As I write, I have before me both the data provided by Tamil Nadu and that given by the Central Water Commission's gauging station upstream of the Mettur Reservoir. The figures are for seven years, from 1991-92 to 1997-98. There are some minor differences between the two tables, but the overall picture is almost the same. With one exception, Karnataka has always provided more than the Tribunal required it to do.

Here, I shall quote only the figures given by Tamil Nadu itself. They clearly state that Karnataka provided 332.37 tmc in 1991-92, 367.40 tmc in 1992-93, 223.34 tmc in 1993-94, 372.64 tmc in 1994-95, 244.05 tmc in 1996-97, and 268.05 tmc in 1997-98.

I apologise for this deluge of numbers, but the point is that allthese figures are substantially more than the 205 tmc required by the Cauvery Tribunal's order. The sole exception was the drought year of 1995-96 when Tamil Nadu received only 183 tmc. (The Central Water Commission says 197 tmc.) Obviously, the Cauvery has enough water to satisfy the needs of both Tamil Nadu and Karnataka.

So what is all the fuss about? Senseless politics, that is what -- politicians in Karnataka have traditionally tried to make heroes of themselves by vowing never to "surrender" a drop of water to Tamil Nadu. But they can't hoard the water without flooding the state.

Since this uncomfortable fact can't be admitted openly, Karnataka's leaders have usually thundered in public even as they released the water quietly. This goofy imitation of Ebenezer Scrooge offers their counterparts in Tamil Nadu the ideal opportunity to play an equally spurious Oliver Twist -- even as they take the water they need.

It is a display of utter irresponsibility that serves the interests of politicians inboth states at the cost of embittering relations. So if there is any real chance of both sides coming to terms, there are sure to be some people who shall resent the end of this cosy arrangement.

Is that why Jayalalitha is making such a fuss today? Well, partly, but not entirely. To begin with, she knows the facts of the case perfectly well. She was, after all, chief minister of Tamil Nadu from 1991 to 1996, and I have given the date on the Cauvery waters for those years.

I am afraid the AIADMK doesn't have much of a case, a point amply proved on the afternoon of Saturday, the eighth of August. Union Law Minister Thambidurai was cau-ght by the media as he came out of Jayalalitha's Poes Garden residence. He readily obliged the cameras, announcing that the new accord on the Cauvery waters was against Tamil Nadu's interests.

"How?" came the mischievous question. Thambidurai was visibly taken aback. "Read our resolution," he snarled back.

Of course, the anger on the Cauvery accord may be simulated, butJayalalitha's fury at the BJP's behaviour is very real indeed. But what are her choices today? Making a grand gesture of withdrawing support is fine, but quite useless unless you have an alternative in place. Is Jayalalitha about to commit precisely the same error made by Sitaram Kesri last year?

The Congress simply cannot afford to join Jayalalitha on this issue. Being seen as taking Tamil Nadu's side shall spell curtains for the Congress in Karnataka. It may not even help revive the Congress in Tamil Nadu, where the AIADMK shall definitely walk away with lion's share of the credit.

Nor is the BJP particularly eager to appease Jayalalitha, and quite rightly so. The genesis of the Cauvery dispute is lost in the mists of history. (There are tales of Chola monarchs attacking the upstream areas for much the same reasons as those cited by Jaya-lalitha today.)

Remember that the Congress was in power in both states for several decades. Later still, both states were ruled by constituents of the United Front.None of them did anything wort-hwhile to bring the silly squabbling to an end. The BJP has done just that, in spite of the fact that it doesn't have a single minister in either Chennai or Bangalore.

By now, BJP leaders are used to the fact that a kind word from Poes Garden is as rare as a whole week without a power-cut in Delhi. But they are genuinely annoyed that Jayalalitha is trying to sabotage an agreement that could benefit two states purely for her own selfish reasons. The BJP is so annoyed in fact that it has pointedly refrained from sending an emissary to Chennai, the inevitable response to earlier crises.

If Plan A, the huffing and puffing over the Cauvery, didn't work, Jayalalitha was sure that Plan B would work. She planned to make an issue of the Jain Commission Report, trying to force the Congress into attacking Karunanidhi. But the Congress has learned its lesson after the last Lok Sabha polls. So when the Lok Sabha debated the issue, P. Shivshankar, the Congress's lead speaker, madeNarasimha Rao his target rather than Karunanidhi.

I am absolutely certain that Jayalalitha would have withdrawn support from the Vajpayee ministry if she had a firm assurance of Congress support. But Congress circles still perceive Jayalalitha as far too much of a maverick.

Of course, that is just as true of other potential Congress allies such as Mulayam Singh Yadav, Laloo Prasad Yadav, and possibly even Mayawati. All of them may cooperate with the Congress for the strictly limited purpose of bringing down the Vajpayee government. But what then?

Mulayam Singh Yadav has already announced that he wants to be prime minister. That intention rubs up against the ambitions of half a dozen Congressmen, not just Sharad Pawar and Sonia Gandhi. And in the long term, the Congress can't cooperate with the Samajwadi Party and the rest for the simple reason that it must wrest their voters away. How can the Congress reign supreme if it signs away Uttar Pradesh and Bihar -- home turf to both the Yadavs as well asMayawati?

Jayalalitha has a tough time ahead of her if she wants to convince the farmers of Tamil Nadu that their interests have been bartered away. She may find it no less difficult to convince the Congress of her sincerity.