Of Ants And Men

INFANTRY: A GLINT OF THE BAYONET
Lancer
Price: Rs 1,695

GAURAV C. SAWANT

‘‘Those Indians were crazy. They came like ants. Our fingers got tired of shooting at them... they just kept coming.’’

— A Pakistani soldier in Time magazine on the Indian infantry in Kargil.
Is this what the infantry is all about? Like ants? Soldiers climbing peaks only to be cut down by a hail of bullets? Does the infantry have no strategy to capture peaks other than by getting slaughtered and hoping that the enemy would run out of bullets and the last man would then fly the infantry standard?

It would seem so since the Pakistani soldier’s quote has been emblazoned prominently in the infantry’s pictorial history book. And the outgoing chief of the army staff, General Ved Prakash Malik, swore by the book, hoping the youth would read it and join the army.

The Pakistani soldier’s broken quote goes on to say: ‘‘We... suffered a lot of casualties.’’ India too suffered more than 524 casualties, and 90 per cent were infantry soldiers. Should the infantry learn to win battles without committing harakiri?

The predominantly pictorial book begins by emphasising the importance of the infantry in battle. Despite third wave warfare, precision guided munitions, sub-metre resolution satellites, it is the man behind the gun who is the battle-winning factor. Undeniably, the infantry is the queen of the battle. However, in their attempt to eulogise the infantry, the writers grossly underplay the importance of other arms like artillery or armour.

It is, for instance, stated: ‘‘Babur defeated an army 10 times the size of his own. He used his well-trained infantry to provide a strong defensive base. It enabled his cavalry to attack the flanks, thereby routing the enemy.’’ Every student of history has read in his textbooks at school that Babur’s artillery was the battle-winning factor. In fact, in India the artillery was used for the first time in the first Battle of Panipat in 1526. It created havoc among the forces of Ibrahim Lodi. This is glossed over here by the authors and dismissed in a passing reference much later.

The book also does not tell the whole truth. About the bravery of the infantry soldiers in the 1962 Sino-Indian war, it is mentioned that in Ladakh ‘‘they remained undefeated.’’ While there is no disputing the bravery of the Indian army, the infantry was not undefeated in Ladakh. In Daulat Beg Oldi the soldiers retreated. Of course, they did not flee from the battlefield, like they did in NEFA.

While the book’s main motive, according to the army chief, is to encourage youth to learn about the army and join its ranks, brushing uncomfortable facts under the carpet or twisting history is bound to be counter-productive in the long run. Youth joining the forces influenced by puffed up images of the army are more likely to be disillusioned when they learn bitter truths about routs and defeats of the queen of the battle.

Commissioned by the infantry, the book details the battle-winning role played by the infantry in every war since Independence. But did the infantry do it alone? Isn’t it high time that military writers addressed the combined effort that goes into winning wars? Could infantry soldiers have won Kargil without Bofors guns pounding the peaks in advance? Or without doctors tending to injured soldiers or air force and army pilots telling them about enemy concentrations?

Notwithstanding these points of criticism, the book is a visual delight. It provides an insight into the dedication of the infantry man on the battlefield. The picture of Generals K.M. Cariappa and Srinagesh sitting on a rock in Zojila after the 1948 Zojila operations and the infantryman battling the forces of nature at the Siachen glacier are a treat.

Back | Next