George Fernandes is a political fighter given to speak out his mind. But lesson one of Kargil is that the defence minister sh-ould not speak. There is strength in anonymity at moments like this.

Nor for that matter should other ministers. Even with the utmost restraint, there is bound to be a difference of nuance if they do, and that can cause serious problems as we have seen in recent days. The ruling alliance has learnt nothing from its handling of Pokharan II. The cacophony that followed it only took away from its impact. Indira Gandhi's low-key statement of 1974 was more effective.

Even if the government had intercepted a message that the Pakistan army had kept the civilian administration and theISI in the dark, which is highly implausible and the message can after all also be a pl-ant, there was just no compelling reason for Fernandes to make it public. It is hardly the way to soften Nawaz Sharif, or to cause a rift in the Pakistani establishment, if that is what was intended. It only demoralises our forces.

There is a demand that Atal Behari Vajpayee shift George Fernandes to another department. Vajpayee may not be Jawaharlal Nehru who removed Krishna Men-on in the midst of the war with China in the face of mounting pressure from within the party. Nehru had the advantage of heading a one-party government while Vajpayee has to contend with a 16-party composition.

Nehru was confident that Krishna Menon will not say a word against him despite being ousted. For all his faults, Menon did not even exercise the right given to a minister who has resigned to give a statement in Parliament. The least that Vajpayee must ensure is that the flip-flop of the last ten days is not repeated.

Lesson number twoof Kargil is that caretaker governments should not be allowed to continue for as long as six months. The truth is that the timing of the elections became a political football between the government and the opposition. Though the Constitution does not distinguish between a caretaker government and a regular one, the fact is that the government has resigned after Parliament expressed a lack of confidence in it. The Lok Sabha, to which the government is accountable, stands dissolved. All this creates a lack of sanction for the government, and is an invitation to mischief makers to fish in troubled waters.

In retrospect, if it was a toss-up between a few lakh new voters not voting, because the electoral rolls are unrevised, and having a government without moral authority for six months, the former was clearly preferable. Today the decision of the Election Commission might benefit the BJP, tomorrow it could be the Congress. The EC has to lay down a policy framework. Revision of electoral rolls had after alltaken place only the previous year for the 1998 polls.

Lesson number three is that the country needs to evolve a well-integrated intelligence system. The Indian intelligence agencies have become like the astrologers who predict the event after it has taken place with an "I told you so". After every recent goof-up, the different agencies have tried to find an alibi that they had warned the government, and this is happening again.

The failure of intelligence on the capture of the heights in Kargil is not only specific to this government. It is also systemic in nature. There was a time when the Joint Intelligence Committee, which was supposed to collect and interpret the data sent by the various agencies, had been downgraded and every unwanted bureaucrat or policeman used to be shunted to it. Of late it had been integrated with the National Security Council.

The trouble is that they are no longer in awe of the executive authority. Indira Gandhi used to meet the heads of RAW and IB every morning. Vajpayeemeets them once a week on an average but the point is that they did not personally brief him about the situation which had been developing for sometime. If it is true that the PM learnt about the serious nature of the infiltration first from Farooq Abdullah, then it is something to worry about.

There is little doubt now that the government had let down its guard in the wake of Lahore. No government cannot afford to become less vigilant in this day and age of modern states which respect strength, even if a thaw in relations is taking place with another country. The tragedy is that any future initiative for friendship with an adversary will be viewed with distrust and suspicion by the people. That is going to be among the costly lessons of Kargil.

Finally, Kargil has underlined that operations in Kashmir are a low-cost affair for Pakistan and entail a high cost for India. The country will have to come to grips with this reality in the months and years to come.

All these lessons are however for a laterdate. The critical thing now is to end the discordant voices coming out of the government, which lead to confusion and demoralisation in the armed forces and in the country.