It ain't no dirty word

It ain't no dirty word
J N. Dixit

Prime Minister Vajpayee and Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah have had their first round of talks on autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir, following the contretemps about the state Assembly resolution. Was Abdullah precipitate in having the resolution passed? Given the signals about the Government of India starting a dialogue with his opponents, the Hurriyat, and the need to maintain his credibility in the context of his electoral promises of 1996 and 1999, Abdullah could not avoid this preemptive act.

The second question: do the demands made in the Autonomy Report and the subsequent resolution reflect the aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir? Do they offer a practical solution to the Kashmir problem, domestically and in relation to Pakistan?

The demand to go back to the pre-1953 status may reflect the aspirations of a segment of the people in the Kashmir Valley. But autonomy demands as envisaged in the Assembly resolution do not reflect the aspirations of the people of Ladakh and Jammu, two major territorial components of the state. While the people of Jammu and Ladakh will oppose them, the more assertive secessionist elements represented in the Hurriyat and their allies will up the ante, making demands bordering on secession.

The third question is whether the Union Cabinet was right in firmly rejecting the resolution. The government could have been more measured if it had reacted in the spirit of the initial, sensible statements by L. K. Advani and Vajpayee: the resolution would be considered by Parliament and there would be discussions. The Cabinet's abrupt rejection gave a handle to secessionist forces to question the central government's sincerity and Abdullah's capacity to respond to aspirations in the Valley. Vajpayee has tried to make amends by engaging Abdullah in a dialogue. It should aim to decentralise power and delegate authority to the people of Kashmir to let them manage their own affairs without eroding India's territorial integrity.

There is a school which argues that any devolution to Kashmir or other states would result in the Balkanisation of India. This is alarmist. The separation of any part of India from the republic on the basis of religion, language or ethnicity will certainly initiate the Balkanisation of our country, with its pluralistic civil society. But a structured devolution and granting of autonomy will strengthen the polity and sustain Indian unity.

Our collective response to the changing nature of our civil society must take into account historical realities as well as current public aspirations. Some truisms merit repetition. The Indian republic itself emerged not as a readymade homogeneous successor state to the British Indian Empire. It was constituted by the knitting together of the British Indian Provinces and the more than 500 Princely States. The Constitution took into account the full diversity of India. The Centre kept residual powers but the states had much delegated authority. The polity was conceived as a federation with a strong Centre to ensure unity in the initial years. Kashmir, Hyderabad, Goa and Sikkim became part of the republic between 1948 and the early '70s. India's territorial identity has been evolutionary.

Kashmir's accession took place in special circumstances. Maharaja Hari Singh, originally aiming for independence, acceded only when he realised that his dream was going to be destroyed by Pakistan. His decision did not represent the view of the Kashmiri people. This is why Nehru had separate negotiations with Sheikh Abdullah to define Kashmir's status given that Abdullah and his National Conference were the most representative entities.

The agreement between Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah of July 24, 1952, and the agreement signed between Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Abdullah on February 24, 1975, represent the evolutionary process of Kashmir becoming an integral part of India. This was a linear and gradual process and did not result from coercion or abrupt political decisions.

The 1952 Nehru-Abdullah Agreement was inspired by events in Kashmir and discussions at the UN between 1948 and 1952. Both Abdullah and Nehru wanted and expected the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the parts of Jammu and Kashmir which remained in their hands. There was a commitment to hold a plebiscite to determine the state's future status after Pakistan fulfilled its UN obligations. It was only when it became clear that Pakistan had no intention of doing this that the leaders of India and Kashmir began the process of integrating Kashmir into India.

Whatever the ups and downs and political controversies of this process, the fact remains that elections were held both for the Assembly and Parliament in Kashmir. The constitutional and procedural changes in the relations between the Centre and Kashmir between 1952 and 1975 had the support of the elected governments of Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah generally accepted this position though he had reservations about some aspects of integration, which led to negotiations between him and Indira Gandhi after preparatory work by Mrs Gandhi's Adviser G. Parthasarthy and Abdullah's colleague Afzal Beg.

The resulting agreement of February 24, 1975, endorsed the integration of Jammu and Kashmir into India. Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, conferring a special status on the state, was to remain in operation. All residual legislative powers remained with the State Assembly. But Parliament would exercise overriding powers to make laws and prevent the disruption of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of India and secessionist activities that eroded the Constitution. The provisions of the Constitution for the state were to be applied with respect for the special circumstances in the state. Only those provisions would be unalterable which affected the unity of India. The question of the nomenclature of the Governor and Chief Minister was not insisted upon by Abdullah at the time.

Kashmir's constitutional crisis is a result of the Government of India (read ruling parties) from the beginning of 1980 not implementing the 1975 agreement faithfully. Besides, the constitutional arrangements on the relationship between Jammu and Kashmir and India did not pay enough attention to the separate identities of Ladakh and Jammu. The result is the demand to return to pre-1952-53 arrangements. This cannot be accepted at this time politically, constitutionally or in security terms. Nor can demands for trifurcation or `Azaadi' be accepted. The solution is purposeful discussions to grant autonomy to the state in the framework of the Sheikh Abdullah-Indira Gandhi Agreement. Devolution and autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir first must be followed by decentralisation and autonomy for all states if the unity of the Indian republic is to be sustained.

Kashmir's constitutional crisis is a result of the Government of India not implementing the 1975 agreement faithfully since the beginning of 1980