It would be illogical to suggest that the strategic frontiers of the country have not changed in any material and political manner after the nuclear tests. The nuclear explosions have also made it imperative for a far closer co-ordination between the Defence and the External Affairs Ministry than was necessary hitherto. One function of change is the logical extension of strategic frontiers that can be given due expression through appropriate infrastructural means and through political gestures.

Insofar as this function is concerned, th-ere are at least five immediate areas, other than the ongoing process with Islamabad, where careful considerations will have to be made. In no particular order of priority they are: India's emergent relations with Myan-mar in which the terms of engagement are being sought to be defined; India's relations withSri Lanka; with Bangladesh; and with China.

In order to situate the review in its proper context, it is instructive to look at the approach to foreign policy issues before the nuclear tests. The Gujral doctrine was tailored to assuage the regional sentiments that had been generated with respect to the history of relationships India had with individual countries in the region. The very nature of coalition government led by Gujral, gave him disproportionate freedom to indulge himself in the conduct of foreign relations. This he could do without undue interference from the coalition partners who were less interested in the details of the conduct of foreign policy than they were in domestic policy. In the case of the Va-jpayee government the situation appears somewhat different. The government is comprehensively besieged in several fronts with regard to the fallout of the nuclear tests. Considerable diplomatic and political energies are being expended solely to ameliorate the pressures that are being brought tobear on the country with respect to India appending its signature to the CTBT. Even though Jas-want Singh took charge as foreign minister as late as December 7 last year, it is manifestly clear that his dialogue with ``key interlocutors'' is higher on his priority rather than micromanaging relations with the neighbours.

Before December 7, it may be recalled that most of the policy pronouncements in terms of security articulations was made mainly by Defence Minister George Frnandes, especially during the early days of this government. Evidence shows that his periodic pronouncements did not clarify India's position adequately. In fact, it may be recalled that the prime minister, who was for six months the foreign minister as well, himself took the trouble of rebutting a specific charge made by Fernandes, that China had built a helipad on Indian soil. The lack of clear thinking with regard to making foreign policy was manifest in the letter Vajpayee sent to President Clinton.

How, then, does all this affectpolicy? Does Sri Lanka, for instance, fall under the ambit of the redefined strategic frontier? If so, what are the spin-offs in terms of foreign policy with regard to Sri Lanka? What are the factors that go into the manifest articulation of this changed strategic frontiers and its attendant interplay? One factor of this interplay is the geographical proximity of the countries, the problems with respect to domestic insurgency situations and the likely impact within India in relevant geographical areas.

It cannot be, for instance, that the Sri Lankans could have overlooked the composition of the ruling BJP and its allies in the matter of judging the new government's approach to Sri Lanka. It is quite plain that Colombo would have been very keen to seek relevant amplifications, clarifications and even verbal assurances that the presence of Fernandes, for instance, and some other parties from Tamil Nadu, would not, in either word or deed, impact in any adverse manner on relations between the two countries.Further the fact that Fernandes was going to hold the sensitive portfolio of defence could not have gone unnoticed in Colombo. When the then information minister Sushma Swaraj visited Colombo on May 25, she was questioned on Fernandes' supportive statements regarding the LTTE. She replied, acknowledging significant divergences, ``Maybe the alliance partners may have different ideas on many issues but the government is working on a common programme.''

On December 28, President Kumar-atunga was asked at a Press conference in New Delhi if the presence of pro-LTTE elements in the government was not a source of worry. She replied: ``It is not a serious problem.'' Shorn of diplomatic garnishing, the fact remains that she conceded, publicly, that it was a problem, but she chose to downplay the magnitude. In the light of persistent reports that the MoD issued specific instructions on July 27 that made it difficult for the armed forces to interdict the traffic of vessels bearing contraband arms/ ammunitions/narcotics in a timely fashion and in the light of subsequent reports which reflect a lackadaisical approach to interdiction of such vessels, it appears that the government is, willy-nilly steering the Sri Lanka policy into unclarified, if not choppy waters. Does this constitute a political signaling? Can this then be a manifestation of an unarticulated security/foreign policy imperative/objective?

The author is Director, Research Group, New Delhi