with Pakistan, already burdened by history. The political management of the tests' fallout has been less than satisfactory. The first 100 days of the BJP's foreign policy has been subject to contradictions and some impulsiveness and lack of planning. Given its commitment to national interests and strengths, it needs to get its act together.