The Japanese reaction to the Pokharan II was swift and hard-hitting. Dubbing the Indian tests as a challenge to the global nuclear order, Japan declared a freeze on grant aid, blocked all new Yen loans and announced its decision to maintain strict control on transfer of materials and technologies related to weapons of mass destruction.

Adding insult to injury, Japan spearheaded the attack against India at the G-8 summit, calling for punitive measures against those who violated international agreements. Worse still, then Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto appeared to be pushing for an internationalisation of Kashmir.

If India was piqued, so was Japan. With its tragic history of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese recoiled with shock and horror to India's tests. The anger ran so deep that the Japaneseestablishment initially refused to even talk to the Indian mission in Tokyo. Hitting out at what it saw as India's nuclear audacity, Japan recalled its ambassador in New Delhi for consultations and announced its economic sanctions. Talks between the two sides were called off; defence-related cooperation ground to a halt and allbilateral dialogue was put on ice.

Tokyo appeared more than a willing accomplice of China in leading the India-bashing in international fora. Indians were deeply offended by the Japanese behaviour. India has been one country in Asia that Japanese leaders could go to without an apology in their pockets.

No wonder then that South Block mandarins have frozen Japan out of its consideration. They are not yet ready to either forgive or forget Japanese transgressions in the hot summer of 1998.

New Delhi and Tokyo would, however, be unwise to let the nuclear bitterness linger too long. India must recognise that its tests have come at a very difficult moment in Japan's life andaccentuated its own security dilemmas.In turn, Japan must see that India is now a nuclear weapon state, and nothing in the world is going to change that status.

New Delhi and Tokyo must cool their tempers and face up to the new strategic context in Asia. The two countries have too much at stake and a lot in common to let the current impasse continue indefinitely.

Saner voices in the Japanese think-tanks and academia are already urging Tokyo to reconsider its policy towards New Delhi and begin a new engagement with it. Some Japanese defence analysts do understand compulsions on India, in particular its security concerns vis-a-vis China.

China casts an even darker shadow on the security calculus of Tokyo. As China transforms itself into the second most important power in the world, Tokyo is deeply concerned about coping with China over the longer term. But in characteristic fashion, Japanese officialdom is loath to discuss in public its threat perceptions on China.

India and Japan have a commoninterest in preventing the emergence of an Asia dominated by Beijing and in building a stable balance of power in theregion.

Energy security is another area for potential cooperation between New Delhi and Tokyo. Japan's dependence on energy exports from West Asia, makes India a natural ally in securing sea-lanes in the Indian Ocean. Japanese nuclear power equipment companies are also keeping an eye out on the Indian energy sector. With its own nuclear power market saturated, Japan is looking at overseas markets.

India and Japan share the same objective on global nuclear disarmament. Both countries have often voiced their support for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. If Tokyo really believes in its own disarmament rhetoric, it could find India a valuable partner.