After a break-down of civilian institutions, resorting to the army seems to prove that it is the only institution left intact in the country. Armed with a nuclear deterrent against external foes the army seems ready to participate in national reconstruction. Will this involvement change its mind about the security agenda that has contributed to the economicmisfortunes of the state? Let us examine the various scenarios of where Pakistan is headed today.

Economic experts are agreed that the current crisis of payments will not go away unless Pakistan radically alters its foreign policy agenda. The economy is not functioning well enough to finance the proper maintenance of the armed forces.

The armed forces are already feeling the financial pinch. Pakistan's recourse to the IMF is intertwined with its foreign policy involvement with the United Sates. Whatever relief comes from the IMF it will carry with it the burden of the West's non-proliferation agenda. If it signs the CTBT this year, the Muslim League government may be seriously destabilised by the agitational politics of the religious parties.

Real economic hardship, averted since 1990 through IMF bail-outs, may descend on Pakistani society and destroy internal security. The government will collapse under pressure and be taken over by the radical Islamist elements with the help of the army whose upperechelons will fragment in response to the Islamic challenge. After Nawaz Sharif, no one will be able to rule unless an Islamic military leadership puts a radical surrogate in control in Islamabad. This will bring about the radicalisation scenario that so-me people are putting forward: a merging of the Islamic warrior with the professional soldier.

The second scenario is that the army, after the involvement of its officers in the civilian government, will gain an awareness of the economic contingencies of the state. The change will take place inside the GHQ because the officers seconded to the civilian departments would be reporting to the COAS. The initial view may encompass only the administrative flaws in the civilian government but gradually the army will wake up to the actual burdens the national economy has to carry under the current security paradigm.

The problem with this scenario is that the Pakistan army, after improving the micro-economic picture, will find the macro-level problems impossible tounderstand. When it discovers that the economy will simply not respond unless fundamental foreign policy changes are effected, it will balk and return to its ivory-tower position on the national security paradigm.As the economic crisis worsens, the government may be challenged by the religious parties on the one hand and by regional movements for independence on the other. The PPP will continue to be pushed to the wall and may choose to assume leadership of the `oppressed nationalities'. It has so far kept clear of any commitment to PONM (Pakis-tan Oppressed Nations Movement) but seems willing to include it in the general anti-government front led by it.

It must, however, be noted that its vague PAI alliance with the religious party of Allama Tahirul Qadri on the one hand and PONM on the other is not holding well at present. However, some analysts are inclined to believe that Benazir Bhutto will decide in the fullness of time to lead the breakaway regional movements in Sindh, NWFP and Baluchistan againstPunjab.

What will be the army's response to this scenario? In this case, the army will be able to build up internal cohesion and side with the Punjab to put down the unrest following economic breakdown. The Islamists, by staying away from the `secular' PONM-like agitation, will emerge as power-brokers in Islamabad which the army will not be able to ignore. On the other hand, the army may not be able to cope with nation-wide internal unrest if it endures the initial crackdowns and begins to simmer.

Among circles who have reacted negatively to the army's trespass into civilian institutions, an elaborate conspiracy theory is being propounded. The Americans are in fact determined to destroy the Pakistan army because it obstructs their non-proliferation agenda in south Asia. The officers attached to the civilian institutions will be overtaken by corruption in time to start an internal rot in the armed forces. The army will finally be so discredited that it will lack the inner cohesion to stand up and opposethe American agenda.

General Jehangir Karamat was noncommittal when consulted by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif during the run-up period to the May 28 nuclear testing by Pakistan, signalling an inherent reluctance in the GHQ to stand by the old security paradigm that didn't work, or support the paradigm shift represented by the prime minister's option not to test. Therefore, the new policy, as imagined by the conspiracy theorists, is to involve the army in tasks that do not compel it to act clearly on its own volition through a decision-making process.

Conspiracy theories apart, the truth of the matter is Pakistan now finds itself forced to call in the army to perform civilian tasks. It hopes to return it as soon as possible to the barracks and avert the consequences of massive civilian redundancies in WAPDA by following up quickly with privatisation.

The writer is a noted Pakistani journalist. This article first appeared in `The Friday Times' (Lahore) where he is a columnist