It is a nightmare game in which one unstable player can trigger mutual disaster. Psychological pressures are intense because the line between information and disinformation is razor thin. No risks can be taken. The stake is millions of lives.

The shock waves sent off by Chowdhary's statement in New York that Pakistan had planned a nuclear first strike on New Delhi in late April have begun to subside. But it helps to justify deterrent counter-measures recommended by nuclear strategists, irrespective of cost. These include early warning and anti-missile systems, dispersed hardened silos for retaliatory strikes, instant communicationsnetworks, an effective command and control organisation with a response time measurable in minutes. This is our first lesson in how the nuclear arms race accelerates.

Doubts have been raised about Chowdhary's statement. His role in the Pakistan nuclear establishment is contested by the Pakistan government. His knowledge of nuclear physics is limited. There are obvious spelling and language mistakes in the protest letter allegedly written by him and four colleagues to Altaf Husain, Chief Scientific Officer of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, before defecting. Yet the naive letter appears convincing. Referring to a high-level meeting at the Khushab Nuclear Research Centre on April 25, 1998, it states:

``Due to my presence as your assistant in the meeting, I have come to know about the decision Pakistan's Nuclear attack on India within next couple of days. Sir, as a Nuclear Physicist I am very well aware of the fact that usage of Nuclear Weapons and atomic bombs is very very dangerous...I believe thatit is my moral duty to make efforts as I can so to avoid the usage of Nuclear Weapons by concerned militant (sic) and Armed Forces of Pakistan.''

The letter requests the authorities ``to be restraint of the usage of so destructive Nuclear/ Atomic weapons. In case of no change of decision, we will go to public and will make every effort which will be possible to save the human being from such a huge Atomic Collision of two Countries''.

Chowdhary surfaced in New York a month after the alleged Pakistani decision to strike, which obviously was not implemented. His version is a chilling example of how misperceptions can lead to nuclear war. They had received intelligence reports that India was poised to attack their nuclear facilities; radar reported Israeli reconnaissance aircraft hovering near the site. The propensity to believe one's own propaganda seemed to confirm an Indo-Israeli conspiracy. So, a preemptive first strike on New Delhi and other Indian targets was cleared. Fictional or not, the scenario isfrighteningly credible. It purportedly occurred before India and Pakistan had unveiled their nuclear prowess. Now the interval between decision and execution would not be two days. Anyway, the worst did not happen.

One possibility is that Chowdhary was present at a nuclear war game which he took for real. Similar war games are undoubtedly played on our side. Much depends on whether we are to believe that he and his colleagues were motivated by opposition to nuclear war or a desire to settle in the West. The latter seems more likely but the former cannot be ruled out.

If the scenario was fictional, who master-minded it? Again, there is an intriguing range of possibilities. It could be the ISI because the picture of Pakistani nuclear readiness drawn by Chowdhary could aim to deter an Indian strike against its nuclear facilities as well as conventional attacks on terrorist bases in Pakistan-held Kash-mir. It would draw world attention to nuclear brinkmanship on the subcontinent. The CIA is anotherpossibility because the US is keen to dramatise the dangers of nuclear war. RAW cannot be ruled out because the publicity could help justify India's tests.

The multiple scenarios illustrate the complexities of negotiating the nuclear minefield. The risk is particularly great because geographical proximity leaves little time to decide whether or not a missile threat is genuine. The distance between the US and the Soviet Union allowed time for response. I was in New York covering the UN when the confrontation came closest to a clash during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. A blip on the radar screen was interpreted as an incoming missile. American missiles were readied for counter-strike when it was discovered that the blip was a bird.

A chance to inspect an underground silo in South Dakota, in which a Titan ICBM was encased, left the nightmare aspect of nuclear confrontation imprinted in my memory. Behind two sets of controls sat two men facing each other. The chamber was painted with stripes to minimiseclaustrophobia. On a signal from Washington, buttons pressed by them would unleash the nuclear-tipped Titan to its Soviet target. Both had revolvers. If one showed signs of pressing the buttons on his own, his partner had instructions to shoot him. The tension of their environment could cause mental instability.

There have been occasions when IAF interceptors were alerted because of suspicious blips on radar. They were interpreted as approaching aircraft until closer examination found them to be transcontinental geese. The missile age provides less time for reconsideration.

If India and Pakistan do not incinerate each other, the nuclear arms race will further impoverish a region with the largest number of destitutes. Without trust, a no-first-use agreement will lack credibility. But trust requires ameliorating the fears and pressures on the other side. There still is room for hope. Responsible journals on both sides have avoided jingoism and warned their governments of the dangers of nuclearrivalry.

Nuclear strategists will bring up China to oppose any move towards freezing nuclear weaponisaton. China by now has assembled a formidable nuclear armoury that can even threaten the US. But that has not prevented India from taking military steps to protect the Line of Actual Control when necessary. The wars in Korea and Vietnam showed that possession of nuclear weapons need not frighten an opponent armed with conventional arms. If we can come to terms with Pakistan, no adversary need be feared, even if nuclear-armed.