It is apparent that both sides will be forced to build up their conventional fo-rces, despite possessing the nuclear deterrent. With Pakistan raising the stakes in Kashmir and Defence Minister George Fernandes making a pitch for raising the defence allocation to three percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) from the present level of 2.3 percent, the region is poised for fresh militarisation.

The two countries could push their missile programmes, add to theirconventional military thrust by renewed mechanisation and also ensure that every inch of the ground under their control is safeguarded. On top of all this will be the ultimate deterrent - the nuclear umbrella.

In the light of this, the earlier move by our Army to cut down the size of the ground troops now looks misplaced. In fact we have been forced to raise a new corps headquarters for the Kargil sector, which indicates a return to the old concept of ``defending every inch of the land''. In addition, two more `force' headquarters have been ra-ised for counter-insurgency (CI) operations in J&K.

The main fallout of the Kargil conflict will be on the defence services. The in-house Ar-my inquiry by the Chief of Staff of Northern Co-mmand into the Kargil episode has already be-en completed and the Army is in the process of initiating certain measures. Some of its findings, which are being processed, are an eye opener. For example, certain officers were reportedly promoted and posted in key positions in theArmy following either political interference or court directives. Num-erous lapses, such as the one which led to the destruction of the ammunition depot in Kargil by enemy shelling, have been exposed and further courts of inquiry are likely to be ordered.But there are mixed lessons from Kargil.

The junior infantry leaders, particularly young officers, did an excellent job. Other arms and services like the Engine-ers, the Signals and the Army Medical Corps too did an excellent job.

Now it is known that due to the increased emphasis on mechanisation and counter-insurgency (CI) operations, the weapons and physical training of the soldiers had suffered. The setting up of a high-altitude commando tr-aining institute near Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh is timely. Ca-lled `Parbat Ghatak Sc-hool, this is located at a height of 15,000 feet and would train officers and jawans in all types of mountain warfare.

Operations in Ka-rgil also exposed a ha-rsh reality. Many commanding officers of ba- ttalions were too oldto influence the course of action in close battle. Unfortunately, the increase in service by two years is bound to have a further debilitating effect on the age profile of infantry battalions. Similarly, the institution of junior commissioned officer (JCO) calls for a review. Except in one or two battalions, it was the young officers and not the seasoned JCOs who led their men into the fire.

Kargil proved beyond doubt that th-ere is greater cohesiveness and esprit-de-corps in battle in infantry formations which have either a single or fixed class composition.

Shortage of officers is seriously affecting the functioning of the Army and this was evident in Kargil. Many of the officers had to be rotated from one operation to another with different battalions to direct artillery fire.Like the earlier Indo-Pak conflicts, Kargil too proved that more than the weaponry it is the manner in which the equipment is used that is crucial.

The Bofors gun played a major role in influencing battle, particularly whenused in direct firing role in the Drass Sector, where posts like Tololing, Point 5140, and Tiger Hill were visible through bi-noculars. However, the employment of such guns in direct firing role in the Ba-talik sector where the enemy locations were not visible was an ill-advised move.

Similarly, the need for light automatic weapons was felt during the Kargil conflict. Our infantrymen found it cumbersome to carry the medium machine guns (MMGs), light machine guns (LMGs) and automatic grenade launchers (AGLs).

A certain amount of prioritisation of equipment purchase is paramount. For example, the Pakistan Army was able to bring about accurate counter-bombardment with the help of gun locating radars, which was responsible for more than 50 percent casualties in some areas. It is unfortunate that such radars which were tested nearly two years ago had not been acquired before the outbreak of hostilities.

More than anything else, Kargil provided an insight into the continuing unorthodox military approach ofPakistan commanders, something which is missing in our military approach. As a senior officer put it: ``There is a doctrinal difference; while we limit our grandiose plans to sand models, the Pakistan commanders don't hesitate to execute them on ground.''