Battle for the mind

Ajai Shukla

The ceasefire in Kashmir has been called off and a new strategy initiated of engaging the Musharraf regime. It is not sufficient, however, to announce a strategic initiative and then sit back and await reactions. Any good strategic plan must not only unleash a new set of dynamics, but also contain the means of adjusting, tweaking and fine-tuning the unfolding situation, in order to continuously direct it towards a desired end. Now that Pakistan has been addressed, it must also be pressured.

Notwithstanding India’s insistence to the contrary, there are, in fact, three parties to the Kashmir problem — India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri people. Eventually, Pakistan has to be incorporated into any long-term solution, if only because she physically occupies one-third of the state and wields clout even on Indian territory through her proxies, the jehadi groups and the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC). While India and Pakistan are locked into inflexible positions, the entity of ‘Kashmir’ is more difficult to identify and deal with due to its polarised and fragmented condition. The mainstream politicians are alienated from the people, largely discredited, and concerned more with their safety and material comforts than with serving the masses. They tread a carefully calibrated path somewhere between autonomy and secessionism, balancing just sufficient nationalism to stay on the right side of the Constitution with enough separatism to stay alive in militant territory. The remarkable absence of assassinations of mainstream political leaders in J&K is due less to the well-known abilities of the J&K Police than to a militant decision not to target them. Presently useless as levers to influence events in Kashmir, the mainstream politicians will sit on the fence and jump onto the side of nationalism when militancy appears to be dying down.

The APHC is a divided house. Once the Pakistani and militant position is moderated, the APHC will be willing to participate in the political process within the state. Until then they need to be contained through constant engagement, but cannot do much to favourably influence events on ground.

The next set of actors is the militant groups operating in the state. The indigenous Kashmiri groups like the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and large portions of the Hizbul-Mujahideen (HM) would probably participate in the later stages of any settlement as evident from the unilateral ceasefire declared by the HM in July 2000. However, the majority of terrorists operating in the state are pan-Islamic fanatics, well beyond the pale. Sworn to die in endless jehad, these groups oppose any settlement short of total independence from India. To negotiate with them is to bestow on them an aura of strength. They have to be physically eliminated on the ground.

Due to little success in dealing with representatives, the only option available to the Centre is to reach out directly to the people. The potential of the Kashmiri public to influence the situation is enormous and radiates in all directions. The mainstream politicians and APHC leaders will have to reflect popular emotion or risk being marginalised in any post-conflict settlement. The security forces have struggled for a decade, in ever-increasing numbers, to eliminate militancy, but are not yet in sight of this goal. The day the common Kashmiri turns his face on the jehadi groups, that species will become extinct as quickly as the militants did in Punjab once the populace decided that peace was a better lifestyle. Despite this, no direct and concerted attempt has been made on the feelings of the Kashmiri people. The common person lives on a tightrope — death in an encounter or cross-fire yawning from one side and a throat slit by the terrorists from the other.

Paying, as they now are, the soul-price of their Faustian pact with the international Islamic terrorist network, they will accept help in extricating themselves, provided this comes from a quarter that enjoys some legitimacy in their eyes. To gain this the government must create conditions where the people can justify to themselves, without humiliation, the acceptance of less than what they had demanded and sacrificed and fought for.

All insurgency manuals in every professional army lay primary emphasis on WHAM! Winning Hearts and Minds. The quest for a higher body count, however, has sidelined that understanding in Kashmir.

With its massive deployment of security forces, the Central government already has in place a statewide infrastructure immune to terrorist coercion. Transforming their present adversarial relationship with the local people into one of trust, confidence and respect will open the faucet for the intelligence required for eliminating terrorists. Since the beginnings of insurgency in J&K, the over-riding emphasis of the security forces has been on killing as many terrorists as possible, regardless of civil-military relations. While arguably necessary initially, this approach has obviously proved counter-productive in the long run, since terrorism still flourishes and has indeed expanded substantially. A new operational philosophy has to be implemented, which measures success not in terrorist corpses, but more in terms of the goodwill generated by the forces.

While implementation of this new operational philosophy will initially bring down statistics of terrorists killed, the benefits will soon accrue. The first of these is seizure of the moral advantage. Over a period of time, greater transparency will inevitably build up further the international pressure on Pakistan to stop supporting terrorism in Kashmir. The next advantage will be the completion of small community development projects. Their implementation by army engineers and units will create not only goodwill for the security forces and development on ground but also create employment for locals, who might otherwise swell the ranks of the terrorists. Army doctors can take medical treatment to remote and inaccessible areas. Similarly, the security forces can assist in education, organising sports events, creating school infrastructure and a host of similar activities that will bring them close to the affections of the locals.

At no stage of this strategy should counter-terrorist operations flag. However, a rigid code of interaction with locals must bar any kind of intimidatory interaction with locals. When intelligence does start flowing, it must be acted upon with dispatch in order to build confidence. But at all times, it must be understood by all commanders on the ground that performance is not being measured by the number of terrorists killed, but by the relationship established with the locals.
Building a political consensus on Kashmir and placing it outside the cut and parry of day-to-day politics will reduce the chances of being deflected from the overall aim. This is especially important when faced with the sensational acts of terror that the jehadi groups will resort to.

The security establishment is likely to protest the imposition of restraints on its activities and has already railed against ‘the destruction of the intelligence network’ during the cease-fire. Sections of the forces, particularly those who have operated for extended durations in Kashmir, will argue that the Kashmiris will never embrace the Indian cause, being inherently pro-Pakistani.

These arguments, all emerging from a narrow tactical perspective, do not hold merit. The primary aim of people-friendly operations is the creation of a reliable intelligence network and the forces will soon start reaping the benefits of committed informers. Regarding the proclivity to Pakistan that some believe the average Kashmiri to be born with, it is worth remembering that terrorism did not exist in the state for over forty years. The Kashmiri youth only picked up the gun when successive governments failed to address the problems of the state.
The people of Kashmir are the centre of gravity of that conflict. They are exhausted, frustrated and ripe for being won over by magnanimity. The time to do it is now.

The writer is a retired army officer who has served in Kashmir.