The official deadlock is a crude representation of two `national minds' trying to defeat each other. Foreign offices clash regularly with each other. Irreconcilable versions of events and points of international law fill the briefcases the diplomats carry to their meetings. The diplomat feels safe when there are no breakthroughs because these are interpreted as a softening of the irreducible official policy. The diplomat is triumphant when the talks break down. He can fly home andannounce how unreasonable the other side was, that he didn't give way and saved the nation's honour. That would make his job secure till the next encounter. His hawkishness is his badge.

If he is a non-Punjabi Pakistani or a non-Hindu Indian, he has to be more hawkish to cover his lack of constituency at home. An Agha Shahi or a Salman Hyder will ensure the most definitive deadlock, after which bilateral official diplomacy will have to be postponed for some time to drain the atmosphere of poisonous fumes.

The track-2 process has it own complications. It depends for its tenor on whom you choose for the unofficial dialogue. You can choose doves with new-fangled variations on the Indo-Pak theme and achieve a session where most disputes are amicably resolved. But such optimistic ornithology gets you nowhere with the governments that view the process as a stab-in-the-back operation organised by `foreign powers' pursuing their own imperialist agenda. Or else you can choose hawks from the private sector heavilymassaged by the foreign offices. Then you can easily reproduce the official deadlock.

India and Pakistan have not been able to hold track-2 dialogue on their own. American and European donors shell out money to get `unofficial' citizens to talk about bilateral disputes. Both states are suspicious of this `third-party' presence. Foreign donors mix hawks with doves to produce the variation of point of view needed to get the discussions started.

They are aware that a good sprinkling of civil and retired military hawks wi-red to foreign offices and intelligence agencies will make the dialogue meaningful. The mixing of do-ves and hawks from both sides has a complex internal chemistry. It is the do-ves who become jittery in the face of their more su-re-footed hawkish compatriots. The dove has developed his own variant view in isolation and knows that back home most people think him a traitor. On the other hand, the hawk is frankly confrontational, sure of his brief and subliminally hostile to the compatriotdove. Group psychology takes over. It becomes important to stay ``with one's own people''. Most doves trim their variant point of view a little to cleave to the group identity.

What happens to the tough dove who will not give ground is quite cruel. His variation on the theme is not liked by the hawks on the other side too because of their maximalist position. After all the hawk is there to get everything or nothing. Then the dove faces the unspoken wrath of his own side. Put together the hawks on both sides, and you have more than a half of the session arrayed against the dove. The dove is treated to a delicate process of shunning from both sides at dinners.

Does that mean that the doves get together and face the ordeal together? No. The dove is an individualist. He has arrived at his independent point of view in isolation from his national environment. He has been frequently told that his articles smell of compromise with the enemy. He has been accused of supporting `foreign' solutions, thus aligninghimself with the American or European agenda. All doves have st-ances with a very fine internal clash of views. This prevents them from standing together. In fact, it is quite possible that one do-ve may dislike the posture of another dove so much that he may prefer to join the hawks on an issue.

The doves become more and more dishevelled as sessions proceed. They run the risk of getting marginalised as the hawks wrestle in the central arena. After three or four meetings, they start becoming stand-offish, unable to embrace the hawkish agenda but equally reluctant to take on their entire quorum. That's the time they start dropping out. The organisers sense it and find replacements. The next stage is all hawk.

The hawks, expert in their field because of the back-up they get from their governments, gradually take the dialogue to its narrow focus. The academcis on both sides have been ta-med, their papers doctored to suit the state that employs them in universities. The official deadlock has beenincrementally reproduced, barring a few picayune `concessions' that are then stated in brief handouts given to the press. After that, the foreign donor, many tho-usand dollars lighter, decides that the dialogue has run its course and switches off the money.

But something else happens too. The hawks, psychologically secure in their status as loyal Pakistanis and Indians, strike up a chemistry of their own. Strangely, the retired generals do it quicker than the civilians. It is like a pause in the battle during which the combatants compliment each other on bravery. The chemistry also works on the civilians, usually among retired diplomats with a friendly style. The failed track-2 revived when governments feel compelled to talk to each other `differently'. The serving diplomat is simply incapable of carrying the new message. If he is consulted, he is more likely to caution against making a gesture that could be interpreted as `giving ground' by the other party.

In a way, the psychology of communicationbetween India and Pakistan is quite simple. Don't talk till the other side has become weak. When under pressure from America to talk, just go through the motions, primed for the creation of another diplomatic deadlock. The wisdom of offering concession to the weakened side is not in the books of Asia. When the other party is down, become tough and wait for it to give in.

The best time to get `soft' is when the other party is down and out. Save the Asian `honour' of your foe from being sullied and you can get far. When minds are similar and mutually suspicious you can't get them to see alien wisdom. If scared outsiders have a leverage, they can coerce the two minds to posture differently. The track-2 process has never looked good on either side, but it is working insidiously within the foreign `conspiracy' to get India and Pakistan to see wisdom that is not indigenous.

The writer is a noted Pakistani journalist. The article, abridged here, first appeared in `The Friday Times' (Lahore) where he is acolumnist