February 15, 2001

Why Congress is appeasing BJP

The Congress enables the Vajpayee government to have all the appearances of stability

At a homely dinner, one friend asked: “How do you see the political scenario evolve over the next few months and years?” First, said the host, you must not take your eyes off the presidential election due in 2002. He seemed to imply that Atal Bihari Vajpayee might be a candidate for the republic’s highest office. For this to be achieved, co-ordination with the Congress might be an essential pre-condition. What, then, will be the quid pro quo?

For those observing Congress behaviour over the past decade or so, there is nothing new in the line of speculation. In the recent past, the Congress has contained within itself two distinct attitudes to the Sangh Parivar.

In Kerala, K. Karunakaran always found the BJP a useful ally in containing the Left Front. In MP, the party had no alternative but to fight the BJP. These parallel tendencies could be contained so long as the Congress was in power at the Centre. But once Congress lost at the Centre, having vacated vast spaces to the BJP in the Hindi heartland and to the regional parties elsewhere, it was under pressure to choose between the two tendencies.

It could take the philosophical view that its current decline was consequence of recent mismanagement particularly in its social policies by P.V. Narasimha Rao and gang, hold its ground, however diminished its numbers, refurbish its image in the opposition, untainted by any coalition, and allow a leadership to emerge which had the potential of catching the nation’s imagination.

The other alternative was to make a swift shift. Recognise its rapid decline and make alliances with leaders of the social groups who had defected from the Congress, the party of which they were once the backbone.

There was, of course, the third temptation. This entailed a contemplation of the social groups which had defected from the Congress as class and caste enemy, a force out to disrupt the national equilibrium which the Congress represented. The caste structure and the Congress, in this framework, were coterminous.
The BJP was the beneficiary of the Congress Party’s total inability to read the tectonic changes that were talking place at the social base.

Let us not forget that the BJP, a tight cadre based party, exploded into a national movement against the backdrop of the Mandal-Mandir conflict. The upper castes, feeling the heat of Mandal, found the tattered tent of the Congress insufficient to accord them protection. They crossed over to the BJP.
The Congress, accustomed to power, arrogant, aloof, found itself unable to respond to the new political and social demands.

The BJP, on the other hand, had been in the field since 1953, had a whiff of power in 1967, and tasted it temporarily in 1977. When a series of opportunities came its way since 1996, it immediately got down to some quick social engineering. Mayawati’s stint as chief minister of UP was the signal that the BJP as party of governance would have to swiftly widen its social base. Bangaru Laxman’s elevation as party president is a sharp move in recognition of that reality.

Sonia Gandhi shunned coalitions at the Panchmarhi session of the Congress in September 1998. It made sense but only in the short run, because elections were due in November in MP, Rajasthan and Delhi where the contest was a direct one between the BJP and the Congress. No coalitions were required. The Congress won.

Various interests, including caste interests, interpreted the results in the three states as an endorsement of "no" to coalitions for all times and in all circumstances. It was an absurd line particularly in a state like UP.

The aversion of the Congress to coalitions had the effect of completely marginalising the Left in the affairs at the Centre. A stable third front was not possible without the Left participating in it, and the Congress supporting it.
A Congress-led coalition was not possible because, first, the Congress itself was averse to coalitions and secondly, the potential coalition partners would face all manner of contradiction since they were in direct conflict with the Congress in at least eight states.

Sheer pressure at the grassroots levels was pushing the Congress into arrangements in Bihar and Maharashtra. If the party had taken the realistic line that it would consider coalitions on a case-by-case basis, these adjustments would have come across as astute, realistic politics. But against a general posture of arrogant aloofness, these efforts at coalition have had the effect of confusing the picture. The party neither stands out on its own in bold relief, nor does it look like an energetic coalition builder.

The Congress today has a wishy-washy image, its most redeeming feature being that it enables the Vajpayee government to have all the appearances of stability, the hiccups within the NDA notwithstanding.

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