Killing fields of Kashmir

Pakistan’s agenda, India’s pain

A MONTH after the Agra summit, the need is to examine as to where India and Pakistan go from the impasse which occurred in the city of the Taj. First, one should look at the official pronouncements about what is planned for the future of bilateral dialogue. There has also to be an assessment of what will actually happen in terms of bilateral discussions. Policy pronouncements by the two governments are characterised by a certain amount of contradiction and ambiguity. In their Press conferences on July 17 both Abdus Sattar and Jaswant Singh described the summit discussions as useful. They attempted to rationalise the failure to agree on a joint declaration in terms of certain last-minute complexities and lack of sufficient time.

This damage control exercise has, however, proved to be tentative and still born. General Pervez Musharraf in his widely publicised press conference unhesitatingly laid the responsibility of the failure of the summit on the Indian government, nuancing this approach with personal praise for Prime Minister Vajpayee. More significant was his assertion that all other facets of Indo-Pakistan relations can be attended to only after India agrees to discuss the status of Kashmir within the framework of Pakistani objectives. He indulged in brazen mendacity asserting that Pakistan is not giving any support to terrorist mercenaries and secessionists, and claimed that they were indigenous ‘‘freedom fighters’’ comparing their activities with the struggle of the Palestinians and secessionists in Chechnya, Kosovo etc. He questioned the sanctity of the Line of Control by declaring that the ‘‘LoC in J&K is the problem,’’ and cannot be a basis for any future solution.

We have been strangely adulatory in our post-summit policy pronouncements on Pakistan. After giving initial indications of the prime minister adhering to his acceptance of Musharraf’s invitation and about continuing other political and official level contacts, we stressed that the summit failed because Pakistan was not willing to accept the reality of cross-border terrorism and its role in nurturing this terrorism. Foreign minister Jaswant Singh’s statement in Parliament on August 6 accurately defined our perceptions of Pakistan’s policies by stating that ‘‘the root of the J&K problem lies in Pakistan’s compulsive and perpetual hostility towards India, arising out of the two-nation theory’’. As far as the continuation of Indo-Pakistan dialogue goes, there have been general indications that Vajpayee and Musharraf might meet on the margins of the forthcoming meetings of the SAARC summit and the UN General Assembly.

But as far as Vajpayee and Jaswant Singh going to Pakistan in response to invitations extended to them are concerned, signals are that no definite time-frame has been envisaged for these visits. The visits can come about only in the context of the ground realities as they evolve in J&K and in Indo-Pakistan relations. India’s foreign secretary Chokila Iyer is likely to meet her counterpart Inam-ul-Haq in Colombo this week. However, I do not think the foreign secretaries could initiate any qualitatively innovative steps to push the process of bilateral dialogue forward. It must also be noted that leaving aside the futile cogitations on Kashmir, Pakistan refused to discuss the even more important and critical issue of nuclear risk reduction. The singular mantra chanted by Musharraf was ‘Kashmir’. And that also had to be discussed on his terms.

Pakistani policy pronouncements over the last two months have rejected the relevance of the Shimla agreement and the Lahore process. Much was made about the lofty views expressed by Musharraf in the visitors’ book at Rajghat about non-violence and about the irrelevance of military solutions in his banquet speech at Rashtrapati Bhavan on July 14. But his words did not match deeds as Pakistan-sponsored violence occurred in J&K even as the summit was taking place. The litmus criterion on the basis of which the prospects of a positive and purposive dialogue can be assessed is the situation on the ground as it has evolved and is evolving after the summit.

Pakistan has rejected all the unilateral efforts for confidence-building measures which India made during the summit. The suggestions about liberalising the travel facilities and visa regimes were rejected out of hand. Pilgrims going to Amarnath have been attacked by Pakistan-backed terrorists. Levels of violence perpetrated by them against civilians have increased in ferocity and frequency after Musharraf’s return to Islamabad. Heavy exchange of fire has resumed along the ethno-religious affiliations and identities of the people of Ladakh and Jammu, asserting that they are subject to the over-arching Islamic identity.

India on its part has announced that it is not going to issue any new invitation to the Hurriyat to come for a dialogue. An invitation already exists. Initiatives related to the ceasefire in J&K since November last and the nomination of K.C. Pant to initiate special dialogue with the people of J&K have not taken off because of strings being pulled against such rational discussions from Pakistan.

Vajpayee aptly assessed Pakistan’s India policies in his address to the national executive of the BJP on July 28 when he stated that Musharraf came to Agra as a military man with a specific self-serving goal and was not serious about restoring peace. An inescapable conclusion is that there is not even a tentative meeting ground on the substance of political issues at discussion between India and Pakistan. It is not willing to accept the objective reality of its supporting secessionist forces against India. More importantly, Pakistan is not willing to pull back from giving this support. Third, Pakistan has decided to continue its undeclared war against India not only in J&K but in other parts of our country, which leads one to a more critical conclusion that the macro-level agenda of Pakistan is to generate centrifugal impulses in India on communal lines and to disrupt Indian economy and stability aimed at the fragmentation of India.

After all, Gauhar Ayub, former speaker of the Pakistan national assembly and son of Field Marshal Ayub Khan, had publicly stated in 1993 that peace could be achieved only with the break-up of India into smaller units. In a way he echoed the strategic designs of the British Imperium at the time of the Partition which India neutralised due to the genius of Sardar Patel and the syncretic and secular political vision of Jawaharlal Nehru.

The Agra summit had only very marginal achievements. Indo-Pakistan discussions should certainly be continued but Vajpayee and Jaswant Singh should make haste slowly about going to Islamabad given the ground realities and misplaced political obduracy and presumptive confidence of Musharraf.