Peace lies beyond the LoC

Kanti Bajpayee

While it makes good sense to be cautious about the future of Jammu and Kashmir, an overly pessimistic and conservative view could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. In fact, there are areas of agreement between Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris that point to a way ahead.

Four areas of agreement exist. First, India and Pakistan oppose outright independence for J&K. Pakistanis want a plebiscite on the status of Kashmir, but they expect and would like the state to join Pakistan. It is doubtful that Islamabad would accept a truly sovereign Kashmir. Second, no one is happy with the status quo. Even Indians admit that things have to change after a bloody 12-year rebellion in the state. Third, Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris concede that a final disposition of Kashmir must involve all three. Fourth, and crucially, most Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris do not want the Line of Control (LoC) converted into an international boundary (IB). The Indian Parliament’s resolution of 1994 attests to India’s opposition. Pakistan’s rejection of the idea is well known. And the most powerful voices in Kashmir are adamantly against partition.

These agreements are a base on which a long-term, seven-part settlement can be built. First, rejection of the LoC’s conversion into an IB is the central principle on which a solution should be constructed. All three parties would accept that the LoC will remain in place without prejudice to the final disposition of the state, whenever that may be.

Second, at the same time, the LoC would be “transcended” by the institution of “soft borders”, that is, by entry points allowing for the flow of goods and people. This would restore a common social and economic life to Kashmir and even a shared municipal life. Kashmiris could come together to plan for local public services and facilities, including power generation.

The third element is autonomy in both Kashmirs. India and Pakistan would, in parallel, give Kashmiris autonomy as in the original Indian constitutional dispensation. New Delhi and Islamabad would have authority only over defence and foreign policy. Accompanying this new constitutional structure would be free and fair elections. Elections would be conducted by the respective national election commissions and monitored by an independent group of Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris. Both India and Pakistan would commit to regular and proper elections.

Fourth, on Kashmir’s defence and foreign affairs, India and Pakistan would work together and with Kashmiris. The joint defence council that operated briefly after Partition could be revived for the purposes of consultation and coordination between New Delhi and Islamabad. Kashmiri representatives would also sit on this council. Internal security would primarily be the responsibility of the Kashmir police. Similarly, on foreign affairs, Kashmir would abide by treaties and agreements signed by India and Pakistan and would be consulted on future agreements. New Delhi and Islamabad would collaborate on crucial external issues as they arose. A solution to Siachen and Wular/Tulbul would be part of the new collaboration. In addition, Kashmir could be given some kind of “international personality”.

Fifth, the diversity of Kashmir needs recognition and accommodation. Jammu, Ladakh and the Northern Areas would become “Union Territories”. These would be administered by India and Pakistan in cooperation with local bodies modeled on “autonomous councils”, as in various parts of India.

Sixth, Kashmir would be demilitarised. This means the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani military and paramilitary forces from the state. Law and order would be the responsibility of the Kashmir police. New Delhi and Islamabad would have to be content with the notion that, if anything went drastically against their interests in a military sense, they would still have the capacity to intervene massively in Kashmir.

Seventh, conditions would have to be created for the return and restitution of Kashmiri Pandits who left the state and lost their livelihood and property. It goes without saying that any future political structure for Kashmir, on both sides, must be protective of minorities such as the Pandits, Sikhs and Buddhists.
The time has come to move ambitiously ahead on Kashmir. General Musharraf and the Indian Prime Minister can do more than convene ‘‘talks about talks about talks’’. Accepting the LoC for what it is, and yet going beyond it, is feasible. The two leaders must seize the moment.

(The writer teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)