While the force's basic foundation was shaky, given the hasty, ad hoc manner in which it was expanded in 1986, its constant overuse in the last 10 years has aggravated matters. A senior officer puts it succinctly: "If you stretch a piece of rubber, there is a limit at which it ultimately breaks. The BSF is being stretched to that point."

With the force being constantly requisitioned to handle internal security duties in addition to its basic task of guarding the borders, training has been the first casualty. Admits BSFDirector General E.N. Ram Mohan, "From 1991 to 1995, since all companies of our battalions were fully deployed, it was not possible to spare them for refresher training." Adds IG (Operations) P.C. Sabarwal, "If duties exceed capabilities, training is bound to suffer. Because of over-deployment, we have not been able to give in-service training to our officers and men."

Each serving man is supposed to undergo training for two months every year, but there has been no time for this. Apart from reducing operational efficiency, the lack of which has been highlighted by the Bandipore incident, this has compromised discipline within the force. Says a senior official, "A jawan is like a raw horse. The fibre of discipline is honed by regular training." In the last five years, the number of punishable offences committed by BSF troops has been alarmingly high (see chart).

Most disturbing are the cases of corruption among senior officers. In 1996, one was charged with smuggling narcotics in the Punjab sector andsentenced to a 14-year jail term. In 1992, a DIG was indicted in a case involving the seizure of gold ornaments in the Valley. The poor operational efficiency of the force owes to its constant over-utilisation. At present, of the BSF's total strength of 157 battalions, as many as 50 are exclusively on anti-militancy duty in the Valley, while seven are posted in the Jammu area.

Eight additional battalions were sent in recently to help fill the vacuum created by the departure of the Army to Kargil. Says a senior officer in the Valley, "The Army's departure has put us under a lot of stress." With its role and scale of operations heightened radically, the force has suffered a record number of casualties: five killed and 28 injured in just three months from May to July. According to Sabarwal, operational casualties did not exceed 50 a year earlier.

But this, according to a senior official, is nothing to gloat over. Casualties are low because of the troops' inherent reluctance to face enemy fire. As he putsit, "If you don't face the intruder, how will the bullet reach you?" On the other hand, in the past year, a number of BSF officers have been killed due to plain bravado. Last November, Commandant Vinod Sharma was leading a patrol in the Valley. On a hunch, he walked straight into a militant hideout, accompanied only by a constable and a sub-inspector. All three were killed, while just one militant died.

Last month, Assistant Commandant Dalal was killed in Kupwara under similar circumstances. A house had been cordoned off by troops in the dead of night. He then walked up to within 10 feet of the house and asked a constable where the militant was. The constable shone a powerful searchlight on the house. Immediately, there was a loud burst of gunfire in which the officer was shot in the eye. He died because he disregarded basic battlefield training.

Comments an official in the Valley, "We are ready to accept casualties but increasingly, the ratio is against us." This can also be attributed to what a seniorofficial calls "performance anxiety, a young officer's urge to be noticed." Plus, there is the accumulated stress of battling insurgency for a decade. Says a senior operations officer, "Work hours extend to almost 24 a day. Although no unit was meant to serve in the Valley for more than two years, in the last 10 years, every unit has served there as many as three times."

Rivalry between officers of different cadres in the BSF also leads to discontentment. Complains a mid-ranking official, "Although the representation of IPS officers is limited to 15-16, all of them are top-ranking people. I had to work under an officer who was 13 years my junior. If things do not click at the top level, they have to go wrong at the bottom."

In the coming months, the inherent flaws in the BSF are bound to be increasingly obvious. Admits Sabarwal, "The Bandipore incident has revealed that there was a breach of security. Due to excessive deployment, we were not able to devote adequate resources for perimeter security."