Survival at the expense of the very masses whose cause they are supposed to be championing. Also exposed is the arrant hypocrisy of the ULFA. It arranged the cold-blooded liquidation of Assamese troops taking the train to Kargil from New Jalpaiguri station. Having masterminded a few cases of martyrdom itself, it then published paeans to the Assamese martyrs of Kargil.

What a sad end for the champions of Assam to come to! But then, it was only to be expected, given that the Assamese movement was started on university campuses by indifferent students whocould see few employment opportunities for themselves and felt the sudden urge for pocket money.

The ULFA movement started off on the wrong foot. It was supposed to advance Assamese interests, yet it depended heavily on extortion for funds. This implied attacks on oil and tea interests -- the two leading industries in the state -- and the regular milking of the business community. This was bound to lead to pointless violence (the killing of Swraj Paul's brother, for instance) and panic reactions from the government (such as the evacuation of Doom Dooma).

In either case, the result had to be a slowdown in business and a withdrawal of capital from the state. It was only a matter of time before the middle class of Assam, who have the most to lose from a general slowdown, rebelled against the ULFA. Only two facilitating conditions would be required: curbs on ULFA activities and clear evidence that the organisation's objectives are repugnant. Operation Rhino provided the former condition, ULFA itself thelatter.

The people of Assam, the most populous state in the Northeast, have never been alienated from the mainstream to the same extent as some other subnationalities of the region. At a time when the entire national will was focused on Kargil, there was no way the ULFA could keep the people away from an Army recruitment drive in Assam. The fact that it tried only shows the extent to which it is out of touch with reality.

The time is ripe to end the insurgency in Assam. The credibility of the ULFA is in a shambles. In the international space, its paymasters are about as popular as Osama bin Laden. The continuing efforts of Operation Rhino have severely limited its mobility in India. Bhutan, its unwilling (and interim) host, is eager to see the ULFA cadres marching out of its territory, bearing their goods and chattels.

Beset from all sides and denied the local support on which it has always depended, the ULFA is in no condition to offer armed resistance to the Army. It only remains for the ULFA toappreciate this fact. Its refusal of the Army's offer for a ceasefire on the festival of Bihu indicates that it is yet to wake up to reality. What it now needs is a gentle shake, followed by an offer of terms.