Rashtriya Rifles was raised as a substitute for the Army's deployment on IS duties. Yet, it was a force in the Army's `garb', comprising mainly of men and officers drawn from it and retaining the ethos and values of the `olive green'. Deployment of RR units took tremendous load off the infantry battalions, many of which had been forced into pursuit of extremists during their much deserved `peace' tenures. It was also felt that in the bargain the Army would have three additional battle-hardened divisions, ready for rear guard action duringwar.

The initial RR battalions deployed in the terrorist-infested areas of Tarn Taran in Punjab and Anantnag in Jammu and Kashmir proved to be extremely effective. In Punjab, claims to the contrary notwithstanding, it was because of the deployment of the Army and RR units that the turnaround in the situation was possible. This, despite certain inherent weaknesses in the class and composition of the RR battalions.

The initial RR units were a `total mix' of troops from all over the Army and they were like `transit camps', with troops coming and going at regular intervals. There was little camaraderie and cohesion among troops. There were also numerous pr-oblems of administration and even of indiscipline. If the initial bat- talions performed well in hostile conditions, it was mainly due to the professional compete-nce of officers who were asked to lead them.

The decision to have the Union Home Ministry (instead of the Ministry of Defence) take over the burden of funding the RR was a step in the rightdirection. Similarly, the decision to alter the basic composition of the RR battalions was timely. Instead of its units comprising of troops from all over the Army, two RR battalions were made an integral part of each of the infantry regiments. Now not only are majority of troops of the two RR battalions drawn from the other units of the Regiment, but their Commanding Officer or the 2IC, is from the same regiment. This ensures not only functional cohesion but also the regimental esprit de corps.

This experiment has produced excellent results even while the units were deployed in the most difficult areas. While a few of the total of 36 RR battalions are deployed in the Northeast, most are a part of the two force headquarters in J&K - Victor Fo-rce in Awantipur and Delta Force in Doda.

Yet, there is need for further reorientation of the Rashtriya Rifles to make them more effective. It is common kno-wledge that even now the best of the officers and jawans with the ri-ght experience and tra-ining are notspared by the regiments for duty with RR battalions. While combating low intensity conflicts, most actions are either at the platoon or the section level and it is important to have the best trained and seasoned `junior leaders' leading the men into the fray. In a lot of places, they are pitted against highly motivated and trained mercenaries, who are guided by locals familiar with the terrain and topography.

Since tackling insurgency and terrorism is heavily dependent on intelligence gathering, frequent shifting of units engaged in the conflict should be avoided. There have been occasions when a unit was moved from South Kashmir to the LOC and then back to South Kashmir - all within six months.

The composition of RR battalions needs to be further modfied. Instead of troops from different units of a regiment teaming up to form the core of the RR battalions, two full fledged units of each of the regiments should be modified for the counter insurgency (CI) role for a period of two or three years. Suchmodifications by way of weapons, equipment and training is invariably done when units move from desert locations to mountains or vice versa. This will ensure greater cohesion since most men and officers would have known each other for a long period. In case of a full-fledged war, the same units on CI role can be used for rear area security.

However, in the whole process of refashioning of units for dealing with terrorism, the primary role of the Army - of fighting external aggression essentially - should not be lost sight of. The attrition rate of the Army's deployment in one form or another in counter insurgency operations is much too high. Look at the number of officers and men who have been killed in J&K in recent weeks. Unfortunately, mo-re and more of the Army appears to be gradually getting drawn into the low intensity conflict frame of mind.

Since a specifically designated force like the RR has been created for dealing with low intensity conflicts and insurgency, the Army should try and de-inductmore of its other units from J&K. The plan to send in even armoured and artillery units piecemeal to J&K, even though for short periods, so that infantry does not suffer alone, is misplaced. It is bound to have a detrimental effect on their training and performance in the years to come. At the crucial time, should our troops flounder in executing their operational plans, what good is rear area security alone?