Vajpayee's meeting with Nawaz Sharif overshadowed deliberations at the tenth SAARC summit. The meeting was tense and sombre. The only concrete decision was to resume the Foreign Secretary-level dialogue. The Foreign Secretaries were asked to discuss the modalities for resuming the dialogue. The fundamental differences on talks remained: Pakistan insisting on priority to Kashmir, India desiring discussion in a coordinated framework on all issues. The fact that the Foreign Secretaries were asked to discuss modalities underlined the controversy about a ``separate working group onKashmir,'' with Pakistan insisting on one and India saying it was not necessary. The stalemate will continue when the dialogue is resumed. Pakistan wishes to project that bilateralism cannot work, especially before the next round of Indo-US talks and the Non-Aligned summit.

Misperceptions were generated in media reports that India had ensured that the summit would not touch on nuclear proliferation and security. All heads of government touched on the impact of nuclear weaponisation in two major SAARC countries in their main policy statements, expressing concern about regional peace and cooperation. Despite members' desire not to get involved in Indo-Pak controversies, Nawaz Sharif, as anticipated, dwelt on Kashmir and related it to regional and international tensions for which he accused India. In the process he also rationalised Pakistan's nuclear weaponisation.The stark contrast between Pakistani and Indian views on SAARC cooperation was expressed in their statements. Vajpayee stated that apprehensionsthat recent developments (read ``nuclear weaponisation'') caused a setback to the SAARC process were not valid. He affirmed South Asia's, particularly India's, commitment to accelerate development, and said India sought good relations with all neighbours. Sharif, in contrast, pointedly called for redefining SAARC's role and priorities. He said it could not remain indifferent or oblivious to the differences and tensions between members.The summit declaration of course refers to shared concerns and projects on which SAARC will act jointly. India announced it would remove restrictions on nearly 2000 imports from SAARC countries. SAPTA's full implementation and its evolution into SAFTA, however, remain uncertain due to the nuclear tests and Pakistan's use of them to divert SAARC's attention to issues of interest to itself. The summit's results remained devoid of creative dynamism. This is not a criticism but an acknowledgement of SAARC's inevitable predicament. Vajpayee's meetings with Chandrika Kumaratunga andKoirala were important not only because they were his first as Prime Minister, but also because sensitive issues still affect bilateral relations. India did not go to the summit with high expectations. Its proceedings turned out as expected.In some ways, Jaswant Singh's visit to Manila was more significant as it gave him a chance to meet senior representatives of the nuclear weapon powers which have been highly critical of India since Pokharan. One cannot help being bemused at Indian journalism's misplaced euphoria. Our correspondents in Manila made much of the ARF's final statement only expressing ``concern'' and ``deploring'' the tests and not ``condemning'' them. This became a diplomatic victory. One fails to understand this self-congratulation. Instead of abusing us openly, the statement abuses us in comparatively gentle language. The substance was criticism. This cannot be wished away just because we managed some verbal modifications in a draft.A matter of particular satisfaction is Sin-gh's discussionswith Madeleine Albright and Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Xijuan. This was the first direct personal interaction between a senior Indian political representative and the Foreign Ministers of these two global powers. Albright agreeing to the meeting indicates an American desire to revive political engagement, possibly to reconcile fundamental differences on nuclear disarmament and security policies. The meeting has provided further impetus for the next round of Indo-US discussions this month. It gave Singh a chance to explain the Indian view on these issues and aspects of Indo-Pak relations which interest the US. The meeting with Tang was the first contact with China after the downslide in relations since May. His statement after the meeting that India and China can jointly ``untie the knot'', and his affirming jointly with Singh that both countries would remain committed to bilateral discussions, is the first step in getting relations back on track. The process, though, will be gradual, because it is complex,born of the avoidable misunderstandings we created eight weeks ago.

Singh utilised the ARF platform to categorically affirm India's position on nuclear weaponisation. He said neither India's strategic deterrence nor its missile programme was on the negotiating table. He signalled India's willingness to generally adhere to the international non-proliferation agenda in saying India was adhering to the substance of the CTBT and was willing to do the same on the Missile-Technology Control Regime.India conveyed its willingness to join efforts for the recovery of ASEAN economies. Singh indicated India's desire for cooperation in developing human resources, specially in science and technology. The only influential individual excessively critical of India was Saizon, ASEAN's Filipino Secretary-General.

When Singh made the general offer that India would be willing to train scientists from ASEAN countries in the uses of nuclear energy, Saizon's churlish response was, ``It's okay as far as it is for peacefulpurposes''. Future prospects of our participation in ASEAN and the ARF will depend on how India handles relations with the US, China and Japan. If relations with them are stabilised, a similar process will follow in India's relations with ASEAN; if not, the prospects will be problematic.

The most necessary follow-up is for India to revive the dialogue with China on the basis of Singh's talks with Tang. It is worth remembering that Tang was the vice-minister (Foreign Secretary) who dealt with India between 1991 and 1996, the period of a significant thaw in relations.