Non-essential staff in the British and American embassies had already been evacuated. There were considerable anxieties in all the countries surrounding former Yugoslavia. Even Hungary was nervous on more than one count. People of Hungarian origin residing in Serbia had been hurriedly mobilised in the army by Slobodan Milosevic as the first line to cushion the attack.

NATO headquarters had alerted Budapest that the new air base in southern Hungary would be required on the ``9th'' day of the NATO action. If Hungarian territory was used to attack Milosevic's military machine, would the Serbian minority in Hungary create internal law and order problems for Budapest?

Everybody in these parts is relieved that NATO action has beenindefinitely postponed after an understanding was reached between Milosevic and President Clinton's special envoy Richard Holbrooke. This understanding is to be translated into a regular document setting out the steps that will restore a sort of status quo ante in Kosovo and ensure a return of the Kosovar refugees from the mountains which in the next few weeks will be covered with snow.

The reason why the negotiations between Milosevic and Holbrooke were so long drawn was the US envoy's insistence on a mechanism to verify Belgrade's compliance with the agreement. There will now be 2,000 men on the ground in Kosovo to monitor compliance. NATO reconnaissance aircraft will have access to Serbian air space to keep a close eye on any Serbian troop and armour movement in Kosovo.

There are two aspects of the agreement that are likely to invite comment in the coming weeks. A major humanitarian disaster has been averted and to this extent western intervention has been on behalf of ethnic Albanians who arepredominantly Muslims. But the intrusive diplomacy that the agreement entails, the extent to which it impinges on issues of Belgrade's sovereignty, is also no trifling issue.

There were two views on whether or not the UN Security Council had authorised action on this specific occasion. Is the international system not destabilised if some powerful countries assume the role of global policemen?That the Balkans continue to erupt along ethnic and religious lines will continue to surprise those not acquainted with the history of the region.

Of course it would be wrong to subscribe too hastily to theses that predict civilisations as the ultimate faultline for that final, catastrophic clash. But the history that is strewn in these parts, particularly in the hands of politicians bereft of any ideology other than nationalism, is also not terribly reassuring.

Even in civilised Budapest, with the echoes of Lizst, Bartok and the Danube, you are constantly reminded of civilisational quarrels. Church bells toll hereunfailingly at noon in pursuance of a medieval, Papal edict that church bells must toll at noon because it was at that auspicious hour that the Christian armies in Hungary defeated the Turks.

Barely 19 km north of Budapest, the exquisite town of Szentendre is a continuous reminder to its thousands of tourists that in the late 17th century Serbian merchants fleeing the Turks had set up this beautiful sanctuary on the bank of Danube.

In the former Yugoslavia, where the Ottoman empire left behind sizeable Muslim populations in its wake, this kind of a historical memory is simply mobilised for nationalist politics. That is what Bosnia was all about.

Traces left behind by the Ottoman were in conflict with the abiding influence of the Austro-Hungarians; Catholic Croatia was in conflict with orthodox Serbia; those with the axis powers during World War II (Croats) were adversarial to the allies (Serbs). Initially, the project of Greater Serbia brought the Serbs into conflict with the Croats.

A bishop in theCardinal's office in Zagreb enlightened me as to how the conflict had begun. He was asked by his Orthodox Church counterpart to escape because he (the Orthodox priest) had advance warning that the Catholics in the area would be ``ethnically cleansed'' that night. It was only later that the Serbs turned upon the Bosnian Muslims with all their ferocity.

There were fierce differences between the Europeans and the Americans on the one hand and among themselves on the other on how Bosnia was to be managed. The Americans were more sensitive to hostile opinion in the Muslim world. The European differences followed the axis vs allies pattern. In the end, when peace was put together in Bosnia, the Europeans could congratulate themselves that the EU, as an idea, had superseded their differences over Bosnia.

Compared to Bosnia, the west has shown greater urgency in handling Kosovo. First, the west was keen not to have a deep divide within NATO. Milosevic's continued ethnic cleansing in Kosovo would have broughtTurkey into conflict with Greece. Moreover, the gains the moderates appear to be making in countries like Algeria and Iran would have been exposed to risk if the hardliners in those societies had been given an occasion to cite western indifference to Muslim interests everywhere, including Kosovo.