Our perceptions regarding China have been coloured by the negative, antagonistic and disdainful views about India held by the Chinese leadership till Deng Xiaoping advent to power. Besides transforming the Chinese polity and economy, he initiated a new and practical approach towards India. The result was a gradual improvement in bilateral relations from 1979 to 1998, the high points being Vajpayee's visit to China as Foreign Minister in 1979,Rajiv Gandhi's visit in December 1988, Narasimha Rao's visit in September 1993, and the visits of Prime Minister Li Peng to Delhi in December 1991 and President Jiang Zemin in November 1996.

The broad undercurrent of this process of normalisation was of expanding bilateral relations in the economic, cultural, technological and scientific spheres while continuing to discuss the political issues, about which there were differences of opinion, the most important being the boundary question.

The process was interrupted by the Indian nuclear weapons tests and the strategic and political justification given by India for having taken the step, mentioning Chinese nuclear capacities and China's defence cooperation arrangements with India's neighbours, Pakistan and Myanmar, as a factor. The period between May and September 1998 witnessed acrimony and distances between India and China which are being overcome gradually through high-level contacts between the two countries.

China's primary focus in the short andmedium terms remains on managing internal political and economic criticalities despite all the achievements that China can claim over the last two decades. It is acknowledged that China faces problems of internal movement of populations, unemployment, food security and intra-regional economic and developmental imbalances. These would remain challenging during the early decades of the next century. These being their primary concerns, China wants to ensure an atmosphere of stability and strategic equilibrium in its neighbourhood. The inclination towards assertiveness and external projections of power would be tempered by China's internal predicaments.

Subject to this overarching situation, the specific factors which could affect Sino-Indian relations in terms of mutual strategic perceptions could be: discernible Chinese threat perceptions about India becoming a base for secessionism in Tibet with international support; potentialities of an Indo-US or Indo-Russian strategic collusion against China; tensionsbetween India and Pakistan, which could impose responsibilities on China in the context of its close relationship with Pakistan; India's nuclear and missile weaponisation which has been underpinned by declared concerns about China's inclinations and a general strategic concern about what China calls Indian `hegemonistic' tendencies.

The Indian threat perceptions are: China's defence cooperation with Pakistan and Myanmar; the possibility of a strategic encirclement of India; tensions on the line of actual control and the dispute about the boundary problem, on which no substantive progress has been made despite the agreements of 1993 and 1996; China's questioning of India's territorial integrity, with Chinese maps still depicting India's international boundaries inaccurately; Chinese nuclear and missile capacities in a hostile axis with Pakistan, profoundly affecting India's security interests; China's generation of non-proliferation pressures on India, compounding all these threat perceptions.

There havebeen reports that the meetings between Foreign Ministers Jaswant Singh and Tang between September 1998 and last June have resulted in a significant decision for bilateral discussions on strategic and security matters. The mutual apprehensions detailed before could form the subject matter of such a discussion at both the ministerial and official levels. The process could be oriented towards a practical bilateral relationship with two objectives: first, to take initiatives to remove the mutual concerns listed and, secondly, to give an impetus to cooperation on broader issues, on which there is a convergence of views and interests.

The Chinese are not averse to UN reforms and making the Security Council more representative. Both India and China are opposed to intrusive internationalism. Leaving aside China's opposition to India's nuclear weaponisation, there are possibilities of cooperation to work against discriminatory arms control and disarmament regimes. Both countries share concerns about the rise ofreligious and ethno-linguistic separatism. There are shared concerns about trans-border terrorism and narco-terrorism. If China is genuinely concerned about ensuring regional stability, China should be able to tell Pakistan to desist from military adventurism and adjust to the ground realities in Jammu and Kashmir.

One has ventured to be prescriptive because, despite the objections raised by the Chinese to some of the points of Indian concern and apprehension during the October discussions, there was acknowledgement that the general factors affecting Sino-Indian relations as described here are valid. There is acceptance that these factors are complex and have to be tackled with patience and deliberation. A beginning can be made by taking initiatives to build an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence. These initiatives could be the expeditious implementation of the 1993 and 1996 agreements, giving high priority to define and delineate the line of actual control.

Simultaneously, the security dialoguecould be commenced including military and non-military issues between the two governments on an early date. A purposive effort for the development and expansion of bilateral trade and economic cooperation could contribute to the process.

There is an invitation pending for our President to visit China for nearly a year now. Further meetings of the Joint Working Group and the exchange of visits between party and economic delegations are scheduled. Now that our new government is in position, new beginnings could be made to stabilise our relations with China, which are of particular importance in the regional strategic context.